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When a chess grandmaster performs a brilliant move, she may think of herself as a genius.
But that move would never have been made without the lessons of her previous mentors
and the pressure of her opponent. When an athlete wins a gold medal, she may think
of herself as superior. But nothing would have been achieved without the training of her
coaches and the support of family and friends. When a scientist has a breakthrough, she
may think of it as her greatest achievement. However, that breakthrough is the result of
her standing “in the shoulder of giants”, as Newton brilliantly realized.
No achievement in life is performed alone. We are a product of our interactions with
our family, our friends, our masters, our colleagues and collaborators. We learn and
grow with everyone around us, no matter if they are intentionally teaching us or not.
We survive thanks to everyone around us, no matter if they are playing as friends or as
antagonists. Life is a product of our struggles, and of the hands that pull us up when
we fall, the hands that point the way forward when we are lost, the hands that push us
ahead when we stop.
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Abstract
This thesis introduces a novel paradigm in artificial intelligence: decision-centered team-
work. Decision-centered teamwork is the analysis of agent teams that iteratively take
joint decisions into solving complex problems. Although teams of agents have been used
to take decisions in many important domains, such as: machine learning, crowdsourcing,
forecasting systems, and even board games; a study of a general framework for decision-
centered teamwork has never been presented in the literature before.
I divide decision-centered teamwork in three fundamental challenges: (i) Agent Se-
lection, which consists of selecting a set of agents from an exponential universe of possible
teams; (ii) Aggregation of Opinions, which consists of designing methods to aggregate
the opinions of different agents into taking joint team decisions; (iii) Team Assessment,
which consists of designing methods to identify whether a team is failing, allowing a “co-
ordinator” to take remedial procedures.
In this thesis, I handle all these challenges. For Agent Selection, I introduce novel
models of diversity for teams of voting agents. My models rigorously show that teams
made of the best agents are not necessarily optimal, and also clarify in which situations
diverse teams should be preferred. In particular, I show that diverse teams get stronger
as the number of actions increases, by analyzing how the agents’ probability distribution
function over actions changes. This has never been presented before in the ensemble
systems literature. I also show that diverse teams have a great applicability for design
problems, where the objective is to maximize the number of optimal solutions for human
selection, combining for the first time social choice with number theory. All of these
theoretical models and predictions are verified in real systems, such as Computer Go
and architectural design. In particular, for architectural design I optimize the design
of buildings with agent teams not only for cost and project requirements, but also for
energy-efficiency, being thus an essential domain for sustainability.
Concerning Aggregation of Opinions, I evaluate classical ranked voting rules from
social choice in Computer Go, only to discover that plurality leads to the best results.
This happens because real agents tend to have very noisy rankings. Hence, I create a
ranking by sampling extraction technique, leading to significantly better results with the
Borda voting rule. A similar study is also performed in the social networks domain, in
xv
the context of influence maximization. Additionally, I study a novel problem in social
networks: I assume only a subgraph of the network is initially known, and we must spread
influence and learn the graph simultaneously. I analyze a linear combination of two greedy
algorithms, outperforming both of them. This domain has a great potential for health, as
I run experiments in four real-life social networks from the homeless population of Los
Angeles, aiming at spreading HIV prevention information.
Finally, with regards to Team Assessment, I develop a domain independent team
assessment methodology for teams of voting agents. My method is within a machine
learning framework, and learns a prediction model over the voting patterns of a team,
instead of learning over the possible states of the problem. The methodology is tested







They may sound your praise and call you great,
They may single you out for fame,
But you must work with your running mate
Or you’ll never win the game;
Oh, never the work of life is done
By the man with a selfish dream,
For the battle is lost or the battle is won
By the spirit of the team.
(Edgar A. Guest)
Teams of agents have been used for taking decisions while solving complex problems
in many important domains. For instance, in machine learning ensemble systems have
been widely studied, where the output of multiple classifiers are aggregated into a final
classification [Polikar, 2012]. Recently, in the artificial intelligence literature, aggregating
the opinions of multiple people has been receiving considerable attention in the study of
crowdsourcing [Mao et al., 2013, Bachrach et al., 2012]. Similarly, multiple agents have
also been used to make predictions, in the study of forecasting systems [Isa et al., 2010].
Such decision-centered teams have been explored even for board games [Obata et al.,
2011, Soejima et al., 2010].
One of the first works to study team-decision making was in 1785, when Condorcet
[Condorcet, 1785] analyzed the guarantees of a jury doing majority voting to make a
correct verdict, assuming a binary problem (guilt or not guilt) and identical jury members.
More recent works in the social sciences literature emphasize the importance of diversity
when forming (human) teams, such as Hong and Page [2004], and LiCalzi and Surucu
[2012], that study models where agents are able to know the utility of the solutions, and
the team can simply pick the best solution found by one of its members.
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In machine learning, however, the main focus has been on how to best divide the
training set across different learners [Polikar, 2012]. In social choice, the complexity
of computing the output of voting rules and of manipulating elections has been widely
studied [Bartholdi III et al., 1989a,b, Davies et al., 2011, Yang, 2015], but that still does
not guide us on how to form the best voting team. Teamwork models are also a major
part of multi-agent systems research, but the focus is on assigning tasks to agents with
different capabilities, in order to maximize the expected utility of the team [Nair and
Tambe, 2005, Guttmann, 2008].
Hence, in this thesis I introduce the concept of decision-centered teamwork to study
domains where a set of fully cooperative agents is used to take decisions into accom-
plishing a common goal. Decision-centered teamwork is the analysis of agent teams that
iteratively take joint decisions to solve complex problems. This thesis is the first general
study of decision-centered teamwork. When forming such teams, we must not only se-
lect agents, but also design aggregation mechanisms and domain-independent methods
to assess the performance of a given team. Hence, I divide decision-centered teamwork
in three fundamental challenges: Agent Selection, Aggregation of Opinions and Team
Assessment.
• Agent Selection is picking a limited number of agents to form a team. Previous
work in social choice considered a single world state [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005,
List and Goodin, 2001], which would lead us to expect the best team to be the one
composed by the best possible agents. I show [Marcolino et al., 2013] that this is not
true, and it is fundamental to also consider diversity when forming teams. However,
my first diversity model only presents necessary conditions for such phenomenon;
therefore I present a second, more general model of diversity [Marcolino et al.,
2014b], where I can predict that diverse teams perform better than uniform teams
(i.e., copies of the best agent) in problems with a large action space. Additionally, I
perform a study of diverse and uniform teams for design problems [Marcolino et al.,
2016a], where the focus is to maximize the number of optimal solutions for human
selection (according to aesthetics or non-formalized compromises).
• Aggregation of Opinions, in the context of decision centered teamwork, is combin-
ing the opinions of each member of the team into a final team decision. I study
ranking extraction and ranked voting rules [Jiang et al., 2014, Yadav et al., 2015]
using existing agents in Computer Go and influence maximization. Additionally,
I study a linear combination of two greedy algorithms for simultaneously learning
and influencing social networks [Marcolino et al., 2016c].
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• Team Assessment is verifying the performance of a given team. In particular, it is
fundamental to predict whether a team is going to be successful or fail in problem
solving. Existing methods are tailored for specific domains, such as robot-soccer
[Ramos and Ayanegui, 2008]. Hence, I propose [Nagarajan et al., 2015, Marcolino
et al., 2016b] a novel domain independent technique, which learns a prediction
function for estimating the performance of a team using only its voting patterns.
Based on such prediction, it is possible to take remedial procedures to increase a
team’s performance.
This thesis presents theoretical, methodological and experimental contributions for
these facets of decision-centered teamwork. I run experiments in three domains: Com-
puter Go [Marcolino et al., 2013, 2014b, Jiang et al., 2014, Nagarajan et al., 2015, Mar-
colino et al., 2016b], Architectural Design [Marcolino et al., 2016a] and influence maxi-
mization in social networks [Yadav et al., 2015, Marcolino et al., 2016c] (Figure 1.1). As
I detail later, these domains have a positive societal impact for health and sustainability.
1.1 Summary of Contributions
1.1.1 Agent Selection
A na¨ıve solution for agent selection would be to simply select the set of the individually
best agents to form a team. I show, however, that team diversity is also an important
aspect of decision-centered teamwork. Hence, this thesis presents three models of diversity
in teamwork.
In my first model, I show that a diverse team can outperform a uniform team if at
least one agent has a higher probability of playing the best action than the best agent in
at least one world state [Marcolino et al., 2013]. However, since only necessary conditions
are provided, I develop a second model [Marcolino et al., 2014b], which study the effect
of increasing the number of actions available to choose from. I define spreading tail
(ST ) agents, that have an increasingly larger number of actions assigned with a non-zero
probability as the number of actions in the domain increases. A diverse team is modeled
as a team of ST agents. I show that the probability of a diverse team picking the best
action increases as the action space increases; and also converges to 1 when the team size
grows in large action spaces. The main idea of my model is that diverse agents are less
likely to agree on the same mistakes when the action space is large, and therefore only two
agents voting for the optimal solution is sufficient. I run experiments in the Computer
Go domain, using six existing Computer Go agents, and analyze the predictions and the
assumptions of my models.
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Decision-centered teamwork allowed me to:
Play better Go by voting
among multiple diverse agents.
Optimally design buildings by voting







Prevent HIV in uncertain social
networks by combining multiple algorithms.
Figure 1.1: Domains where I explored decision-centered teamwork.
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My third diversity model focuses on agent teams for design problems. This thesis
introduces design problems as a novel problem in social choice, where the performance
of a voting system is evaluated by the number of optimal solutions found by an agent
team. For maximum applicability, I study agents that are queried for a single opinion,
and multiple solutions are obtained by multiple voting iterations. I show that diverse
teams composed of agents with different preferences maximize the number of optimal
solutions, while uniform teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent are in
general suboptimal. I run experiments with diverse and uniform teams in a real system
for architectural design optimization. The design of buildings are not only optimized for
cost and conformity with project requirements, but also for energy-efficiency. Hence, this
is an important domain for sustainability.
1.1.2 Aggregation of Opinions
In the context of decision-centered teamwork, team coordination is aggregating the opin-
ions of multiple agents into taking a final decision. I study the performance of four
classical ranked voting rules from social choice in Computer Go. First, I build a ranking
for each agent by directly extracting their estimated utilities of each action from their
search trees. However, after aggregating such rankings, I find that plurality still had the
best winning rates. Such surprising result may seem discouraging at first, but I introduce
a novel method to extract rankings from existing agents, based on the frequency that ac-
tions are played when sampling an agent multiple times. I show that using this method,
the Borda ranked voting rule outperforms plurality. While performing this study, I also
introduce a technique for generating diverse teams by creating random parametrizations
of a base agent [Jiang et al., 2014], in order to analyze larger diverse teams of voting
agents. Similarly, I analyze the performance of ranked voting aggregation in the social
networks domain, in the context of influence maximization [Yadav et al., 2015].
Additionally, I analyze a linear combination of two greedy algorithms in a novel social
networks problem: I assume only a subgraph of the network is initially known, and
we must spread influence and learn the graph simultaneously [Marcolino et al., 2016c].
Although influence maximization has been extensively studied [Kempe et al., 2003, Cohen
et al., 2014, Golovin and Krause, 2010, Maghami and Sukthankar, 2012, Li and Jiang,
2014], the main motivation of previous works is viral marketing, and hence they assume
that the social network graph is fully known beforehand, generally taken from some social
media network (such as Facebook or MySpace). However, the graphs recorded in social
media do not really represent all the people and all the connections of a population. Most
critically, when performing interventions in real life, we deal with large degrees of lack of
knowledge.
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I show that the traditional greedy influence maximization algorithm may have arbi-
trarily low performance. However, we can still effectively influence and learn a network
graph when the independence of objectives hypothesis holds (which will be later defined
in this thesis). When it does not hold, I give an upper bound for the influence loss, which
converges to 0 as the number of interventions in the network grows. I run extensive
experiments over four real-life social networks of the homeless population of Los Angeles.
Influence maximization has a great potential to positively impact society, as we can
modify the behavior of a community. For example, we can increase the overall health of
a population; my main motivation is to spread information about HIV prevention in the
homeless population of Los Angeles.
1.1.3 Team Assessment
Team assessment is essential for decision-centered teamwork. We must be able to assess if
a team is likely to succeed or fail in order to take remedial procedures when appropriate.
For instance, we could switch team members or the aggregation mechanisms according to
the current assessment, in order to increase the team performance in an online manner.
Hence, it is important to develop methods to quickly assess a team’s performance.
I propose a model for team assessment [Nagarajan et al., 2015, Marcolino et al.,
2016b], which allows me to develop a novel domain independent technique to predict
online the final reward of a team. The final reward is defined by a random variable;
which is influenced by a set of variables representing the subset of agents that agreed on
the chosen action at each world state. Based on that, I show that the final reward can be
predicted by linear models, and I derive a domain-independent prediction function using
only the frequencies of agreement of each subset of agents. Additionally, I show that the
quality of the prediction increases as the action space grows larger.
I evaluate the quality of the predictions using a real system of Computer Go playing
agents, over a varying of board sizes. I study the predictions at every turn of the games,
and compare with an analysis performed by using an in-depth search. I achieve an
accuracy of 71% for a diverse team in 9 × 9 Go, and of 81% when I increase the action
space size to 21 × 21 Go. For a uniform team, I obtain 62% accuracy in 9 × 9, and
75% accuracy in 21× 21 Go. I also predict the final performance of an ensemble system
that votes to classify hand-written digits, demonstrating the domain independence of my
method.
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1.2 Guide to thesis
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the related work and the nec-
essary background for the research presented in this thesis. Part II introduces the work
on agent selection: Chapter 3 presents my first diversity model; Chapter 4 shows my
second model, where diverse teams in large action spaces are analyzed; and Chapter 5
presents my model about agent teams for design problems. Part III introduces my work
on aggregation of opinions: Chapter 6 presents an experimental study on ranked voting
rules in Computer Go and Social Networks, and Chapter 7 studies a linear combination
of two algorithms for simultaneously influencing and mapping social networks. Part IV
focuses on team assessment, where Chapter 8 introduces a domain independent technique
to predict success or failure in teams of voting agents. Finally, Chapter 9 presents my
conclusions and discussions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.
(Isaac Newton)
In this chapter I discuss relevant background and related work for this thesis. The
study of decision-centered teamwork relates to different areas of study in Computer Sci-
ence, and even in other fields, such as Social Science. Hence, in this section I will discuss
the literature in Multi-agent Systems, focusing on the study of Social Choice (Section 2.1)
and Teamwork (Section 2.2); Machine Learning, especially Ensemble Systems (Section
2.4); and Social Science (Section 2.3), where many models have been proposed to study
diversity in human teams. Since the thesis also introduces the problem of simultaneously
influencing and mapping social networks (in Chapter 7), I will also discuss the relevant
literature for this problem in Section 2.7.
2.1 Social Choice
Social choice studies theoretical frameworks for analyzing the combination of individual
preferences or opinions into a collective decision. One of the most common methods to
aggregate the opinions of different agents into taking a decision is voting. Hence, voting
is extensively studied in the social choice literature. Normally, voting is seen under one
of two possible views: (i) as a way to decide on a fair outcome, given the preferences of
different individuals; (ii) as a way to use the opinions of different agents to estimate a
correct outcome, or a “truth”.
The classical work in the second view is the Condorcet’s Jury Theorem [Condorcet,
1785], published in the 18th century. Condorcet developed the theorem to justify the use
of voting in the jury system. According to his theorem, when facing a binary decision, as
long as the average of the probability of each individual being correct is higher than 12 , a
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“Correct Outcome”
Agent 1’s vote Agent 2’s vote ... Agent n’s vote
Figure 2.1: “Classical” voting model. Each agent has a noisy perception of the truth, or
correct outcome. Hence, its vote is influenced by the correct outcome.
group of independent individuals doing majority voting will have a higher probability of
being correct than the individuals alone. In fact, as the number of voters go to infinite,
the probability of taking a correct decision converges to 1. This theorem is extended
to the k options case in List and Goodin [2001], where it is shown that if each of the
individuals have a probability of choosing the best answer higher than choosing any other
answer, the group performing majority voting will still be stronger than the individuals
alone.
Recently, social choice has been considered extensively in the artificial intelligence
literature. Each agent is modeled as having a noisy perception of the truth (or correct
decision) [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005]. Hence, the correct outcome influences how each
agent is going to vote, as shown in the model in Figure 2.1.
Therefore, given a voting profile and a noise model (the probability of voting for
each action, given the correct outcome) of each agent, we can estimate the likelihood of
each action being the best by a simple (albeit computationally expensive) probabilistic
inference. Any voting rule is going to be optimal if it corresponds to always picking the
action that has the maximum likelihood of being correct (i.e., the action with maximum
likelihood of being the best action), according to the assumed noise model of the agents.
That is, the output of an optimal voting rule always corresponds to the output of actually
computing, by the probabilistic inference method mentioned above, which action has the
highest likelihood of being the best one.
Classically, however, this view of voting considers only teams of identical agents [List
and Goodin, 2001, Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005], and thus they do not consider the
importance of diversity when selecting agents. More recent works are also considering
agents with different probability distribution functions. Caragiannis et al. [2013] study
which voting rules converge to a true ranking as the number of agents (not necessarily
identical) goes to infinity. In Soufiani et al. [2012] the problem of inferring the true
ranking is studied, assuming agents with different pdfs, but drawn from the same family.
Therefore, team formation is not the focus of their work.
Since the classical works of Bartholdi III et al. [1989a,b], many works in social choice
also study the computational complexity of computing the winner in elections [Aziz et al.,
2015, Amanatidis et al., 2015], and/or of manipulating the outcome of an election, in
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general by disguising an agent’s true preference [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2003, Davies
et al., 2011, Yang, 2015]. The main motivation of such works is in finding voting rules
which are easy to compute (i.e., the winner can be computed in polynomial time), but
are hard to manipulate (i.e., an agent would have to run an NP-Complete algorithm in
order to calculate a voting profile different than its true preference in order to change the
final outcome of the voting procedure).
There are also works studying the aggregation of partial [Xia and Conitzer, 2011a,b] or
non-linear rankings (such as pair-wise comparisons among alternatives) [Elkind and Shah,
2014], since it could be costly/impossible to request agents for a full linear ranking over all
possible actions. Some very recent works in social choice also analyze probabilistic voting
rules, where the agents’ votes affect a probability distribution over outcomes [Brandl
et al., 2015, Chatterji et al., 2014].
2.1.1 Large Solutions Pool
In this thesis I also consider agent teams for design problems, where the objective is to
maximize the number of optimal solutions. In Chapter 5 I discuss in detail why for design
problems it is important to obtain a large number of solutions. In this chapter I present
the current state of the art in social choice with regards to obtaining a large solution
pool.
Most of the social choice literature is about finding a correct ranking in domains
where there is a linear order over the alternatives, and hence a unique optimal decision
[Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005, Caragiannis et al., 2013, List and Goodin, 2001, Soufiani
et al., 2012, Baharad et al., 2011]. Recent works, however, are considering more complex
domains. Farfel and Conitzer [2011] analyze the case where instead of having a single
preferred action, voters have a preference over an interval of real numbers. Xia and
Conitzer [2011a] study the problem of finding k optimal solutions, where k is known
beforehand, by aggregating rankings from each agent. However, not only do they need
strong assumptions about the quality of the rankings of such agents, but they also show
that calculating the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) from the rankings is an NP-
hard problem.
Procaccia et al. [2012] study a similar perspective, where the objective is to find the top
k options given rankings from each agent, where, again, k is known in advance. However,
in their case, they assume there still exists one unique truly optimal choice, hidden among
these top k alternatives. Elkind and Shah [2014], motivated by the crowdsourcing domain,
study the case where instead of rankings, the voters output pairwise comparisons among
all actions, which may not follow transitivity. However, their final objective is still to
pick a single winner, not to maximize the set of optimal solutions found by a voting
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system. Oren and Lucier [2014] study the problem of finding the top k options in an
on-line setting, where we must take a decision concerning adding a candidate to a k-sized
pool at each time we see the (ranked) vote of an agent; hence the problem of maximizing
the number of optimal solutions is not considered.
Finally, outputting a full comparison among all actions can be a burden for an agent
[Boutilier, 2002, Kalech et al., 2011]. In this thesis I show that actual agents can have
very noisy rankings, and therefore do not follow the assumptions of previous works in
social choice. Hence, as any agent is able to output at least one action (i.e., a single
vote), I study here systems where agents vote across multiple iterations, which brings the
model closer to real applications for design.
2.2 Teamwork
Teamwork is an important topic of research in the multi-agent systems literature. Many
theoretical frameworks of teamwork have been developed. For example, Cohen and
Levesque [1991] introduced the Joint Intentions theory. In that framework, a team has
a joint mental state. All agents work to achieve a certain objective in the joint mental
state. If one of the agents discovers that the objective has been achieved, or became
irrelevant/impossible, then it must communicate with its teammates in order to pass this
belief to the joint mental state. In the SharedPlans [Grosz and Kraus, 1996] framework,
there is a set of possible recipes for achieving one action, which are composed by subac-
tions, forming a hierarchy; and agents may have individual plans to perform some of the
subactions. These ideas are combined in an actual implemented framework in STEAM
[Tambe, 1997], where agents build a hierarchy of joint intentions when performing tasks
in three different domains. STEAM is further extended in Tambe et al. [2002], where
a markov decision process (MDP) model is proposed, enabling agents to autonomously
decide when to transfer control (i.e., decision-making) to humans or other agents.
A common approach to coordination is to consider a centralized controller, that plans
beforehand the best action each agent should take at each world state (i.e., plans oﬄine);
and the agents merely execute the actions ascribed to them in the plan. These are nor-
mally studied in the Dec-POMDP framework (decentralized partially observable Markov
decision process) [Bernstein et al., 2002], and policy iteration is one of the main methods
to compute the global plan (i.e., a policy) [Bernstein et al., 2009].
Task allocation is also an important approach to coordinate a team. A problem or
goal is distributed in a set of tasks, and each agent must execute a subset of those. The
contract net protocol [Smith, 1980] is a very common technique for task allocation, where
agents can be manager and contractors. A manager receives bids and allocate a task to
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the most appropriate agent. Upon being allocated a task, the agent (contractor) must
execute it, but it can divide those in subtasks and also act as a manager to allocate
those. A similar approach is the auction based task allocation mechanism [Bertsekas,
1992], where agents submit bids to compete for tasks, like in actual auctions.
For large teams, especially swarms, a common approach is to specify individual be-
haviors for each agent, in order for a desired global behavior to emerge in a distributed
fashion [Marcolino and Chaimowicz, 2008, 2009a,b]. Designing the individual behaviors
in an automatic way, however, is still an open challenge.
Decision-centered teamwork is a fundamentally different form of teamwork from the
ones previously described. Instead of each agent executing one action, or solving a certain
subtask of a common goal, the team must decide on a single team action at each world
state towards problem solving. However, it is still a form of teamwork, as all agents are
fully cooperative, and they share a common goal. Aggregating their opinions at each step
of problem-solving is their method of achieving that common goal.
2.2.1 Team Formation
Team formation is also an active topic of research in multi-agent teamwork. However, the
main focus has been in modeling tasks as requiring a set of skills; and the team formation
problem is considered as selecting a set of agents with all the necessary skills but the
minimum cost [He and Ioerger, 2003, Guttmann, 2008]. More recent work go beyond a
simple sum of skills and also models the synergy of a group [Liemhetcharat and Veloso,
2012], or how to automatically configure a network of agents [Gaston and desJardins,
2005]. In Matthews et al. [2012], a team formation procedure is presented for a class of
online football prediction games, and the system is able to play successfully against a
large number of human players.
Recently, ad-hoc teamwork is also surging as an important area of study in the multi-
agent literature [Stone et al., 2013], where agents must coordinate without being pre-
programmed to work together. Researchers have considered, for example, how to lead a
group to the optimal joint action with a new ad-hoc agent [Agmon and Stone, 2012], or
how to influence a flock of agents [Genter and Stone, 2014]. Barret and Stone [2015] have
demonstrated ad-hoc teamwork in practice in the simulated robot soccer domain. These
works, however, do not analyze the importance of diversity when forming agent teams.
2.3 Social Science
Forming teams to take decisions has also been studied in the social sciences. For example,
Hong and Page [2004] is an impactful work showing the importance of diversity when
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forming (human) teams. Even though recently some of the mathematical arguments
were put into question [Thompson, 2014], it remains as a mile-stone on the study of the
importance of diversity, as many researchers were influenced by their work [Luan et al.,
2012, Lakhani et al., 2007, Krause et al., 2011], showing the importance of diversity in
different settings. In their model, each agent has a set of local minima that they reach
while trying to maximize an objective function. The agents can improve the solution from
the local minima of their team members, therefore the search of a team stops only in the
intersection of the local minima of all agents. By using a large number of diverse agents
the system is able to converge to the optimal solution. Their model, however, does
not cover situations where agents are unable to improve the solution from their team
members’ local minima. This can happen, for example, when we use existing software,
that were not architectured to collaborate in this way or when there are time constraints.
Therefore, there are many situations where the agents have to collaborate in other ways,
such as voting. If a team of agents votes, the system will not necessarily converge to an
option in the intersection of their local minima. However, as I will show, it is still possible
for a diverse team to play better than a uniform strong team.
A more recent model to analyze diversity was proposed in LiCalzi and Surucu [2012].
It is an equivalent model to Page’s and still do not overcome the limitations previously
described. In Braouezec [2010], the authors show the benefits of diverse agents voting
to estimate the optimum of a single peaked function. In this thesis I am dealing with
a harder problem, as the function to be optimized changes at every iteration. Another
work that uses voting to study diversity is West and Dellana [2009], but they assumed
that Page’s model would work in a voting context, and do not propose a new model.
Lamberson and Page [2012] study diversity in the context of forecasts. They assume that
solutions are represented by real numbers, and a team converges to the average of the
opinion of its members. Hence, they do not capture domains with discrete solutions, and
the model also does not cover teams of voting agents.
Prediction markets are also studied in the social sciences. They are markets where the
users bet on possible outcomes of real world events. For example, if a user u believes that
an event x will take place with probability pu (for instance, a certain candidate winning an
election), then she can offer to buy a share on x with a price pu. Similarly, a user can also
offer to buy a share that an event x will not take place, and the price pu will correspond
to the probability of the event not taking place. The final market price of the event x
can be interpreted as the probability of x actually taking place in the world. Erikson and
Wlezien [2008], for example, compare the accuracy of prediction markets in determining
the final outcome of elections with pools. Manski [2006] presents the first theoretical
study concerning to what extent the market prices can be actually understood as the
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probabilities of events occurring. A historical analysis of political prediction markets in
the USA is presented at Rhode and Strumpf [2004]. In this thesis, however, I will focus
on voting as a way to aggregate opinions, rather than markets.
2.4 Machine Learning
Combining multiple classifiers through voting is a very common technique in machine
learning [Polikar, 2012]. Such systems are called Ensemble Systems. Traditionally, each
classifier runs the same algorithm, but trained with different subsets of items, or different
features. The way that each subset of items is selected for each classifier defines different
ensemble system approaches, for example: bagging, boosting, or ada-boost; while mixture
of experts trains each classifier in a different subspace of the feature space.
Combining multiple classifiers has been a very active research area. For example,
Sylvester and Chawla [2005] uses a Genetic Algorithm to learn an optimal set of weights
when combining multiple classifiers, Chiu and Webb [1998] uses voting to predict the
future actions of an agent, and AL-Malaise et al. [2014] use ensembles to predict the
performance of a student.
Diversity is known to be important when forming an ensemble, and some systems try
to minimize the correlation between the classifiers while training [Chen and Yao, 2009].
Still, an important problem is how to form the ensemble system, i.e., how to pick the
classifiers that lead to the best predictions [Fu et al., 2012].
My models allow us to make many predictions about teams as the action space and/or
number of agents changes, and also compare the rate of change of the performance of
different teams, or analyze agent teams in the context of design problems. To the best of
my knowledge, there are no models similar to mine in the machine learning literature.
Additionally, team assessment is also important for ensembles, as we need techniques
to evaluate whether the current ensemble is performing well in order to change it if
necessary. In Chapter 8 I will perform experiments in predicting the final performance of
an ensemble system.
2.5 Team Assessment
As in Chapter 8 I discuss a technique for assessing the performance of a team of voting
agents, in this section I discuss relevant literature in team assessment.
Traditional team assessment methods rely heavily on tailoring for specific domains.
Raines et al. [2000] present a method to build automated assistants for post-hoc, oﬄine
team analysis; but domain knowledge is necessary for such assistants. Other methods
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for team analysis are heavily tailored for robot-soccer, such as Ramos and Ayanegui
[2008], that present a method to identify the tactical formation of soccer teams (num-
ber of defenders, midfielders, and forwards). Mirchevska et al. [2014] present a domain
independent approach, but they are still focused on identifying opponent tactics, not in
assessing the current performance of a team.
In the multi-agent systems community, we can see many recent works that study
how to identify agents that present faulty behavior [Khalastchi et al., 2014, Lindner
and Agmon, 2014, Tarapore et al., 2013]. Other works focus on verifying correct agent
implementation [Doan et al., 2014] or monitoring the violation of norms in an agent
system [Bulling et al., 2013]. Some works go beyond the agent-level and verify if the
system as a whole conforms to a certain specification [Kouvaros and Lomuscio, 2013],
or verify properties of an agent system [Hunter et al., 2013]. However, a team can still
have a poor performance and fail in solving a problem, even when the individual agents
are correctly implemented, no agent presents faulty behavior, and the system as a whole
conforms to all specifications.
Sometimes even correct agents might fail to solve a task, especially embodied agents
(robots) that could suffer sensing or actuating problems. Kaminka and Tambe [1998]
present a method to detect clear failures in an agent team by social comparison (i.e., each
agent compares its state with its peers). Such an approach is fundamentally different
than this work, as we are detecting a tendency towards failure for a team of voting agents
(caused, for example, by simple lack of ability, or processing power, to solve the problem),
not a clearly problematic situation that could be caused by imprecision/failure of the
sensors or actuators of an agent/robot. Later, Kaminka [2006], Kalech and Kaminka
[2007], Kalech et al. [2011] study the detection of failures by identifying disagreement
among the agents. In my case, however, disagreements are inherent in the voting process.
They are easy to detect but they do not necessarily mean that a team is immediately
failing, or that an agent presents faulty behavior/perception of the current state.
There is also a body of work that focuses on analyzing (and predicting the perfor-
mance of) human teams playing sports games. For example, Quenzel and Shea [2014]
learn a prediction model for tied NFL American football games, where they use logistic
regression to predict the final winner. They study the coefficients of the regression model
to determine which factors affect the final outcome with statistical significance. Heiny
and Blevins [2011] use discriminant analysis to predict which strategy an American foot-
ball team will adopt during the game. In soccer, Bialkowski et al. [2014] analyze data
from games to automatically identify the roles of each player, and Lucey et al. [2015]
also use logistic regression to predict the likelihood of a shot scoring a goal. We can
also find examples in basketball. Maheswaran et al. [2012] use a logistic regression model
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to predict which team will be able to capture the ball in a rebound, while Lucey et al.
[2014] study which factors are important when predicting whether a team will be able to
perform an open 3-points shot or not.
2.6 Other Multiple Algorithms Techniques
There is a vast literature on using multiple algorithms to solve complex problems. For
example, in algorithm portfolios [Gomes and Selman, 2001], multiple programs run in
parallel to solve a single problem instance, as one of them may be the fastest for the
particular instance. In multi-start local search algorithms [Gyorgy and Kocsis, 2011],
many searches run in parallel, and we must dynamically decide to allocate computational
resources to a search process or to initialize a new search. There are also works about mul-
tiple experts systems, where predictions are performed by choosing one among multiple
experts’ advice [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006]. In the robotics literature, multi-heuristic
A* search has recently been proposed [Aine et al., 2014], where multiple heuristics are
used simultaneously to find a bounded suboptimal solution.
Concerning distributed optimization, Chapter 5 is related to the study of distributed
genetic algorithms [Knysh and Kureichik, 2010]. The experimental section on agent
team for designs (Section 5.5) relates to the “island model”, where populations evolve
concurrently. This model has been improved recently, by Osaba et al. [2015], with a
technique where some of the populations stop evolving temporarily in order to focus the
search on promising ones. Normally, however, the populations interact by transferring
offsprings, not by voting, and a theoretical study of voting teams which must maximize
the number of optimal solutions was never performed. Other recent works study how to
run genetic algorithms on GPUs in order to solve classical NP-hard problems or navigate
UAVs [Cekmez et al., 2013, 2014].
2.7 Social Networks
As in Chapter 7 I will focus on the problem of influencing social networks that are not
fully known in advance, I discuss here related works in influence maximization.
The influence maximization problem has recently been a very popular topic of re-
search. Normally, the main motivation is viral marketing in social media (like Facebook
or MySpace). Hence, previous works assume full knowledge of the social network graph.
The classical result is Kempe et al. [2003], where they study the approximation guarantee
of a greedy algorithm for the “independent cascade model”, which will be described in
Chapter 7. Golovin and Krause [2010] extended that result to the case where we are able
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to observe which nodes are already influenced or not before picking each one. However,
they still assume full knowledge of the graph. Similarly, Dhamal et al. [2015] study the
specific situation where we select two subsets of nodes at two different phases, and we
can observe the network between the phases. Cohen et al. [2014] focus on how to quickly
estimate the potential spread of one node, since running simulations (as needed by the
greedy algorithm) in large graphs is computationally expensive. A different view was
studied by Yadav et al. [2015], where they analyze a model where nodes try to influence
their neighbors multiple times, and each edge has an existence probability. Here, how-
ever, I will deal with a different kind of uncertainty, as in my model whole portions of
the graph are completely unknown.
Some works in the AAMAS (multi-agent systems) community study variations of
the original influence model. For example, Pasumarthi et al. [2015] study the problem
where the objective is to maximize influence not in the whole social network graph,
but only in a subset of nodes which represent targeted consumers of a certain product.
Anagnostopoulos et al. [2015] study the case where multiple entities compete to spread
influence in order to convince consumers to buy their respective products. Maghami and
Sukthankar [2012] consider influence maximization under more realistic assumptions than
traditional models: they assume agents pertain to social groups, and the ones of the same
group are more likely to influence each other. Moreover, they assume multiple products,
and that each agent has a certain probability of buying a particular one. Li and Jiang
[2014] study a different way to increase the realism: they consider graphs with multiple
edge types, modeling different connection types between people (for example, Facebook
or real life interaction). Tsang and Larson [2014], instead of focusing on the problem
of selecting subset of nodes, run several experiments to study the evolution of social
networks, assuming that each node has a degree of adoption (instead of a binary value
representing influenced or not influenced), and nodes are more likely to be influenced by
others with a similar adoption degree. However, even though all these works are more
realistic than the traditional models, they still assume full knowledge of the social network
graph.
Chapter 7 is also related to the problem of submodular optimization (as influence
is a submodular function) by selecting elements without knowledge of the whole set.
Badanidiyuru et al. [2014] present an algorithm for selecting the best subset, giving
elements arriving from a “stream”. Hence, in their case, given enough time the whole
set would be seen, and which elements are discovered does not depend on which ones are
selected.
My problem is also related to the classical max-k-cover problem [Khuller et al., 1999],
where we must pick k subsets that maximize our coverage of a set. In that case, however,
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the elements of each subset is known. There is also an online version of the max-k-cover
problem [Alon et al., 2009], where we pick one subset at a time, but an adversary fixes
which element must be covered next. However, the set and the available subsets are still
known in advance. Similarly, Grandoni et al. [2008] study the case of covering a set whose
elements are randomly chosen from a universe of possible elements. Another important
related problem is the submodular secretary problem [Bateni et al., 2013], where we again
pick a subset to optimize a submodular function. However, in that case, we receive one
element at a time, and we must make an irrevocable decision of either keeping it or not.
The problem of learning a graph online was studied in the context of security games
by Barth et al. [2010], where there is a possible attack graph with unknown edges. They
learn edges when they are used by an attacker for the first time, and repeatedly update
the probability of protecting each edge using an online learning algorithm [Freund and
Schapire, 1999]. In my case, however, we cannot update weights iteratively, as we pick a
node at most one time.
Finally, Chapter 7 also relates to sequential decision making with multiple objec-
tives [Roijers et al., 2013]. Here I do not aim at computing an optimal policy (which is
computationally expensive), but at studying a greedy method, similar to other works in
influence maximization. My algorithm is a scalarization over two objectives, but such







I exclude no one I am strengthened by all
My name is Diversity and yes I stand tall.
Recognize me and keep me in the mix
Together there’s no problem that we can’t fix.
I am your best hope towards true innovation
And to many, I reflect hope and inspiration.
(Charles Bennafield)
3.1 Introduction
Team formation is essential when dealing with a multi-agent system. Given limited
resources, we must select a strong team to deal with a complex problem. Many works
model team formation as selecting a team that accomplishes a certain task with the
maximum expected value, given a model of the capabilities of each agent [Nair and Tambe,
2005, Guttmann, 2008]. Other works go beyond a simple sum of skills, for example by
considering synergetic effects in a team of agents [Liemhetcharat and Veloso, 2012] or
studying how to automatically configure a network of agents [Gaston and desJardins,
2005].
After forming a team, their members must work together. There are many different
ways for a team to coordinate. One common and simple way is to use voting. By voting,
a team of agents can get closer to finding the best possible decision in a given situation
[List and Goodin, 2001]. Only one voting iteration might not be enough, sometimes
the agents must vote continuously in many different scenarios. Consider, for example,
agents that are cooperating in a board game [Obata et al., 2011, Soejima et al., 2010],
deciding together stock purchases across different economic scenarios, or even picking
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items to recommend to a large number of users [Burke, 2002]. This situation imposes
a conflict for team formation: should we focus on the diversity of the team or on the
strength of each individual member? Previous works do not address this issue. Diversity
is proposed as an important concept for team formation in the field of Economics and
Social Science [Hong and Page, 2004, LiCalzi and Surucu, 2012]. However, Hong and
Page [2004], LiCalzi and Surucu [2012] assume a model where each agent brings more
information, and the system converges to one of the best options known by the group.
When a team votes to decide its final opinion, their model and theorems do not hold
anymore. In the current literature on voting it is assumed a model where agents have a
fixed probability to take the best action [Condorcet, 1785, List and Goodin, 2001, Young,
1995, Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005, Xia, 2011], and under that model it is not possible to
show any advantage in having a diverse team of agents. My experiments show, however,
that a diverse team can outperform a uniform team of stronger agents. It is necessary to
develop, therefore, a new model to analyze a team of voting agents.
In this chapter, I present a new model of diversity and strength for a team of voting
agents. The fundamental novelty of my model is to consider a setting with multiple world
states, and each agent having different performance levels (characterized by different
probability distributions) across world states. Under this model, I can show that a team
of diverse agents can perform better than a uniform team composed by strong agents. I
present the necessary conditions for a diverse team to play better than a uniform team,
and study optimal voting rules for a diverse team. I show synthetic experiments with a
large number of teams that demonstrate that both diversity and strength are important to
the performance of a team. I also show results in one of the main challenges for Artificial
Intelligence: Computer Go. Go is an iterative game, and the possible board states can
represent a great variety of different situations, in such a way that the relative strength of
different Go playing software changes according to the board state. Therefore, we can use
my model to study a team of agents voting to play Computer Go. By using a diverse team
I am able to increase the winning rate against Fuego (one of the strongest Go software)
by 18.7%, and the diverse team could play 11% better than a team of copies of Fuego.
Moreover, the diverse team plays 15.8% better than one of the versions of parallelized
Fuego. I also improve the performance of the diverse team by 12.7% using one of my
proposed voting rules. Therefore, I effectively show that a team of diverse agents can have
competitive strength, and even play better, than a uniform team composed by stronger
agents. My new model provides a theoretical explanation for my results.
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3.2 Methodology
Let Φ be a set of agents φi voting to decide an action a in the set of possible actions A
and Ω be a set of world states ωj . I assume that we can rank the actions from best to
worst and Uj is the vector of expected utilities of the actions in world state ωj , ordered
by rank. The agents do not know the ranking of the actions, and will vote according to
some decision procedure, characterized by a probability distribution function (pdf) over
action ranks. Hence, each agent φi has a pdf Vi,j for deciding which action to vote for in
state ωj . Agents that have the same Vi,j in all world states will be referred as copies of
the same agent.
Let αj be the likelihood of world state ωj . If we expect the world states to be
equally frequent, we can use αj = 1/|Ω|. I define strength as the weighted average of
the expected utility of an agent or a team. It is given by the following dot product:
s =
∑
ωj∈Ω αjVj ·Uj, where Vj is the pdf of the agent/team in world state ωj . Vj can
be calculated given a team of agents and a voting rule. A voting rule is a function that
given the (single) votes of a team of agents, outputs an action.
I define the team formation problem as selecting from the space of all possible agents
Ψ a set of n agents Φ that has the maximum strength in the set of world states Ω.
An application does not necessarily know Vi,j for all agents and for all world states. In
this chapter, I focus on showing that the na¨ıve solution of forming a team by selecting
the strongest agents (or copies of the best agent) is not necessarily the optimal solution.
Therefore, I am introducing a new problem to the study of team formation.
I define diversity as how different are the probability distributions of agents in Φ






φk∈Φ αjH(Vi,j,Vk,j), where H
is a distance measure between two pdfs. In this chapter, I use the Hellinger Distance









At each iteration, each agent will examine the current world state and submit its
(single) opinion about which one should be the next action. The opinions are then
combined using plurality voting, that picks as a winner the option that received the most
votes. I consider in this chapter three different voting rules: simple - break ties randomly,
static - break ties in favor of the strongest agent overall, optimal - break ties in favor of
the strongest agent of each world state. I consider the static voting rule because in some
applications we might have a clear idea of which is the strongest agent overall, but the
information of which is the strongest agent for a given world state might not be available.
I will encounter this situation in the Computer Go domain, as will be clear in Section
3.3.2. This voting procedure will repeat at every iteration, until the end, when the system
can obtain a reward.
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Agent State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 Strength
Agent 1 1 0 1 1 0.75
Agent 2 0 1 1 0 0.5
Agent 3 1 1 0 0 0.5
Agent 4 1 1 0 1 0.75
Agent 5 0 0 1 1 0.5
Table 3.1: A team of deterministic agents that can reach perfect play under simple voting.
“1” indicates agent plays perfect action.
3.2.1 Diversity Beats Strength
I first present examples to demonstrate that a diverse team can play better than a uniform
team. First, let’s consider the simplest case, when all agents are deterministic. The team
made of copies of the strongest agent will play as well as the strongest agent, no matter
how many members we add in the team. However, a team of diverse agents can overcome
the strongest agent, and even reach perfect play, as we increase the number of agents.
Consider, for example, the team in Table 3.1. This diverse team of 5 agents will reach
perfect play under simple voting, while copies of the best agent (Agent 1 or Agent 4) will
be able to play well only in 3 out of 4 world states, no matter how many agents we use
in the team.
We can easily change the example to non-deterministic agents, by decreasing slightly
the probability of them playing their deterministic action. An example is shown in Table
3.2, where I show the pdf of the agents for each world state. I considered the utility
vector < 1, 0, 0 > for all world states. The resulting strength of the teams is very similar
to the deterministic case. Assuming all world states are equally likely, the strength of the
diverse team is 0.9907, while copies of the best agent have strength 0.7499. Therefore,
it is possible for a team of weak diverse agents to overcome a uniform team of stronger
agents, when in certain states the individual agents are stronger than the overall strongest
agent.
Even if we make the number of agents go to infinity, copies of the best agent will still
be unable to perform the best action in one world state, and will play worse than the
diverse team with only five agents. This situation is not considered in the Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem, neither in the classical nor in the extended version, because they assume
independent agents with a fixed pdf. Therefore, in the previous models, we would not be
able to show the importance of diversity.
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Agent State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Agent 1 < 0.99, 0.01, 0 > < 0, 0.99, 0.01 > < 0.99, 0, 0.01 > < 0.99, 0.01, 0 >
Agent 2 < 0, 0.99, 0.01 > < 0.99, 0.01, 0 > < 0.99, 0, 0.01 > < 0, 0.01, 0.99 >
Agent 3 < 0.99, 0.005, 0.005 > < 0.99, 0.005, 0.005 > < 0, 0.5, 0.5 > < 0, 0.5, 0.5 >
Agent 4 < 0.99, 0.01, 0 > < 0.99, 0.004, 0.006 > < 0, 0.4, 0.6 > < 0.99, 0.003, 0.007 >









Table 3.2: A team of non-deterministic agents that can overcome copies of the best agent.
3.2.1.1 Necessary Conditions
I present a formal proof of the conditions necessary for a diverse team to play better than
copies of the best agent, under the simple voting rule. If the conditions of the theorem
are not met, we can simply use copies of the best agent as the optimal team. To simplify
the presentation of the proof, we will consider a utility function with a value of 1 for the
optimal action and 0 for the other actions. That is, we will consider the optimal team in
a fixed world state as the team that has the highest probability of performing the optimal
action. Let ψbest be the strongest agent in Ψ, and abest be the best action in a given world
state.
Theorem 3.2.1 For a diverse team to be the optimal team under the simple voting rule
it is necessary that at least one agent in Ψ has a higher probability of taking the best
action than ψbest in at least one world state, or a lower probability of taking a suboptimal
action than ψbest in at least one world state.
Proof: I develop the proof by showing that copies of the best agent of a given world state
will be the optimal team in that world state. Therefore, it is necessary that the agents
in the diverse team play better than the best agent overall in at least one world state.
Let ψbest,j be the strongest agent in world state ωj . Let’s define the pdf of this agent as
< p1, ..., pk >, where p1 is the probability of taking the best action. I will show that a team
of n copies of ψbest,j doing simple voting will have a higher probability of taking the best
action than a team of n agents composed of x copies of ψbest,j andm agents ψi doing simple
voting, where the probabilities of each ψi are given by < p1 − i, p2 + γi,2, ..., pk + γi,k >,
γi,l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ (2, k) and
∑k
l=2 γi,l = i.
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Given a team of agents, let them all vote. We will start with a team of x copies of
agent ψbest,j . We will perform m iterations, and at each one we will add either another
agent ψbest,j or agent ψi, where i is the current iteration. Let vi−1 be the current vote
result. The result of vi−1 is either: (i) victory for abest, (ii) tie between abest and other
options, (iii) defeat for abest.
(i) If vi−1 is a victory for abest, the new agent can change the result only when it votes
in another option. Suppose al is an option that upon receiving one more vote will change
a victory for abest into a tie between abest and al. Agent ψbest,j will vote in option al with
probability pl, while agent ψi will vote in option al with probability pl + γi,l. Therefore,
if vi−1 is such that one vote can change a victory for abest into a tie between abest and
other options, agent ψi will have a higher probability of changing a victory for abest into
a tie between abest and other options.
(ii) If vi−1 is a tie between abest and other options, agent ψbest,j will break the tie in
favor of abest with probability p1 while agent ψi with probability p1− i. Therefore, agent
ψbest,j will have a higher probability of breaking the tie in favor of abest. Moreover, if al is
an option that is currently tied with abest, agent ψbest,j will vote for al with probability pl,
while agent ψi with probability pl+γi,l. Therefore, agent ψi will have a higher probability
of changing a tie between abest and other options into a defeat for abest.
(iii) If vi−1 is a defeat for abest, agent ψbest,j will vote for abest with probability p1
while agent ψi will vote for abest with probability p1 − i. Therefore, if vi−1 is such that
one vote can change a defeat for abest into a tie between abest and other options, agent
ψbest,j will have a higher probability of changing a defeat for abest into a tie between abest
and other options.
In all three cases, agent ψbest,j leads to a higher increase in the probability of picking
abest than agent ψi. Therefore, up to any iteration i, copies of ψbest,j will have a higher
probability of playing the best action than a diverse team. Hence, if ψbest,j = ψbest∀j,
then copies of the best agent ψbest will be the best team in all world states, and therefore
it will be the optimal team. Therefore, for a diverse team to perform better, at least one
agent must have either a higher probability of taking the best action or a lower probability
of taking a suboptimal action than ψbest in at least one world state.
This theorem, however, only gives the necessary conditions for a diverse team to be
stronger than a non-diverse team. The sufficient conditions will depend on which specific
game the agents are playing. Basically, given the pdf of the agents for a set of world
states, we can calculate the pdf of both the diverse team, and the team made of copies of
the best agent. If the diverse team has a higher probability of taking the best action in
a subset of the world states that is enough for it to play better, considering that it will
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have a lower probability of taking the best action in the complementary subset, then the
diverse team will play better than copies of the best agent.
3.2.1.2 Optimal Voting Rules
In my next theorem, I show that given some conditions, the optimal voting rule for a
diverse team is to consider plurality voting, but break ties in favor of the strongest agent
that participates in the tie. Basically, we have to assume that all agents are strong enough
to contribute to the team, so no agent should be ignored. If there are harmful agents in
the team, we can try to remove them until the conditions of the theorem are satisfied.
Again, we consider a utility function with a value of 1 for the optimal action and 0 for
the other actions. Given a team Φ with size n, our conditions are:
Assumption 1 Weak agents do not harm
For any subset of Φ with an even number of agents n′, and for a fixed world state ωj ,
let φ′best,j be the best agent of the subset. We divide the agents in 2 sets: Weak containing
the n′/2 − 1 agents that have the lowest probability of taking the best action and the
highest probability of taking a suboptimal action, and Strong containing the n′/2 agents
that have the highest probability of playing the best action and the lowest probability of
taking a suboptimal action (except for the best agent φ′best,j , that is in neither one of the
sets). We assume that when all agents in Weak and φ′best,j vote together in an option ax,
and all agents in Strong vote together in another option ay, the probability of ax being
the best action is higher than the probability of ay being the best action.
Assumption 2 Strong agents are not overly strong
Given a fixed world state ωj , I assume that if m1 agents voted in an action ax and m2
agents voted in an action ay, the probability of ax being the best action is higher than
ay being the best action, if m1 > m2. If there is a situation where the opinion of a set of
agents always dominates the opinion of another set, we can try to remove the dominated
agents until the assumption holds true.
Theorem 3.2.2 The optimal voting rule for a team is to consider the vote of all agents,
but break ties in favor of the strongest agent if the above assumptions are satisfied.
Proof: By Assumption 2 we know that we are looking for a tie-breaking rule, as the
action chosen by most of the votes should always be taken. Let’s consider the sets and
the voting result described in the Assumption 1. Let < p1, ..., pk > be the pdf of agent
φ′best,j , and the pdf of the other agents of the subset be < p1− i, p2 + γi,2, ..., pk + γi,k >,
γi,l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ (2, k) and
∑k
l=2 γi,l = i. Let b be a rank in (2, k). The probability of ax
being the best action is given by:
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where ζ is a constant (according to the Bayes theorem).
While the probability that ay is the best action is given by:





By Assumption 1, we have that P1 > P2. We can generate another voting pattern by
making one agent φweak in Weak vote for ay and one agent φstrong in Strong vote for ax.
The probability of ax being the best action will change to:
P ′1 = P1 ∗ (p1−strong)(pb+γweak,b)(p1−weak)(pb+γstrong,b)
While the probability of ay being the best action will change to:
P ′2 = P2 ∗ (p1−weak)(pb+γstrong,b)(p1−strong)(pb+γweak,b)
As (p1− strong) > (p1− weak) and (pb +γweak,b) > (pb +γstrong,b) by the Assumption
1, we have that P ′1 > P1. Similarly, as (p1 − weak) < (p1 − strong) and (pb + γstrong,b) <
(pb + γweak,b) by the Assumption 1, we have that P
′
2 < P2.




2. Hence, for all modifications
that can be generated by switching one of the agents, it is better to break ties in favor of
the strongest agent. We can use all these voting patterns as a base and apply the same
process recursively, to generate all possible voting patterns with a tie. Therefore, it will
always be better to break ties in favor of the strongest agent.
Now I consider voting patterns with a tie between more than two options. Let’s
suppose that in this case breaking ties in favor of the strongest agent (φ′best,j) is not the
optimal voting rule. Therefore, we should break the tie in favor of some option ay. This
implies that ay has a higher probability of being the best action than ax, the option
chosen by the best agent. Now let’s remove the agents that voted in all other options
except ax and ay. This affects the probability of ax and ay being the best action in the
same way. Therefore, we should still break ties in favor of option ay. However, we already
showed that when there are two options we should break ties in favor of the strongest
agent. Hence, we should break the tie in favor of option ax. So, by contradiction, we see
that if there is a tie between more than two options we should still break ties in favor of
the strongest agent.
If the strongest agent of the team is not one of the agents involved in the tie, we can
ignore the opinion of the strongest agent according to Assumption 2, and break the tie
in favor of the strongest agent from the ones involved in the tie, because Assumption 1
applies to any subset of the agents.
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An application may not have the knowledge of the pdf of the agents in individual
world states. Therefore, I also study an approximation of the optimal voting rule, that
break ties in favor of the strongest agent overall, instead of breaking ties in favor of the
strongest agent in a given world state. In the next section we will see that both the
optimal voting rule and our approximation improves the performance of a diverse team.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Synthetic
I perform synthetic experiments using the quantal response (QR) model for the agents
[McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995]. The quantal response model is a pdf from behavioral game
theory to approximate how human beings (or non-rational players) behave while playing
a game. It states that the probability of playing the best action is the highest, and it
decays exponentially as the utility of the action gets worse. I use the QR model in my
experiment, because it is a convenient way to represent non-rational agents with different
strengths playing a game with a great number of options.
The pdf depends on a parameter, λ, that defines how rational (i.e., strong) is the
agent. As λ gets higher, the agent provides a closer approximation to a perfect player. I
define a λij for each agent i and world state j.
I generated 1200 random teams of 4 agents, playing in 10 world states, and with 82
possible actions. I define each λij as a random number in the interval (0, 7), according
to a uniform distribution. For each team, we can calculate the diversity and the average
strength of the agents, according to the equations defined earlier. In Figure 3.1, we
can see the performance of each team, as a function of diversity and the strength of its
members. The strength of a team can be calculated after we generate the pdf of the team,
by calculating the probability of all possible situations where the system would pick a
particular ranking position. I assume that all world states are equally likely, hence the
strength of a team is the average over all world states. I used a utility vector that gives
a value close to 1 to the best action, and a low value to the other actions.
I performed a multiple linear regression for each voting rule. The following models
were found: simple: z = −0.09 + 1.48s + 0.45d; static: z = −0.03 + 1.36s + 0.55d;
optimal: z = 0.09 + 0.92s + 1.29d. The variable s is the average strength of the team
members, d is the diversity of the team, and z is the strength of the team. The coefficient
of multiple determination (R2) of the models are 0.96, 0.81, 0.88, respectively.
As can be seen, both diversity and strength had a positive weight. This shows that
groups with more diversity are stronger, given a fixed strength for their members. It
is interesting to note that the impact of diversity increases as we change the voting
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(a) Simple Voting (b) Static Rule
(c) Optimal Rule
Figure 3.1: 1200 random teams of 4 agents.
rule from simple to static, and from static to optimal. The mean strength of all teams
are 0.56(±0.08), 0.61(±0.08), 0.74(±0.06), respectively. We can note that, as expected,
simple had the lowest strength, followed by static, and optimal had the highest strength.
The optimal voting rule is 30% stronger than simple voting in average.
3.3.2 Experiments in Computer Go
I also perform experiments with four Go software: Fuego 1.1, GnuGo 3.8, Pachi 9.01,
MoGo 3, and two (weaker) variants of Fuego (Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ), in a total of 6
different agents. These are all publicly available Go software. Fuego is known to be
the strongest Go software among all of them. Fuego, Pachi and MoGo follow a UCT
Monte Carlo Go algorithm [Gelly et al., 2006]. Fuego uses heuristics to simulate games
during the Monte Carlo simulations. There are mainly 5 possible heuristics in Fuego’s
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code. These heuristics have a hierarchical order, and the original Fuego agent follows
the order <Atari Capture, Atari Defend, Lowlib, Pattern> (The heuristic called Nakade
is not enabled by default). Fuego∆ follows the order <Atari Defend, Atari Capture,
Pattern, Nakade, Lowlib>. FuegoΘ follows the order <Atari Defend, Nakade, Pattern,
Atari Capture, Lowlib>. The memory available for Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ is half of the
memory available for Fuego.
All results presented are obtained by playing 1000 9x9 Go games, in a HP dl165 with
dual dodeca core, 2.33GHz processors and 48GB of RAM. I first present results when my
system plays as white, against the original Fuego playing as black with opening database.
Then, I present results of my system playing as black, against the original Fuego playing
as white with opening database. I will compare the winning rate of different agents and
teams when playing against the same opponent. When I say that a result is significantly
better than another, I use a t-test with 1% significance level (α = 0.01).
I call a team composed by different Go software as “Diverse” or by the name of the
voting rule that they use (“Simple” or “Static”). The team of copies of the strongest agent
(Fuego) will be called “Uniform”. The copies are initialized with different random seeds,
therefore due to the nature of the search algorithms, they will not always choose the same
movement. When I want to be explicit about the number of agents in a team I will add a
number after the name of the team. “Diverse” is composed by Fuego, GnuGo, Pachi and
MoGo when executed with 4 agents, and is composed by all agents when executed with
6 agents. I also work with a parallelized version of Fuego (“Parallel”), and I will add a
number after its name to indicate the number of threads.
Before introducing my results, I first analyze the agents under the classical voting
theory and under my proposed theory. To simplify the analysis, I consider here the
probability of playing the best move (Pbest); therefore, I consider a utility vector with a
value of 1 for the best move, and 0 for the other moves. I start by the classical voting
theories. In order to estimate Pbest, I use 1000 board states from my experiments. In
1000 games, I randomly choose a board state between the first and the last movement.
I then ask Fuego to perform a movement in that state, but I give Fuego a time limit
50x higher than the default one. Therefore, Fuego is approximating how a perfect (or at
least much stronger) player would play. To avoid confusion with the names I will call this
agent Perfect. I then obtain Perfect’s evaluation for all the positions of the board, and
organize them into a ranking.
I ran all agents in the selected 1000 board states and for each state I verify in which
position of the ranking each agent would play. If, instead of playing, the agent resigns,


















Table 3.3: Probability to select the best move of each player and the teams.
Perfect’s evaluation. Based on that, I can generate a histogram for all agents, shown in
Figure 3.2.
Assuming that the agents are independent, and that each one will choose a move
according to the probability distribution corresponding to its histogram, we can calculate
Pbest of any group and voting rule that we want. Basically we have to calculate the
probability of all the possible situations where the system would pick the best move. For
a team of k agents we have to calculate O(nk−1) probabilities, where n is the number of
possible options. While for a team of 4 agents I am able to calculate the precise value,
for a team of 6 agents I am going to show approximations.
In Table 3.3 we can see Pbest of each individual player and of all teams. The Pbest
of the teams is higher than the Pbest of each one of the agents, and is higher for a team
of 6 agents than for a team of 4 agents. This result is expected when we consider the
extended version of the Condorcet’s Jury Theorem [List and Goodin, 2001], at least for a
uniform team. According to the theorem Pbest approaches 1 when the number of agents
goes to infinity. However, we would also expect Uniform to perform better than Diverse.
Would it be possible, then, for a diverse team to perform better than a uniform team?
Intuitively, we would expect that a uniform team would agree on certain moves much
more often than a diverse team. And indeed, when we look at the graph of the frequency
of the size of the set of agents that voted for the winning move (Figure 3.3), we can see
that they are very different. In the x-axis I show the number of agents that agreed on the
selected movement, and in the y-axis the frequency of each number considering all moves
in the 1000 games. The expected size of the set for Diverse is 3.50, while for Uniform
is 4.43. Therefore, if Fuego plays badly in a certain board state, all copies of Fuego
would also tend to vote for the same bad moves. In a diverse team, however, some agents
could be able to play better in that particular situation. The extended Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem assumes that agents are independent, but in fact their relative performances
might change according to the state of the board.
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of the agents, using real data.
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Size of set of winning agents










Figure 3.3: Expected size of the set of agents that vote for the winning move, with 6
agents and no opening database.






Table 3.4: Weak agents can play better in some board states. In parentheses, I show
when the difference in Pbest is 99% significant.
Now I analyze the agents according to my proposed theory. I will use Theorem 3.2.1
to justify that it is worth it to explore a diverse team. If Fuego, the strongest agent, is
always stronger in all board positions, then we can just use copies of Fuego as the optimal
team. Therefore, I will test if all agents are able to play better than Fuego in some board
positions. I selected 100 board states, and I played all agents 50 times for each board
state. Based on my estimate of the best move (obtained from Perfect), I can calculate
Pbest for each agent and for each board state. In Table 3.4, we can see in how many
board states the agents have a higher Pbest than Fuego (in its default time limit). As
can be observed, all agents are able to play better than Fuego in some board positions,
therefore it is possible for a diverse team to play better than copies of the best agent. As
the number of board states where an agent plays better is not small, we can expect that
a diverse team should be able to overcome the uniform team.
According to Theorem 3.2.2, if we assume that the weak agents (like GnuGo) are not
weak enough to harm the system, and the strong agents (like Fuego and its variants) are
not strong enough to dominate a subset of the agents, then the optimal voting rule is to
break ties in favor of the strongest agent. However, during a game the system does not
have access to the pdf of the agents, and has no way to identify which is the strongest
agent. Therefore, I present results using the static voting rule, that break ties in favor
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of the strongest agent overall. Based on my synthetic results, we can predict that static
should perform better than simple. I also tried a weighted voting rule, which allowed me
to empirically learn the best weights by a hill climbing algorithm. The resulting rule was
equivalent to the static voting rule.
We can see my results for white in Figure 3.4(a,b). Diverse plays significantly better
than Fuego, with 6 agents or with the static voting rule. When I keep the opening
database, Diverse plays significantly better than Uniform and Parallel with 6 agents.
Without the opening database, Diverse still plays significantly better than Parallel with
6 agents, but the difference between Diverse and Uniform is not significant. Static is
either significantly better than Simple, or the difference between them is not significant.
In Figure 3.4(c,d) we can see the results for black. Again, Diverse plays significantly
better than Fuego when using the static voting rule. This time, however, Diverse (with
6 agents or using the static voting rule) is able to play significantly better than Uniform
without the opening database, but with the opening database the difference between them
is not significant. Again, Static is either significantly better than Simple, or the difference
between them is not significant. Static is always significantly better than Parallel.
To verify the generality of improving the results by the static voting rule and by
adding more agents, I also played our system as white against Pachi as black, without
opening database. Simple 4 won 56.2% of the games, Static 4 won 65.5% and Simple 6
won 66.8%. Therefore, these techniques can improve the results in other situations.
By the classical view of voting, my experimental result is not expected. If we view
each agent as having a fixed pdf, we would predict that copies of the best agent would
perform much better than a diverse team with weaker agents. However, in my results I
showed that the diverse team has a competitive strength, and is able to play even better
than copies of the best agent in some situations. My new model provides a theoretical
explanation for my experimental results.
3.4 Detailed Study: Why a Team of Diverse Agents Perform
Better?
I study in detail three games from my experiments, in order to better understand why a
team of weak players can perform as well, or better than a team made of copies of the
best player. I study games with 6 agents, using the simple voting rule. According to my
theoretical work, at least one agent must play better than the strongest agent in at least
one world state for a diverse team to overcome a uniform team. These are only necessary
conditions, for a diverse team to effectively play better this must happen in many world
states, specially in critical situations that can decide the game. Here I show that this
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(a) Results for white. Single agents and the diverse team (Sim-
ple/Static).





















Uniform 4 Uniform 6
(b) Results for white. The uniform team, the diverse team
(Simple/Static), and a parallelized agent (Parallel).
























(c) Results for black. Single agents and the diverse team (Sim-
ple/Static).


















Static 6Parallel 4 Parallel 6
Uniform 4 Uniform 6
(d) Results for black. The uniform team, the diverse team (Sim-
ple/Static), and a parallelized agent (Parallel).
Figure 3.4: Results in the Computer Go domain. The error bars show the confidence
interval, with 99% of significance.
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really happens in Computer Go, based on an analysis by an expert human player. As
Go is a complex game, note that some expert readers might not agree completely with
all points of this analysis. Although I present results in the Computer Go domain, this
phenomenon should also occur in other complex domains, where the relative strength of
the agents change according to the world state.
These games are analyzed by Chao Zhang, a 4-dan amateur Go player. In order
to show that the weak agents are not playing better simply by chance, I estimate the
probability of all agents playing all analyzed moves by repeatedly playing them 100 times
in the board state under consideration. Based on these probabilities, I calculate the
probabilities of the diverse team and the uniform team, to show that the diverse team
would perform better in these board states. An important point to note is that it is not
the case that a certain subset of the agents always vote for a better move; the set of
agents that can find a better move than Fuego changes according to each board state.
This analysis requires some Go knowledge to be fully understood. Go is a turn-based
game between two players: black and white. At each turn, the players must place a stone
in an empty intersection of the board. If a group of stones is surrounded by the opponent’s
stones they are removed from the board (i.e. they are “killed”). The stones that surround
an area form a territory, whose value is counted by the number of empty intersections
inside. In the end of the game, the score is defined by the amount of territory minus
the number of captured stones, and the player with the highest score wins. A detailed
description of the rules can be found in Pandanet [2016].
I first analyze the Go game in Figure 3.5. In some positions, the weak agents vote for
better moves than Fuego, the strongest agent. Move 11 is a very interesting situation.
Here, Fuego, Pachi and MoGo vote for move D4, while GnuGo votes for E8 (X). Even
though GnuGo is the weakest agent, in this situation it is able to find a better move than
all other agents. E8 is better because it allows white to get the territory in the upper left
corner. Besides, white can aim at G7 to kill the black group in the upper right. If white
plays D4, black can play E8 to kill white aiming at the upper left corner. Unfortunately,
GnuGo loses the vote in this situation. In all other positions, I show situations where the
weak agents vote together for a better move than Fuego. For example, in move 23, Fuego
votes for B4 (∆) while Pachi, MoGo, Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ vote for B7. If white chooses
B7, white can kill C7&D7 or B5&C5&D5&E5. If black saves C7&D7, white can use B4
to kill the other group; If black saves B5&C5&D5&E5, white can use C8 to kill C7&D7.
If white chooses B4, black will use B7 to kill the white group in the upper left. Fuego’s
mistake is critical in this situation, and would lead to losing the game. In move 45, Fuego
would make another mistake. Fuego votes for B9 (∆), while GnuGo and Pachi vote for






































































































































































































































Figure 3.5: First example, the diverse team plays as white without the opening database
against Fuego. White wins by resignation.
developments. H3, on the other hand, is aiming at killing black in the right bottom. In
this case Fuego∆ also votes for B9, so the static voting rule would choose a worse move.
In move 63, Fuego would play E3, while GnuGo, Pachi, Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ vote for
G2. If white plays G2, the black group in the right bottom dies, while if white plays E3,
white cannot kill them. This is another critical mistake, that would make white lose the
game. Finally, in move 75, Fuego votes for A7, while Pachi and FuegoΘ vote for G2. G2
is better than A7, as it allows white to have a larger territory. As can be seen, there are
many situations where the weaker agents vote together for a better move than Fuego.
The probabilities of each agent playing the analyzed moves can be seen in Table 3.5. It
is clear that Fuego did not choose the worse move by accident: in many cases it has a
lower probability than the other agents of playing the best move between the two options.
Consequently, the uniform team is still not able to perform well in these situations, it
still has a low probability of playing the best move, and it is always outperformed by the
diverse team. In some situations, the probability of playing the worst move even increases
by using multiple copies of Fuego.
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Agent
Move 11 Move 23 Move 45 Move 63 Move 75
E8* D4 B7* B4 H3* B9 G2* E3 G2* A7
Fuego 2% 51% 83% 14% 1% 76% 53% 29% 22% 16%
GnuGo 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Pachi 6% 75% 30% 70% 46% 0% 78% 1% 35% 1%
MoGo 2% 61% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 84% 53% 0%
Fuego∆ 24% 19% 100% 0% 16% 19% 76% 13% 24% 7%
FuegoΘ 35% 9% 99% 0% 12% 30% 78% 10% 31% 11%
Diverse 15% 57% 99% 0% 20% 28% 88% 7% 45% 5%
Uniform 0% 73% 95% 4% 0% 98% 63% 26% 23% 21%
Table 3.5: Probability of playing the moves in the first example. * indicates the better
move.
I now analyze the game in Figure 3.6. In move number 4, Fuego∆ and Pachi vote for
C7, while Fuego votes for move G3 (∆). G3 is a bad opening for white, because the two
white groups would be split by black. Another example is in move 7, when GnuGo, Pachi
and Fuego∆ vote for B6, while Fuego votes for G7 (∆). Black and white are fighting in
the upper left corner. If white plays G7, it waives the fight and plays in a place that is not
immediately important. White should choose B6 to continue the fight in order to win.
Even GnuGo, the weakest agent, knows that B6 is a better move. In move 25, GnuGo
and Mogo choose A8, while Fuego chooses F2 (∆). If white does not play A8, black will
play A5 to kill the white group in the left side. White has to kill with A8. This time
Fuego’s mistake is critical, and could lead to losing the whole game. In this situation
GnuGo helps avoid a critical mistake, because FuegoΘ also votes for F2. Moreover, it
is an example of a case where the static voting rule fails, as it would break the tie in
favor of Fuego. I expect that significant improvements in game play would be possible
if we learn which is the strongest agent in a given situation, and better approximate the
optimal voting rule. Another interesting move is 37. Fuego and Fuego∆ vote for D2,
while MoGo and FuegoΘ vote for E3. Both moves are equally good, as they get the same
territory. However, GnuGo might have a better move: F6. If white plays F6, it can aim
at both G6 and F4 for the next moves, which will cause great harm to black’s territory.
This is another example of a situation where the weakest agent has a better move than
all other agents. The probabilities of each agent playing the analyzed moves can be seen
in Table 3.6. Again, we can see that the diverse team would have a higher probability of
finding the better moves than the uniform team.
In the games with the opening database, an interesting one is in Figure 3.7. In move
29, GnuGo, Pachi and MoGo choose D2, while Fuego votes for B8 (∆). D2 can protect




















































































































































Figure 3.6: Second example, the diverse team plays as white without the opening database
against Fuego. White wins by resignation.
Agent
Move 3 Move 7 Move 25 Move 37
C7* G3 B6* G7 A8* F2 F6* D2 E3
Fuego 20% 2% 7% 41% 11% 30% 1% 53% 19%
GnuGo 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 0%
Pachi 27% 14% 99% 1% 28% 19% 26% 27% 0%
MoGo 0% 8% 1% 0% 89% 0% 0% 41% 45%
Fuego∆ 20% 0% 34% 20% 28% 10% 0% 83% 7%
FuegoΘ 25% 4% 50% 7% 37% 11% 0% 80% 12%
Diverse –% –% 77% 0% 70% 1% 1% 90% 5%
Uniform 19% 0% 2% 30% 7% 27% 0% 84% 8%
Table 3.6: Probability of playing the moves in the second example. Some results are











































































































































































































































72 , 79 PassFull Game
Figure 3.7: Third example, the diverse team plays as white with the opening database
against Fuego. White wins by resignation.
it more solid. In move 31, Pachi and MoGo vote for B3, and Fuego votes for B1 (∆). Even
if both moves might be able to kill the black stone in B2, B3 can kill it for sure. If white
plays B1, black can play B3 and would lead to complications. This mistake could make
white lose the game. If black survives, it can kill the white group in the lower left. In
move 45, Pachi, MoGo and Fuego∆ vote for F4, while Fuego votes for A4 (∆). F4 splits
black into two groups and can make use of this division in the future. A4 just wastes a
move and gives black more territory. In move 51, Pachi and MoGo choose E9, and Fuego
chooses H6 (∆). E9 makes the white group on the left survive, while H6 wastes a move
and will lead to the death of the white group. This is a critical mistake, that would make
white lose the game. In move 67, GnuGo and MoGo vote for B4, while Fuego votes for G2
(∆). B4 is better, as it can get more territory. G2 just wastes a move. The probabilities
of each agent playing the analyzed moves can be seen in Table 3.7. Again, in all these
situations the diverse team has a higher probability of playing the better move than the
uniform team. In some cases, the probability of playing the worse move even increases
with multiple copies of Fuego.
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Agent
Move 29 Move 31 Move 45 Move 51 Move 67
D2* B8 B3* B1 F4* A4 E9* H6 B4* G2
Fuego 3% 16% 44% 26% 17% 40% 0% 35% 0% 12%
GnuGo 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
Pachi 77% 18% 64% 0% 78% 17% 90% 0% 3% 0%
MoGo 91% 0% 98% 0% 92% 0% 51% 0% 46% 4%
Fuego∆ 6% 4% 11% 1% 51% 12% 0% 1% 0% 9%
FuegoΘ 5% 7% 13% 0% 50% 21% 0% 2% 0% 5%
Diverse 82% 3% 75% 0% 54% 12% 37% 0% 9% 1%
Uniform 0% 12% 56% 32% 5% 53% 0% 44% 0% 4%
Table 3.7: Probability of playing the moves in the third example. * indicates the better
move.
3.5 Conclusion and Discussions
I showed that diverse teams can outperform teams composed by copies of the best player.
However, it is still a challenge to find the best possible teams. In an open multi-agent
system the pdfs of the agents are generally not available. Moreover, in many complex
scenarios we cannot even easily enumerate all the possible states of the world. Hence,
given a world state, how can we quickly and automatically know the relative strength of
the different agents? This is still an important open problem.
I gave an initial step by studying in detail different scenarios where diverse agents are
able to outperform the best agent. One possible direction for future work is to identify
common characteristics of world states where a certain agent is able to play better than
the best agent. Hence, given a new world state we would be able to estimate the strongest
agent for that specific world state and better approximate the optimal voting rule. In
addition, we could also dynamically change the team in order to have the best (or close
to the best) possible one for each different scenario.
In real-life scenarios, like robot teams, the problem is even more challenging. We
can always estimate the pdf of an agent by running it multiple times in a given world
state, if we have at least an estimation of the ground truth. However, for an embodied
agent, the number of times we can sample might be very limited. A similar challenge
is faced in Evolutionary Robotics [Nolfi and Floreano, 2001], where a great range of
robots/controllers must be constantly evaluated. One common approach is to perform
the evaluation in simulation, and implement in real life the best performing solution.
Likewise, we could sample the pdf of different robots in simulation, in order to estimate
their pdfs in the real world. Of course, the accuracy of the pdf estimation would depend
on the accuracy of the simulation environment.
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In general, however, even without knowledge of the pdfs of the agents, this chapter
shows that a team composed by strong but very similar agents is not necessarily optimal.
Hence, if an operator is not able to estimate the pdfs, she should at least evaluate the
performance of diverse teams before picking only the strongest agents as the chosen team
for a certain multi-agent application.
In the next chapter I will present a second model of diversity, which will allow an
operator to better identify in which situations diverse teams should be preferred.
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Chapter 4
Give a Hard Problem to a Diverse Team
Together, we form a necessary paradox; not a senseless contradiction.
(Criss Jami)
Team formation is crucial when deploying a multi-agent system [Nair and Tambe,
2005, Guttmann, 2008, Liemhetcharat and Veloso, 2012, Matthews et al., 2012]. Many
researchers emphasize the importance of diversity when forming teams [LiCalzi and Su-
rucu, 2012, Lamberson and Page, 2012, Hong and Page, 2004]. However, there are many
important questions about diversity that were not asked before, and are not explored in
such models.
LiCalzi and Surucu [2012] and Hong and Page [2004] propose models where the agents
know the utility of the solutions, and the team converges to the best solution found by
one of its members. Clearly in complex problems the utility of solutions would not be
available, and agents would have to resort to other methods, such as voting, to take a
common decision. Lamberson and Page [2012] study diversity in the context of forecasts,
where the solutions are represented by real numbers and the team takes the average of
the opinion of its members. Domains where the possible solutions are discrete, however,
are not captured by such a model.
In the previous chapter, I studied teams of agents that vote in discrete solution spaces.
I showed that a diverse team of weaker agents can overcome a uniform team made of copies
of the best agent. However, this does not always occur, and the previous model do not
present ways to know when we should use diverse teams. Moreover, it lacks a formal
study of how the performance of diverse teams change as the number of agents and/or
actions increases.
In this chapter I shed new light on this problem, by presenting a new, more general
model of diversity for teams of voting agents. My model captures better than the previous
ones the notion of a diverse team as a team of agents that tend to not agree on the same
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actions, and allows us to make new predictions. My main insight is based on the notion
of spreading tail (ST ) and non-spreading tail (NST ) agents. As I will show, a team of ST
agents has a diverse behavior, i.e., they tend to not agree on the same actions. Hence,
I can model a diverse team as a team of ST agents, and show that the performance
improves as the size of the action space gets larger. I also prove upper and lower bounds
on how fast different teams converge. The improvement can be large enough to overcome
a uniform team of NST agents, even if individually the ST agents are weaker. As it is
generally hard to find good solutions for problems with a large number of actions, it is
important to know which teams to use in order to tackle such problems. Moreover, I
show that the performance of a diverse team converges to the optimal one exponentially
fast as the team grows. My synthetic experiments provide even further insights about my
model: even though the diverse team overcomes the uniform team in a large action space,
the uniform team eventually will again play better than the diverse team as the action
space keeps increasing if the best agent does not behave exactly like an NST agent.
Finally, I test my predictions by studying a system of voting agents, in the Computer
Go domain. I show that a uniform team made of copies of the best agent plays better in
smaller board sizes, but is overcome by a diverse team as the board gets larger. Moreover,
I analyze the agents and verify that weak agents have a behavior closer to ST agents,
while the best agent is closer to an NST agent. Therefore, I show that my predictions are
verified in a real system, and can effectively be used while forming a multi-agent team.
4.1 Model for Analysis of Diversity in Teams
Consider a problem defined by choosing an action a from a set of possible actions A.
Each a has an utility U(a), and our goal is to maximize the utility. I always list the
actions in order from best to worst, therefore U(aj) > U(aj+1) ∀j (a0 is the best action).
In some tasks (like in Section 4.2), a series of actions are chosen across different states,
but here I focus on the decision process in a given state.
Consider a set of agents, voting to decide over actions. The agents do not know the
utility of the actions, and vote for the action they believe to be the best according to their
own decision procedure, characterized by a probability distribution (pdf). I write as pi,j
the probability of agent i voting for action aj . I denote by pi,j(m), when I explicitly talk
about pi,j for an action space of size m. If the pdf of one agent is identical to the pdf of
another agent, they will be referred to as copies of the same agent. The action that wins by
plurality voting is taken by the team. Ties are broken randomly, except when I explicitly
talk about a tie breaking rule. Let Dm be the set of suboptimal actions (aj , j 6= 0)
assigned with a nonzero probability in the pdf of an agent i, and dm = |Dm|. I assume that
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there is a bound in the ratio of the suboptimal action with highest probability and the one
with lowest nonzero probability, i.e., let pi,min = minj∈Dmpi,j and pi,max = maxj∈Dmpi,j ;
there is a constant α such that pi,max ≤ αpi,min ∀ agents i.
I define strength as the expected utility of an agent and/or a team. The probability
of a team playing the best action will be called pbest. I first consider a setting where
U(a0)  U(aj)∀j 6= 0, hence I can use pbest as my measure of performance. I will later
consider more general settings, where the first r actions have a high utility.
I define team formation as selecting from the space of all agents a limited number of
agents that has the maximum strength by voting together to decide on actions. I study
the effect of increasing the size m of the set of possible actions on the team formation
problem. Intuitively, the change in team performance as m increases will be affected by
how the pdf of the individual agents i change when m gets higher. As we increase m, dm
can increase or not change. Hence, I classify the agents as spreading tail (ST ) agents or
non-spreading tail agents (NST ).
I define ST agents as agents whose dm is non-decreasing on m and dm → ∞ as
m → ∞. I consider that there is a constant  > 0, such that for all ST agents i, ∀m,
pi,0 ≥ . I assume that pi,0 does not change with m, although later I discuss what happens
when pi,0 changes.
I define NST agents as agents whose pdf does not change as the number of actions m
increases. Hence, let mi0 be the minimum number of actions necessary to define the pdf
of an NST agent i. We have that ∀m,m′ ≥ mi0, ∀j ≤ mi0 pi,j(m) = pi,j(m′), ∀j > mi0
pi,j(m) = 0.
I first give an intuitive description of the concept of diversity, then define formally
diverse teams. By diversity, I mean agents that tend to disagree. In the previous chapter,
a diverse team is defined as a set of agents with different pdfs. Hence, they disagree
because of having different probabilities of playing certain actions. In this chapter, I
generalize the previous definition to capture cases where agents disagree on actions, re-
gardless of whether their pdfs are the same or not. Formally, I define a diverse team to
be one consisting of a set of ST agents (either different ST agents or copies of the same
ST agent). In my theoretical development I will show that this definition captures the
notion of diversity: a team of ST agents will tend to not agree on the same suboptimal
actions. I call uniform team as the team composed by copies of an NST agent. This is
an idealization to perform my initial analysis. I will later discuss more complex domains,
where the agents of the uniform team also behave like ST agents.
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Agents Action 1 Action 2
Agent 1 0.6 0.4
Agent 2 0.55 0.45
Agent 3 0.55 0.45
Uniform pbest: 0.648
Diverse pbest: 0.599
(a) With 2 actions, uniform team plays better
than diverse team.
Agents Action 1 Action 2 Action 3
Agent 1 0.6 0.4 0
Agent 2 0.55 0.25 0.2
Agent 3 0.55 0.15 0.3
Uniform pbest: 0.648
Diverse pbest: 0.657
(b) When we add one more action, diverse team plays better
than uniform team.
Table 4.1: Performance of diverse team increases when the number of actions increases.
4.1.1 A Hard Problem to a Diverse Team
I start with an example, to give an intuition about my model. Consider the agents in
Table 4.1(a), where I show the pdf of the agents, and pbest of the uniform team (three
copies of agent 1) and the diverse team (one copy of each agent). I assume agent 1 is an
NST agent, while agent 2 and 3 are ST agents. In this situation the uniform team plays
better than the diverse team. Now let’s add one more action to the problem. Because
agent 2 and 3 are ST agents, the probability mass on action 2 scatters to the newly added
action (Table 4.1(b)). Hence, while before the ST agents would always agree on the same
suboptimal action if they both did not vote for the optimal action, now they might vote
for different suboptimal actions, creating a tie between each suboptimal action and the
optimal one. Because ties are broken randomly, when this happens there will be a 1/3
chance that the tie will be broken in favor of the optimal action. Hence, pbest increases
when the probability of the ST agents agreeing on the same suboptimal actions decreases,
and the diverse team now plays better than the uniform team, even though individually
agents 2 and 3 are weaker than agent 1.
I now present my theoretical work. First I show that the performance of a diverse
team converges when m → ∞, to a value that is higher than the performance for any
other m.
Theorem 4.1.1 pbest(m) of a diverse team of n agents converges to a certain value p˜best
as m→∞. Furthermore, p˜best ≥ pbest(m), ∀m.
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Proof: Let pi,min = minj∈Dm pi,j , pi,max = maxj∈Dm pi,j and T be the set of agents in the
team. By my assumptions, there is a constant α such that pi,max ≤ αpi,min for all agents
i. Then, we have that 1 ≥ 1− pi,0 =
∑
j∈Dm pi,j ≥ dmpi,min. Therefore, pi,min ≤ 1dm → 0
as dm tends to ∞ with m. Similarly, αpi,min → 0 as dm → ∞. As pi,j ≤ αpi,min we
have that ∀j pi,j → 0 as dm → ∞. I show that this implies that when m → ∞, weak
agents never agree on the same suboptimal action. Let i1 and i2 be two arbitrary agents.
Without loss of generality, assume i2’s dm (d
(i2)
m ) is greater than or equal i1’s dm (d
(i1)
m ).
The probability (σi1,i2) of i1 and i2 agreeing on the same suboptimal action is upper
bounded by σi1,i2 =
∑
aj∈A\a0 pi1,jpi2,j ≤ d
(i2)
m pi1,maxpi2,max ≤ d(i2)m αpi2,minpi1,max ≤
αpi1,max (as d
(i2)
m pi2,min ≤ 1). We have that αpi1,max → 0 as pi1,max → 0, because α is




2 ≤ n(n−1)2 maxi1,i2 σi1,i2 → 0, as n is a constant.
Hence, when m→∞, the diverse team only chooses a suboptimal action if all agents
vote for a different suboptimal action or in a tie between the optimal action and subop-













that is, the total probability minus the cases where the best action is not chosen: the
second term covers the case where all agents vote for a suboptimal action and the third
term covers the case where one agent votes for the optimal action and all other agents
vote for suboptimal actions.
When m is finite, the agents might choose a suboptimal action by agreeing over that
suboptimal action. Therefore, we have that pbest(m) ≤ p˜best ∀m.
Let puniformbest (m) be pbest of the uniform team, with m actions. A uniform team is not
affected by increasing m, as the pdf of an NST agent will not change. Hence, puniformbest (m)
is the same, ∀m. If p˜best is high enough so that p˜best ≥ puniformbest (m), the diverse team will
overcome the uniform team, when m → ∞. Therefore, the diverse team will be better
than the uniform team when m is large enough.
In practice, a uniform team made of copies of the best agent might not behave exactly
like a team of NST agents, as the best agent could also increase its dm as m gets larger.
I discuss this situation in Section 4.2. In order to perform that study, I derive in the
following corollary how fast pbest converges to p˜best, as a function of dm.





), where dmaxm is the highest and d
min
m the lowest dm of the team.
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Proof: I assume here the notation that was used in the previous proof. First I show a
lowerbound on pbest(m). We have that pbest(m) = 1 − ψ1, where ψ1 is the probability
of the team picking a suboptimal action. ψ1 = ψ2 + ψ3, where ψ2 is the probability of
no agent agreeing and the team picks a suboptimal action and ψ3 is the probability of
at least two agents agreeing and the team picks a suboptimal action. Hence, pbest(m) =
1− ψ2 − ψ3 = p˜best − ψ3 ≥ p˜best − ψ4, where ψ4 is the probability of at least two agents




2 are the agents whose σi∗1,i∗2 = σ
max.
We have that pbest(m) ≥ p˜best − n(n−1)2 σmax ≥ p˜best − n(n−1)2 d
(i∗2)











(as pi,min ≤ 1dm ). Hence, pbest(m) ≥




Now I show an upper bound: pbest(m) = p˜best − ψ3 ≤ p˜best − ψ5, where ψ5 is the
probability of at least two agents agreeing and no agents vote for the optimal action.




2 are the agents whose σi∗1,i∗2 = σ
min; and pmax,0 =





m . Hence, pbest(m) ≤
p˜best − n(n−1)2 σmin(1 − pmax,0)n−2 ≤ p˜best − n(n−1)2 d
(i∗1)
m pi∗1,minpi∗2,min(1 − pmax,0)n−2 ≤









(1 − pmax,0)n−2 ≤
p˜best − n(n−1)2 α−2 1dmaxm (1− pmax,0)
n−2  p˜best − pbest(m) ≥ Ω( 1dmaxm ).
Hence, agents that change their dm faster will converge faster to p˜best. This is an
important result when I consider later more complex scenarios where the dm of the agents
of the uniform team also change.
Note that p˜best depends on the number of agents n (Equation 4.1). Now I show that
the diverse team tends to always play the optimal action, as n→∞.
Theorem 4.1.3 p˜best converges to 1, as n→∞. Furthermore, 1− p˜best converges expo-
nentially to 0, that is, ∃ constant c, such that 1 − p˜best ≤ c(1 − 2)n, ∀n ≥ 2 . However,
the performance of the uniform team improves as n→∞ only if ps,0 = maxj ps,j, where
s is the best agent.
Proof: By the previous proof, we know that when m → ∞ the diverse team plays the
optimal action with probability given by p˜best. I show that 1 − p˜best → 0 exponentially
as n → ∞ (this naturally induces p˜best → 1). I first compute an upper bound for∑n
i=1(pi,0
∏n




j=1,j 6=i(1 − pj,0) ≤
∑n
i=1 pi,0(1 − pmin,0)n−1 ≤
npmax,0(1− pmin,0)n−1 ≤ n(1− )n−1 for pmax,0 = maxi pi,0, pmin,0 = minj pj,0.
Since
∏n
i=1(1−pi,0) ≤ (1−)n, thus we have that 1−p˜best ≤ (1−)n+n(1−)n−1. So we
only need to prove that there exists a constant c such that (1−)n+n(1−)n−1 ≤ c(1− 2)n,
as follows: (1−)
n+1+(n+1)(1−)n
(1−)n+n(1−)n−1 = (1− )1−+n+11−+n = 1− + 1−1−+n ≤ 1− 12, if n ≥ 2 (by
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setting 1−1−+n ≤ 2). Hence, ∃c, such that (1− )n + n(1− )n−1 ≤ c(1− 2)n when n ≥ 2 .
Therefore, the performance converges exponentially.
For the uniform team, the probability of playing the action that has the highest
probability in the pdf of the best agent converges to 1 as n→∞ [List and Goodin, 2001].
Therefore, the performance only increases as n→∞ if the optimal action is the one that
has the highest probability.
Now I show that we can achieve further improvement in a diverse team by breaking
ties in favor of the strongest agent.
Theorem 4.1.4 When m → ∞, breaking ties in favor of the strongest agent is the
optimal tie-breaking rule for a diverse team.
Proof: Let s be one of the agents. If we break ties in favor of s, the probability of voting











It is clear that Equation 4.2 is maximized by choosing agent s with the highest ps,0.
However, I still have to show that it is better to break ties in favor of the strongest agent
than breaking ties randomly. That is, I have to show that Equation 4.2 is always higher
than Equation 4.1.
Equation 4.2 differs from Equation 4.1 only on the last term. Therefore, I have to
show that the last term of Equation 4.2 is smaller than the last term of Equation 4.1.










































j=1,j 6=i,j 6=s(1− pj,0)
Therefore, for the last term of Equation 4.2 to be smaller than the last term of








j=1,j 6=s,j 6=i(1− pj,0)


























(1−pi,0)∀i 6= s. Therefore, it is always better to
break ties in favor of the strongest agent than breaking ties randomly.
Next I show that with one additional assumption, not only the diverse team converges
to p˜best, but also pbest monotonically increases with m. My additional assumption is that
higher utility actions have higher probabilities, i.e., if U(aj) ≥ U(aj′), then pi,j ≥ pi,j′ .
Theorem 4.1.5 The performance of a diverse team monotonically increases with m, if
U(aj) ≥ U(aj′) implies that pi,j ≥ pi,j′.
Proof: Let an event be the resulted choice set of actions of these n agents. I denote
by P (V ) the probability of occurrence of any event in V (hence, P (V ) =
∑
v∈V p(v)). I
call it a winning event if in the event the action chosen by plurality is the best action a0
(including ties). I assume that for all agents i, if U(aj) ≥ U(aj′), then pi,j ≥ pi,j′ .
I show by mathematical induction that we can divide the probability of multiple
suboptimal actions into a new action and pbest(m+ 1) ≥ pbest(m). Let λ be the number
of actions whose probability is being divided. The base case holds trivially when λ = 0.
That is, there is a new action, but all agents have a 0 probability of voting for that new
action. In this case we have that pbest does not change, therefore pbest(m+ 1) ≥ pbest(m).
Now assume that we divided the probability of λ actions and it is true that pbest(m+
1) ≥ pbest(m). I show that it is also true for λ + 1. Hence, let’s pick one more action to
divide the probability. Without loss of generality, assume it is action adm , for agent c,
and its probability is being divided into action adm+1. Therefore, p
′
c,dm
= pc,dm − β and
p′c,dm+1 = pc,dm+1 + β, for 0 ≤ β ≤ pc,dm . Let p
after
best (m + 1) be the probability of voting
for the best action after this new division, and pbeforebest (m+ 1) the probability before this
new division. I show that pafterbest (m+ 1) ≥ pbeforebest (m+ 1).
Let Γ be the set of all events where all agents voted, except for agent c (the order
does not matter, so we can consider agent c is the last one to post its vote). If γ ∈ Γ
will be a winning event no matter if agent c votes for adm or adm+1, then changing agent
c’s pdf will not affect the probability of these winning events. Hence, let Γ′ ⊂ Γ be the
set of all events that will become a winning event depending if agent c does not vote for
adm or adm+1. Given that γ ∈ Γ′ already happened, the probability of winning or losing
is equal to the probability of agent c not voting for adm or adm+1.
Now let’s divide Γ′ in two exclusive subsets: Γdm+1 ⊂ Γ′, where for each γ ∈ Γdm+1
action adm+1 is in tie with action a0, so if agent c does not vote for adm+1, γ will be a
51
winning event; Γdm ⊂ Γ′, where for each γ ∈ Γdm action adm is in tie with action a0, so if
agent c does not votes for adm , γ will be a winning event. I do not consider events where
both adm+1 and adm are in tie with a0, as in that case the probability of a winning event
does not change (it is given by 1− p′c,dm − p′c,dm+1 = 1− pc,dm − pc,dm+1).
Note that for each γ ∈ Γdm+1, the probability of a winning event equals 1− p′c,dm+1.
Therefore, after changing the pdf of agent c, for each γ ∈ Γdm+1, the probability of a
wining event decreases by β. Similarly, for each γ ∈ Γdm , the probability of a winning
event equals 1 − p′c,dm . Therefore, after changing the pdf of agent c, for each γ ∈ Γdm ,
the probability of a winning event increases by β.
Therefore, pafterbest (m+1) ≥ pbeforebest (m+1) if and only if P (Γdm) ≥ P (Γdm+1). Note that
∀γ ∈ Γdm+1 there are more agents that voted for adm+1 than for adm . Also, ∀γ ∈ Γdm there
are more agents that voted for adm than for adm+1. If, for all agents i, pi,dm ≥ pi,dm+1,
we have that P (Γdm) ≥ P (Γdm+1). Therefore, pafterbest (m+ 1) ≥ pbeforebest (m+ 1), so we still
have that pbest(m + 1) ≥ pbest(m). Also note that for the next step of the induction be
valid, so that we can still divide the probability of one more action, it is necessary that
p′c,dm ≥ p′c,dm+1.
4.1.2 Generalizations
In the previous theorems I focused on the probability of playing the best action, assuming
that U(a0)  U(aj) ∀j 6= 0. I show now that the theorems still hold in more general
domains where r actions (Ar ⊂ A) have a significant high utility, i.e., U(aj1)  U(aj2)
∀j1 < r, j2 ≥ r. Hence, I now focus on the probability of playing any action in Ar. I
assume that my assumptions are also generalized, i.e., pi,j >  ∀j < r, and the number
dm of suboptimal actions (aj , j ≥ r) in the Dm set increases with m for ST agents.
Theorem 4.1.6 The previous theorems generalize to settings where U(aj1)  U(aj2)
∀j1 < r, j2 ≥ r.
Proof Sketch: I give here a proof sketch. We just have to generate new pdfs p′i,j ,
such that p′i,0 =
∑r−1
j=0 pi,j , and p
′
i,b = pi,b+r−1,∀b 6= 0. We can then reapply the proofs
of the previous theorems, but replacing pi,j by p
′
i,j . Note that this does not guarantee
that all agents will tend to agree on the same action in Ar; but the team will still tend
to pick any action in Ar, since the agents are more likely to agree on actions in Ar than
on actions in A \Ar.
Now I discuss a different generalization: what happens when pi,0 decreases as m
increases (∀ agents i). If pi,0 → p˜i,0 as m→∞, the performance in the limit for a diverse
team will be p˜best evaluated at p˜i,0. Moreover, even if pi,0 → 0, my conclusions about
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(a) Convergence of pbest to predicted value.












(b) Actual performance value.
Figure 4.1: Comparing diverse and uniform when uniform also increases dm.
relative team performance are not affected as long as we are comparing two ST teams
that have similar pi,0: the same argument as in Corollary 1 implies that the team with
faster growing dm will perform better.
4.2 Experimental Analysis
4.2.1 Synthetic Experiments
I present synthetic experiments, in order to better understand what happens in real
systems. I generate agents by randomly creating pdfs and calculate the probability of
playing the best action (pbest) of the generated teams. I use a uniform distribution
to generate all random numbers. When creating a pdf, I rescale the values assigned
randomly, so that the overall sum of the pdf is equal to 1.
As I said earlier, uniform teams composed by NST agents is an idealization. In more
complex domains, the best agent will not behave exactly like an NST agent; the number
of suboptimal actions with a non-zero probability (dm) will also increase as the action
space gets larger. I perform synthetic experiments to study this situation. I consider that
the best agent is still closer to an NST agent, therefore it increases its dm at a slower
rate than the agents of the diverse team.
In my first experiment, I use teams of 4 agents. For each agent of the diverse team,
pi,0 is chosen randomly between 0.6 and 0.7. The remaining is distributed randomly from
10% to 20% of the next best actions (the number of actions that will receive a positive
probability is also decided randomly). For the uniform team, I make copies of the best
agent (with highest pi,0) of the diverse team, but distribute the remaining probability
randomly from 1% to 3% of the next best actions.
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Figure 4.2: pbest of a diverse team as the number of agents increases.
We can see the average result for 200 random teams in Figure 4.1, where in Figure
4.1(a) I show the difference between the performance in the limit (p˜best) and the actual
pbest(m) for the diverse and the uniform teams; in Figure 4.1(b) I show the average
pbest(m) of the teams. As can be seen, when the best agents increase their dm at a slower
rate than the agents of the diverse team, the uniform teams converge slower to p˜best. Even
though they play better than the diverse teams for a small m, they are surpassed by the
diverse teams as m increases. However, because p˜best of the uniform teams is actually
higher than the one of the diverse teams, eventually the performance of the uniform teams
get closer to the performance of the diverse teams, and will be better than the one of the
diverse teams again for a large enough m.
This situation is expected according to Theorem 4.1.1. If the dm of the best agent
also increases as m gets larger, the uniform team will actually behave like a diverse team
and also converge to p˜best. p˜
uniform
best ≥ p˜diversebest , as the best agent has a higher probability
of playing the optimal action. Hence, in the limit the uniform team will play better than
the diverse team. However, as we saw in Corollary 4.1.2, the speed of convergence is in
the order of 1/dm. Therefore, the diverse team will converge faster, and can overcome
the uniform team for moderately large m.
As Theorem 4.1.3 only holds when m→∞, I also explore the effect of increasing the
number of agents for a large m. The p˜best of a team of agents is shown as the dashed
line in Figure 4.2. I am plotting for agents that have a probability of playing the best
action of only 10%, but as we can see the probability quickly grows as the number of
agents increases. I also calculate pbest for random teams from 2 to 6 agents (shown as
the continuous line), when there are 300 available actions. Each agent has a probability
of playing the best action of 10%, and the remaining probability is randomly distributed
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over the 10% next best actions. As can be seen, the teams have a close performance to
the expected. I only show up to 6 agents because it is too computationally expensive to
calculate the pdfs of larger teams.
4.2.2 Computer Go
I present now results in a real system. I use in my experiments 4 different Go software:
Fuego 1.1, GnuGo 3.8, Pachi 9.01, MoGo 4, and two (weaker) variants of Fuego (Fuego∆
and FuegoΘ), in a total of 6 different, publicly available, agents. Fuego is considered
the strongest agent among all of them. Fuego is an implementation of the UCT Monte
Carlo Go algorithm, therefore it uses heuristics to simulate games in order to evaluate
board configurations. Fuego uses mainly 5 heuristics during these simulations, and they
are executed in a hierarchical order. The original Fuego agent follows the order <Atari
Capture, Atari Defend, Lowlib, Pattern> (The heuristic called Nakade is not enabled
by default). My variation called Fuego∆ follows the order <Atari Defend, Atari Cap-
ture, Pattern, Nakade, Lowlib>, while FuegoΘ follows the order <Atari Defend, Nakade,
Pattern, Atari Capture, Lowlib>. Also, Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ have half of the memory
available when compared with the original Fuego.
All my results are obtained by playing either 1000 games (to evaluate individual
agents) or 2000 games (to evaluate teams), in a HP dl165 with dual dodeca core, 2.33GHz
processors and 48GB of RAM. I compare results obtained by playing against a fixed
opponent. Therefore, I evaluate systems playing as white, against the original Fuego
playing as black. I removed all databases and specific board size knowledge of the agents,
including the opponent. I call Diverse as the team composed of all 6 agents, and Uniform
as the team composed of 6 copies of Fuego. Each agent is initialized with a different
random seed, therefore they will not vote for the same action all the time in a given world
state, due to the characteristics of the search algorithms. In all the graphs I present in this
section, the error bars show the confidence interval, with 99% of confidence (p = 0.01).
I evaluate the performance of the teams over 7 different board sizes. I changed the
time settings of individual agents as I increased the board size, in order to keep their
strength as constant as possible. The average winning rates of the team members is
shown in Table 4.2, while Table 4.3 show the winning rates of the individual agents1.
We can see my results in Figure 4.3 (a). Diverse improves from 58.1% on 9x9 to 72.1%
on 21x21, an increase in winning rate that is statistically significant with p < 2.2×10−16.
This result is expected according to Theorem 4.1.1. Uniform changes from 61.0% to
1In my first experiment, Diverse improved from 56.1% on 9x9 to 85.9% on 19x19. I noted, however, that
some of the diverse agents were getting stronger in relation to the opponent as the board size increased.
Hence, by changing the time setting to keep the strength constant, I am actually making my claims harder
to show, not easier.
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Team 9x9 11x11 13x13 15x15 17x17 19x19 21x21
Diverse 32.2% 30.8% 29.6% 29.4% 31.5% 31.9% 30.3%
Uniform 48.1% 48.6% 46.1% 48.0% 49.3% 46.9% 46.6%
Table 4.2: Average winning rates of the team members across different board sizes. Note
that these are not the winning rates of the teams.
Agent 9x9 11x11 13x13 15x15 17x17 19x19 21x21
Fuego 48.1% 48.6% 46.1% 48.0% 49.3% 46.9% 46.6%
GnuGo 1.1% 1.1% 1.9% 1.9% 4.5% 6.8% 6.1%
Pachi 25.7% 22.9% 25.8% 26.9% 23.5% 20.8% 11.0%
MoGo 27.6% 26.4% 22.7% 22.0% 27.1% 30.1% 27.1%
Fuego∆ 45.7% 45.8% 42.2% 40.4% 43.0% 44.5% 47.4%
FuegoΘ 45.5% 40.2% 39.2% 37.6% 41.8% 42.3% 43.6%
Table 4.3: Winning rates of each one of the agents across different board sizes.
65.8%, a statistically significant improvement with p = 0.0018. As we saw before, an
increase in the performance of Uniform can also be expected, as the best agent might
not be a perfect NST agent. A linear regression of the results of both teams gives a
slope of 0.010 for the diverse team (adjusted R2: 0.808, p = 0.0036) and 0.005 for the
uniform team (adjusted R2: 0.5695, p = 0.0305). Therefore, the diverse team improves
its winning rate faster than the uniform team. To check if this is a significant difference,
I evaluate the interaction term in a linear regression with multiple variables. We find
that the influence of board size is higher on Diverse than on Uniform with p = 0.0797
(estimated coefficient of “size of the board × group type”: −10.321, adjusted R2: 0.7437).
Moreover, on the 9x9 board Diverse is worse than Uniform (p = 0.0663), while on the
21x21 board Diverse is better with high statistical significance (p = 1.941 × 10−5). I
also analyze the performance of the teams subtracted by the average strength of their
members (Figure 4.3 (b)), in order to calculate the increase in winning rate achieved by
“teamwork” and compensate fluctuations on the winning rate of the agents as we change
the board size. Again, the diverse team improves faster than the uniform team. A linear
regression results in a slope of 0.0104 for Diverse (adjusted R2: 0.5549, p = 0.0546) and
0.0043 for Uniform (adjusted R2: 0.1283, p = 0.258).
I also evaluate the performance of teams of 4 agents (Diverse 4 and Uniform 4). For
Diverse 4, I removed Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ from the Diverse team. As can be seen in
Figure 4.4, the impact of adding more agents is higher for the diverse team in a larger
board size (21x21). In the 9x9 board, the difference between Diverse 4 and Diverse 6 is
only 4.4%; while in 21x21 it is 14%. Moreover, we can see a higher impact of adding
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(a) Absolute winning rates.




















(b) Relative to the average strength of team members.














Figure 4.4: Winning rates for 4 and 6 agents teams.
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agents for the diverse team, than for the uniform team. These results would be expected
according to Theorem 4.1.3.
As can be seen, the predictions of my theory holds: the diverse team improves signifi-
cantly as I increase the action space. The improvement is enough to make it change from
playing worse than the uniform team on 9x9 to playing better than the uniform team
with statistical significance on the 21x21 board. Furthermore, I show a higher impact of
adding more agents when the size of the board is larger.
4.2.3 Analysis
To test the assumptions of my model, I estimate a pdf for each one of the agents. For
each board size, and for each one of 1000 games from my experiments, I randomly choose
a board state between the first and the last movement. I make Fuego evaluate the chosen
board, but I give it a time limit 50x higher than the default one. Therefore, I use this
much stronger version of Fuego to approximate the true ranking of all actions. For each
board size, I run all agents in each board sample and check in which position of the
approximated true ranking they play. This allows me to build a histogram for each agent
and board size combination. Some examples can be seen in Figure 4.5. We can see that
a strong agent, like Fuego, has most of its probability mass on the higher ranked actions,
while weaker agents, like GnuGo, has the mass of its pdf distributed over a larger set of
actions, creating a larger tail. Moreover, the probability mass of GnuGo is spread over a
larger number of actions when I increase the size of the board.
I study how the pdfs of the agents change as we increase the action space. My
hypothesis is that weaker agents will have a behavior closer to ST agents, while stronger
agents to NST agents. In Figure 4.6 (a) I show how many actions receive a probability
higher than 0. As can be seen, Fuego does not behave exactly like an NST agent.
However, it does have a slower growth rate than the other agents. A linear regression
gives the following slopes: 13.08, 19.82, 19.05, 15.82, 15.69, 16.03 for Fuego, Gnugo,
Pachi, Mogo, Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ, respectively (R2: 0.95, 0.98, 0.94, 0.98, 0.98, 0.98,
respectively). It is clear, therefore, that the probability mass of weak agents is distributed
into bigger sets of actions as we increase the action space, and even though the strongest
agent does not behave in the idealized way it does have a slower growth rate.
I also verify how the probability of playing the best action changes for each one of the
agents as the number of actions increase. Figure 4.6 (b) shows that even though all agents
experience a decrease in pi,0, it does not decrease much. From 9x9, all the way to 21x21, I
measure the following decrease: 20%, 23%, 39%, 26%, 28%, 22%, for Fuego, Gnugo, Pachi,
Mogo, Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ, respectively. Hence, on average, they decreased about 25%
from 9x9 to 21x21. Even though my assumption about pi,0 does not hold perfectly, the
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0 100 200RankingFuegoΘ - 21x21
Fuego - 13x13
0 100 200RankingFuego - 17x17
GnuGo - 13x13
0 100 200RankingGnuGo - 17x17
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0 100 200RankingPachi - 13x13
0 100 200RankingPachi - 17x17
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0 100 200RankingFuegoΘ - 17x17
Figure 4.5: Histograms of agents for different board sizes.
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(a) Size of the set of actions that receive a nonzero
probability.














(b) pi,0 as the size of the board grows.
Figure 4.6: Verifying the assumptions in the real system.
predictions of my model are still verified. Therefore, the amount of decrease experienced
is not enough to avoid that the diverse team increases in performance as the action space
grows.
4.3 Conclusion and Discussions
Diversity is an important point to consider when forming teams. In this chapter I present
a new model that captures better than previous ones the intuitive notion of diverse agents
as agents that tend to disagree. This model allows me to make new predictions. I show
that the performance of diverse teams increases as the size of the action space gets larger.
Uniform teams may also increase in performance, but at a slower pace than diverse teams.
Therefore, even though a diverse team may start playing worse than a uniform team, it
can eventually outperform the uniform team as the action space increases. Besides, I show
that in large action spaces the performance of a diverse team converges exponentially fast
to the optimal one as the number of agents increases.
I start my model with the notion of spreading tail (ST ) and non-spreading tail (NST )
agents. ST agents are agents that have a non-zero probability over a larger set of actions
as the action space increases, while NST agents always have a constant number of actions
with non-zero probability. I define a diverse team as a team of ST agents, and a uniform
team as a team of NST agents. Therefore, my focus change from modeling diverse teams
as teams with different agents (as in Chapter 3), to focusing on diverse teams as teams
where the agents tend to disagree. This change allows me to make new predictions that
were not possible before.
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Note that my model does not say that an NST agent will never vote for a new action.
I define the pdfs of the agents by the rankings of the actions. Hence, when the number of
actions increases from a certain number x0 to a new number x1, a new action a∗ may be
the action with highest utility. Therefore, an agent will assign to a∗ the same probability
that it assigned before to the previously best action when the number of actions was only
x0. A uniform team made of copies of the best agent also does not mean that the agents
always vote for the same actions. The vote of each agent is a sample from a pdf, so copies
of a single agent may or may not vote for the same action. In fact, we observe an increase
in performance by voting among multiple copies of a single agent, both theoretically and
experimentally.
The division of agents into two types (ST and NST ) is, however, only an idealization,
that allows me to isolate and study in detail the effect of diversity. A very strong agent
will normally assign most of its probability mass to the actions with the highest utility,
so in the extreme its pdf would never change by adding new actions. In reality, however,
it may also consider a larger set of actions as the action space grows. Therefore, I relax
my model, and introduce the hypothesis that the best agent spreads the tail of its pdf
at a slower pace than weaker agents. I show that because of this effect, a diverse team
increases in performance faster than uniform teams, and I illustrate this phenomenon with
synthetic experiments. Hence, even in a relaxed model where both diverse and uniform
teams are composed of ST agents, a diverse team still outperforms a uniform team as the
action space grows. The effect, however, is transient, as a uniform team may still have a
higher convergence point than a diverse team, so in extreme large action spaces it would
again outperform the diverse team. If the agents have the same probability of playing
the best action, however, then it is clear that in the limit the diverse team will always be
better than the uniform team.
My model needs one strong assumption: that the probability of the individual agents
voting for the best action does not change as the action space increases. This assumption
allows my analysis to be cleaner, although it may not hold perfectly in a real system.
In fact, in my Computer Go experiments we did observe a decrease in the probability
of the agents voting for the best action. However, even though the assumption did not
hold perfectly, the predictions of my theory holds: a diverse team significantly increased
in performance as the action space got larger. Clearly, a decrease in the probability of
the individual agents voting for the best action will decrease the performance of a team,
while the effects studied in this paper will increase the performance. Therefore, as long
as the decrease is not large enough to counter-balance the effect under study, we are still
going to observe an increase in performance as the action space gets larger. Moreover,
as I discuss in my generalizations, the argument that teams that spread the tail faster
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converge faster is still valid when the assumption does not hold; hence if the agents are
equally strong (i.e., the individual agents have the same probability of voting for the best
action) the team with faster growing tail will always perform better.
As mentioned, I verified my theory in a real system of Computer Go playing agents.
Not only a real diverse team of agents effectively increased in performance as the board
size increased, but I also verified that the strongest agent indeed spreads the tail of its pdf
at a slower rate than other weaker agents. I also verified that both diverse and uniform
teams increase in performance, but the diverse team increased two times faster. This is
explained by the relaxed version of my model, when I predict diverse teams to converge
faster than uniform teams, as illustrated by my synthetic experiments.
In the next chapter, I will study diverse and uniform teams in the context of design
problems, where the number of optimal solutions must be maximized, allowing a human
to choose according to aesthetics or compromises that cannot be formalized.
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Chapter 5
So Many Options, but We Need Them All
Creativity is allowing yourself to make mistakes.
Art is knowing which ones to keep.
(Scott Adams)
5.1 Introduction
Teams of voting agents are a powerful tool for finding the optimal solution in many
applications [Mao et al., 2013, Bachrach et al., 2012, Soejima et al., 2010, Polikar, 2012,
Isa et al., 2010]. Voting is a popular approach since it is easily parallelizable, it allows
the re-use of existing agents, and there are theoretical guarantees for finding one optimal
choice [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005, List and Goodin, 2001].
For design problems, however, finding one optimal solution is not enough. For ex-
ample, it could be mathematically optimal under measurable metrics but lack aesthetic
qualities or social acceptance by the target public. Besides, the solution could have a poor
performance in some key objective of a multi-objective optimization problem. Essentially,
designers need to explore a large set of optimal alternatives, to pick one solution not only
according to her aesthetic taste (and/or the one of the target public), but also according
to preferences that may be unknown or not formalized, especially when there are multi-
ple optimization objectives leading to intricate trade-offs and compromises [Gerber, 2007,
Woodbury and Burrow, 2006, Radford and Gero, 1980, van Langen and Brazier, 2006,
Gero and Sosa, 2008].
Hence, we actually need systems that find as many optimal solutions as possible,
allowing a human to explore such optimal alternatives to make a choice. Even if a user
does not want to consider too many solutions, they can be filtered and clustered [Erhan
et al., 2014], and be presented in manageable ways [Smith et al., 2010], allowing her to
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easily make an informed choice. Therefore, a system of voting agents that produces a
unique optimal solution is insufficient, and I propose the novel social choice problem of
maximizing the number of optimal alternatives found by a voting system. As ranked
voting may suffer from noisy rankings when using existing agents (Chapter 6), I study
multiple plurality voting iterations, allowing great applicability and re-use of existing
agents.
Traditionally, social choice studies the optimality of voting rules, assuming a certain
noise models for the agents, and rankings composed of a linear order over alternatives
[Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005, Caragiannis et al., 2013, List and Goodin, 2001]. Hence,
there is a single optimal choice, and a system is successful if it can return that optimal
choice with high probability. More recently, several works have been considering cases
where there is a partial order over alternatives [Xia and Conitzer, 2011a, Procaccia et al.,
2012], or where the agents output pairwise comparisons instead of rankings [Elkind and
Shah, 2014]. However, these works still focus on finding an optimal alternative, or a
fixed-sized set of optimal alternatives (where the size is known beforehand). Therefore,
they still provide no help in finding the maximum set of optimal solutions. Moreover,
they assume agents that are able to output comparisons among all actions with fairly
good precision, and the use of multiple voting iterations has never been studied. When
considering agents with different preferences, the field is focused on verifying if voting
rules satisfy a set of axioms that are considered to be important to achieve fairness
[Nurmi, 1987].
Meanwhile, the computational design literature has not yet found the potential of
teams of voting agents. They mainly study traditional optimization techniques to find
optimal solutions, such as genetic algorithms [Miles et al., 2001, Yi and Malkawi, 2009,
Gerber and Lin, 2013], particle swarm optimization [Luh et al., 2011, Felkner et al., 2013],
ant colony optimization [Luh and Lin, 2009], immune systems [Zhao et al., 2014], etc.
Many researchers also explore the potential of swarms of agents that interact on the
geometric space to emerge aesthetically complex shapes (but lacking any optimization
attempt) [Snooks, 2011, Vehlken, 2014, Aranda and Lasch, 2006, Baharlou and Menges,
2013, Ireland, 2009, Carranza and Coates, 2000, Hanna, 2005]. Therefore, the literature
still lacks a deep study of other multi-agent techniques and ideas.
Hence, in this chapter I bring together the social choice and computational design
fields, offering new perspectives to both literatures. I present a theoretical study of which
kinds of teams are desirable for design problems, and how their size may effect optimality.
In doing so, I show many novel results for the study of multi-agent systems. For example,
instead of studying agents with different preferences in order to verify fairness axioms, as
in traditional social choice, I show here that agents with different preferences are actually
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fundamental when voting to find a “truth” (i.e., optimal decisions). On the other hand,
agents with the same set of preferences significantly harm the performance, and in general
the number of optimal solutions decreases as the size of the team grows. Such results
were never seen before in the social choice literature, as voting to estimate optimality
is normally studied separated from voting as a way to aggregate agents with different
preferences.
My theoretical development draws a novel connection between social choice and num-
ber theory, instead of the traditional connections with bayesian probability theory. This
novel connection allows me to show, for instance, that the optimal diverse team size is
constant with high probability, and a prime number of optimal actions may impose prob-
lems. I also show that we can maximize the number of optimal solutions with agents with
different preferences as the team size grows, as long as the team size grows carefully.
Moreover, I simulate design agents in synthetic experiments to further study my
model, confirming the predictions of my theory and providing realistic insights into what
happens when systems run with bounded computational time. Finally, I present exper-
iments in a highly relevant domain: architectural design, where I show teams of real
design agents that vote to choose the best qualifying and energy-efficient design solutions
for buildings. Such domain is fundamental in the current scenario where we must find
energy-efficient solutions for our modern life-style, since it is known that the early design
of a building has a major impact in its performance through-out its whole life-span [Lin
and Gerber, 2014, Bogensta¨tter, 2000, Echenagucia et al., 2015]. I study actual teams of
voting agents, and show that by aggregating their opinions, we are able to find a large
percentage of optimal solutions, significantly overcoming single agents. I also discuss how
my model can explain and make predictions about the real system, and how it can guide
researchers in computational design when developing novel agents for design.
5.2 Design Domains
I consider in this chapter domains where the objective is to find the highest number of
optimal solutions. I show that design is one of such domains. With the rapid development
of computation, algorithmic techniques have been emerging as an important approach in
design [Terzidis, 2006]. For example, Gero [2000] argues that computational approaches
can be used to increase the space of design exploration and the creativity in designs.
One of the most common computational design approaches is to use parametric designs
[Vierlinger and Bollinger, 2014, Globa et al., 2014, Erhan et al., 2014], where a human
designer creates an initial design of a product using computer-aided design tools. However,

















Figure 5.1: A parametric design of a building, showing two parameters: X1 and Y 1.
values can be modified to change the design of the product. It is up to the designer to
decide which parameters are going to be available, their valid types and their valid range.
This approach is used because design is an inherently complex problem [Simon, 1973].
Although a human is able to test and evaluate a few solutions looking for optimality, the
number of different possibilities that she can manually create is highly limited, especially
under the (common) hard time-constraints. In Figure 5.1, I show a simple example in
the context of architectural design, where the parameters X1 and Y 1 are being used to
specify the position of the lower left corner of the building relative to the site boundary.
The design of a product normally occurs over multiple phases, where increasing levels
of details are decided and optimized. My work is focused on the initial design phase,
when multiple possible design alternatives are analyzed in order to choose one for further
study and optimization. This initial design phase is, however, very important to the final
performance of a product [Smith et al., 2010, Holzer et al., 2007]. For example, in the
context of architectural design (as how I explore later in my experiments), it has been
acknowledged that it has a high impact on the overall building performance [Bogensta¨tter,
2000, Lin and Gerber, 2014, Echenagucia et al., 2015, Yi and Malkawi, 2009].
Design problems are in general multi-objective [Lin and Gerber, 2012, Keough and
Benjamin, 2010], since a product normally must be optimized across different objectives.
For example, a product should have a low cost, but at the same time high quality, two
highly-contradictory objectives. Hence, there are a large number of optimal solutions, all
tied in a Pareto frontier. For the computational system, these optimal solutions are all
equivalent. However, a human may have unknown preferences, may dynamically decide to
value some objective over another when handling intricate trade-offs, and/or may choose
the option that most pleases her own aesthetic taste or the one of the target public/client.
Note that choosing a design according to aesthetics is an undefined problem, since
there are no formal definitions to compare among different options. Hence, the best that a
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system can do is to provide a human with a large number of optimal solutions (according
to other measurable factors), allowing her to freely decide among equally optimal solutions
— but most probably with different aesthetic qualities.
Therefore, it is natural that in design problems we are going to have many possible
solutions, and we want to find as many optimal ones as possible. In fact, the exploration of
a large space of possible alternatives is essential in design, as recently shown by Woodbury
and Burrow [2006], van Langen and Brazier [2006], and Gero and Sosa [2008]. There are
many benefits in discovering a large number of optimal solutions, and I list some of them
below:
Knowledge “Does not Hurt”: I argue that having more optimal solutions to
choose from is not worse than having less. Although some works in psychology show
that humans may get frustrated in the face of too many options, especially under time
pressure [Haynes, 2009, Iyengar and Lepper, 2000], I argue that if a designer has enough
time or motivation to analyze only x solutions, she can do so with a system that provides
more than x optimal solutions by sampling the exact amount that she desires. However,
she will never be able to do so with a system that provides less than x optimal solutions.
Note also that the works in psychology [Haynes, 2009, Iyengar and Lepper, 2000]
were taken in the context of consumers deciding among products to purchase, not in
the context of design exploration. As mentioned before, in design the necessity of large
exploration spaces is recognized [Gerber, 2007, Woodbury and Burrow, 2006, van Langen
and Brazier, 2006, Gero and Sosa, 2008].
Moreover, as I discuss in detail later, voting systems could be combined with another
system that identify and eliminate solutions that are similar by applying clustering and
analysis techniques, and that presents the optimal alternatives to a human in a manage-
able way [Erhan et al., 2014, Smith et al., 2010], so that every solution that the human
looks at is meaningful.
Knowledge Increases Confidence in Optimality: In general design problems,
the true Pareto frontier is unknown. Genetic algorithms are widely used in order to es-
timate it. The only knowledge available for the system to evaluate the optimality is in
comparison with the other solutions that are also being evaluated during the optimization
process [Lin and Gerber, 2014]. Many apparently “optimal” solutions are actually dis-
covered to be sub-optimal as we find more solutions. Hence, finding a higher number of
optimal solutions decreases the risk of a designer picking a wrong choice that was initially
outputted as “optimal” by a system (for example, the single agents, as I will show later).
Knowledge Increases Aesthetic Qualities: If a human has a larger set of optimal
solutions to choose from, there is a greater likelihood that at least one of these solutions
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is going to be of high aesthetic quality according to her preferences, or the ones of the
target public [Gero and Sosa, 2008].
Knowledge Increases Diversity of Options: In general, when a system x has
more optimal solutions available than a system y, it does not necessarily imply that the
solutions in the system x are more similar, while the optimal solutions in y are more
different/diverse. In fact, all things equal (i.e., the algorithms are equally able to find
unique solutions), the greater the amount of optimal solutions, the higher the likelihood
that we have more diverse solutions available.
Of course we could have some algorithm x that produces many optimal solutions
by creating small variations of one unique solution, but here I do not consider these
potentially misleading systems. Again, I assume that such solutions could be identified
and filtered by another system [Erhan et al., 2014, Smith et al., 2010].
5.3 Agent Teams for Design Problems
I present my theory of agent teams for design problems. I consider teams that vote
together at each possible decision point of the design of a product (for example, they
may vote for the value of each parameter, in a parametric design). Before showing my
theoretical development, I first show an example to give an intuitive idea about my results.
Then, in Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 I show my formal results.
5.3.1 Example
Let’s consider a parametric design problem with two different parameters: ω1 and ω2.
Let’s say that for ω1 there are two possible optimal values: a0 or a1. For ω2, let’s assume
three possible optimal values: a1, a2, a3. I consider that any solution with an optimal
value for each parameter is optimal, and hence there are 6 (and only 6) possible optimal
vectors: < a0, a1 >, < a0, a2 >, < a0, a3 >, < a1, a1 >, < a1, a2 >, < a1, a3 >.
Of course the information of which actions are optimal is not known before-hand,
otherwise we would not need a design system at all. I list here the optimal values only
for the purpose of my example.
I will study teams where each agent outputs a value for each parameter, and these
opinions are aggregated by voting. Voting across each parameter, however, will only
produce a single solution. Therefore, I consider multiple voting iterations (where one
iteration goes across all parameters). At each iteration, we may find a new optimal






Action a0 a1 a2 a3




Agent 1 0.3 0.7
Agent 2 0.3 0.7
Agent 3 0.3 0.7
Agent 4 0.7 0.3
Agent 5 0.7 0.3
Agent 6 0.7 0.3
(a) First parameter
Action a0 a1 a2 a3
Agent 1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4
Agent 2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1
Agent 3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1
Agent 4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4
Agent 5 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
Agent 6 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
(b) Second parameter
(II) Diverse agents
Table 5.1: Probability distribution function of the agents in my example.
I will study in this chapter the performance of different kinds of teams. Consider
now that we have a strong agent, that always votes for optimal values, but according to
the probabilities shown in Table 5.1 (I). We can see, therefore, that each time we run
such agent, it has a greater tendency of voting for ω1 := a1 and ω2 := a2 than the other
possible optimal values.
Now, let’s first consider a uniform team composed of multiple copies of the previously
mentioned strong agent. The vote of each agent is a different sample from the same
probability distribution function (pdf) in Table 5.1 (I). I consider that the team aggregates
the opinions of its members by plurality voting for each parameter. That is, for each
parameter the team takes the decision voted by the largest number of agents. As each
individual agent has a greater tendency of voting for ω1 := a1 and ω2 := a2, we expect to
see the optimal solution < a1, a2 > more often than the other possible optimal solutions.
In fact, in Table 5.2 (a) I calculate the probability of finding each possible optimal solution
for uniform teams of 6 and 12 agents. As we can see, even though the probability of
outputting any optimal solution remains constant as 1, the higher the number of agents
the higher the likelihood that the team will output the solution < a1, a2 >.
Of course, we have limited time to find optimal design alternatives. Consider, for
example, that we can run the whole system only 10 times. Ideally, we want to find all
the 6 possible optimal solutions within these 10 iterations. In expectancy, however, with
6 agents we would repeat the solution < a1, a2 > 6.7 times, and with 12 agents 8.4 times.
Hence, we would end up being able to find only around 3 optimal solutions.
Consider now a diverse team composed of agents with different preferences, as shown
in Table 5.1 (II). We can see the pdfs when aggregating the opinions of such agents with
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Solution < a0, a1 > < a0, a2 > < a0, a3 > < a1, a1 > < a1, a2 > < a1, a3 >
6 Agents 0.0160 0.1310 0.0160 0.0822 0.6724 0.0822
12 Agents 0.0033 0.0715 0.0033 0.0393 0.8430 0.0393
(a) Uniform Team
Solution < a0, a1 > < a0, a2 > < a0, a3 > < a1, a1 > < a1, a2 > < a1, a3 >
6 Agents 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590
12 Agents 0.1638 0.1638 0.1638 0.1638 0.1638 0.1638
(b) Diverse Team
Table 5.2: Probability of outputting each possible optimal solution, for the diverse and
uniform teams.
plurality voting in Table 5.2 (b). For a 6 agents team I consider one copy of each agent,
and for a 12 agents team I consider two copies of each agent. As we can notice, even
though now the probabilities of voting for optimal solutions sum up to 0.954 ≤ 1 with 6
agents, they are evenly distributed over all optimal solutions. Hence, if we run 10 voting
iterations, each option is expected to be seen 1.5 times. Moreover, when we increase the
number of agents to 12, the team improves, as the probabilities of voting for each optimal
solution increases (summing up now to 0.982), but they remain evenly distributed. Hence,
each option is expected to be seen now 1.6 times.
As we can see, teams of agents with different preferences have a great potential in
increasing the number of optimal solutions that we can find, as there is a greater prob-
ability of finding a new solution each time we run the system, even though the agents
themselves may have a lower probability of finding optimal solutions than the ones in the
uniform team.
However, the performance of the team also depends on the team size, and it will not
necessarily increase as the team grows (even for the diverse team). For example, in Table
5.3 we can see the pdfs of the diverse team for other team sizes. As we can see, even
though the team size increases, for several optimal solutions the probability of voting for
them decreases. For example, the solution < a0, a3 > goes from 0.1590 with 6 agents all
the way down to 0.0787 with 9 agents. Hence, we will see a lower number of optimal
solutions after 10 voting iterations. However, when the number of agents reaches 12, we
again have the situation where the total probability is equally divided across all possible
optimal solutions.
Hence, the diverse team will, in general, improve as the team size grows, but not
for all team sizes. Therefore, we have to increase the team size carefully to guarantee
optimality. In the next section I formalize my theory.
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Solution < a0, a1 > < a0, a2 > < a0, a3 > < a1, a1 > < a1, a2 > < a1, a3 >
6 Agents 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590 0.1590
7 Agents 0.1107 0.1515 0.1515 0.1466 0.2007 0.2007
8 Agents 0.1118 0.1468 0.1118 0.1806 0.2371 0.1806
9 Agents 0.1046 0.1333 0.0787 0.2171 0.2766 0.1632
10 Agents 0.1065 0.1713 0.1065 0.1641 0.2638 0.1641
11 Agents 0.1339 0.1687 0.1339 0.1666 0.2099 0.1666
12 Agents 0.1638 0.1638 0.1638 0.1638 0.1638 0.1638
Table 5.3: Probability of outputting each possible optimal solution, for different sizes of
the diverse team.
5.3.2 Theory
I consider here a team of agents that vote together at each decision point of the design
of a product. For the sake of clarity and precision, I present in this section an idealized
model. In Section 5.3.3 I generalize my model to more complex situations, and in Section
5.4 I generalize further by performing synthetic experiments.
Let Φ be a set of agents φ, and Ω a set of world states ω. Each ω has an associated
set of possible actions Aω. For example, each world state may represent a parameter of
a parametric design problem, and each action may represent a possible value for such
parameter. At each world state, each agent φ outputs an action a, an optimal action
according to the agent’s imperfect evaluation – which may or may not be a truly optimal
action. Hence, there is a probability pj that the agent outputs a certain action aj . The
teams take the action decided by plurality voting (i.e, as mentioned in the previous section,
the team takes the decision voted by the largest number of agents – I consider ties are
broken uniformly at random).
I assume first that the world states are independent, and by taking an optimal action
at all world states we find an optimal solution for the entire problem. That is, I assume
first that by taking locally optimal decisions at each design decision point, a globally
optimal solution is obtained. I generalize this assumption later, in Proposition 5.3.10 (in
Section 5.3.3), where I consider design problems with correlated parameters. I will also
further discuss this assumption in Section 5.6.
In this chapter my objective goes beyond finding one optimal solution, I want to
maximize the number of optimal solutions that we can find. For greater applicability, I
consider here agents that output a single action. Hence, we generate multiple solutions
by re-applying the voting procedure across all world states multiple times (which are
called voting iterations – one iteration goes across all world states, forming one solution).
Formally, let S be the set of (unique) optimal solutions that we find by re-applying the
71
voting procedure through z iterations. Our objective is to maximize |S|. I will show
that, under some conditions, we can achieve that when z →∞ (I study bounded time in
Section 5.4).
I consider that at each world state ω there is a subset Goodω ⊂ Aω of optimal
actions in ω. An optimal solution is going to be composed by assigning any a ∈ Goodω
in world state ω – for all world states. Conversely, I consider the complementary subset
Badω ⊂ Aω, such that Goodω∪Badω = Aω,Goodω∩Badω = ∅. I drop the subscripts
ω when it is clear that I am referring to a certain world state.
One fundamental problem is selecting which agents should form a team. By the
classical voting theories, one would expect the best teams to be uniform teams composed
of multiple copies of the best agent [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005, List and Goodin,
2001]. Here I show, however, that for design problems uniform teams need very strong
assumptions to be optimal, and in most cases they actually converge to always outputting
a single solution – an undesirable outcome. However, diverse teams are optimal as long
as the team size grows carefully, as I explain later in Theorem 5.3.6.
I call a team optimal when: (i) |S| → ∏ω |Goodω| as z → ∞, and (ii) all optimal
solutions are chosen by the team with the same probability 1/
∏
ω |Goodω|. Otherwise,
even though the team still produces all optimal solutions, it would tend to repeat already
generated solutions whose probability is higher. Since in practice there are time bounds,
such condition is fundamental to have as many optimal solutions as possible in limited
time. Also note that condition (ii) subsumes condition (i), but I keep both for clarity.
I first consider agents whose pdfs are independent and identically distributed. Let
pGoodj be the probability of voting for aj ∈ Good, and pBadk be the probability of voting
for ak ∈ Bad. Let n := |Φ| be the size of the team, and Nl be the number of agents that
vote for al in a certain voting iteration. If ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad, pGoodj > pBadk , the
team is going to find one optimal solution with probability 1 as n→∞, as I show in the
following observation:
Observation 5.3.1 The probability of a team outputting one optimal solution goes to 1
as n→∞, if pGoodj > pBadk , ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad.
Note that as the agents are independent and identically distributed, we can model the
process of pooling the opinions of n agents as a multinomial distribution with n trials
(and the probability of any class k of the multinomial corresponds to the probability pk
of voting for an action ak).
Hence, for each action al, the expected number of votes is given by E[Nl] = n × pl.
Therefore, by the law of large numbers, if pGoodj > p
Bad
k ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad, we have
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that Nj > Nk. Hence, the team will pick an action aj ∈ Good, in all world states, if n
is large enough (i.e., n→∞).
However, with a team made of copies of the same agent, the system is likely to lose
the ability to generate new solutions as n increases. If, for each ω, we have an action




j ∀aωm 6= aωj , the team converges to picking only action aωm.
Hence, |S| = 1, which is a very negative result for design problems. Therefore, contrary
to traditional social choice, here it is not the case that increasing the team size always
improves performance.
I formalize this notion in Proposition 5.3.2 below, where I also show the conditions for




j be the probability of picking any




|Good| + λj ,
where
∑
j λj := 0. Hence, some λj are positive, and some are negative (unless they are
all equal to 0). Let λ+ be the set of λj > 0. Let λ
High be the maximum possible value
for λj ∈ λ+, such that the relation pGoodj > pBadk , ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad is preserved. I
show that when z → ∞, |S| is the highest as maxλ+ → 0, and the lowest (i.e., one) as
minλ+ → λHigh. Note that maxλ+ → 0 represents the situation where the probability
is equally divided among all optimal actions, and minλ+ → λHigh represents the case
where one optimal action receives a high probability in comparison with the other optimal
actions.
Proposition 5.3.2 The maximum value for |S| is ∏ω |Goodω|. When z, n → ∞, as
maxλ+ → 0, |S| →∏ω |Goodω|. Conversely, as minλ+ → λHigh, |S| → 1.
Proof: As maxλ+ → 0, λj → 0, ∀aj . Hence, E[Nj ]→ n× pGood|Good| , ∀aj ∈ Good. Because
ties are broken randomly, at each world state ω, each aj ∈ Goodω is selected by the
team with equal probability 1|Goodω | . As E[Nj ] = E[Nk] ∀aj , ak ∈ Good, we have that at
each ω it is possible to choose |Goodω| different actions. Hence, there are
∏
ω |Goodω|
possible combinations of solutions. At each voting iteration, ties are broken at each ω
randomly, and one possible combination is generated. As z →∞, eventually we cover all
possible combinations, and |S| →∏ω |Goodω|.
Conversely, as minλ+ → λHigh, E[Nj ]→ n×pGoodj for one fixed aj such that pGoodj >
pGoodk , ∀aj 6= ak ∈ Good. Consequently, E[Nj ] > E[Nk], at each ω. Hence, there is no tie
in any world state, and the team picks a fixed aωj at each world state. Therefore, even if
z →∞, |S| → 1. Note that I do not say here that the same action is picked across world
states (as aωj may differ for each ω), but that the same optimal solution is picked for all
voting iterations.
Therefore, uniform teams need a very strong assumption to satisfy condition (i): the






























Figure 5.2: Illustrative example of the probability distribution functions of two diverse
agents.
actions (i.e., maxλ+ → 0). If maxλ+ → 0, condition (ii) is also satisfied as n grows,
because of Observation 5.3.1 (i.e., the probability of outputting a suboptimal solution
goes to 0) and because of the fact that all actions are equally likely to be chosen; hence
each solution is chosen with equal probability 1/
∏
ω |Goodω|.
I show that, alternatively, we can use agents with different “preferences” (i.e., “di-
verse” agents), to maximize |S|. I consider here agents that have about the same ability
in problem-solving, but they prefer different optimal actions. As the agents have simi-
lar ability, I consider here the probabilities to be the same across agents, except for the
actions in Good, as each agent φi has a subset Good
i ⊂ Good consisting of its pre-
ferred actions (which are more likely to be chosen than other actions). I denote by pij
the probability of agent φi voting for action aj . Hence, I define the pdf of the diverse
agents as: ∀aj ∈ Goodi, let pGoodi :=
∑
j pij , pij :=
pGoodi
|Goodi| ; ∀aj ∈ Good \ Goodi,
pij :=
pGood−pGoodi
|Good\Goodi| ; and ∀ak /∈ Goodi, aj ∈ Goodi, pij > pik. Goodi ∩Goodl (of agents
φi and φl) is not necessarily ∅. The pdfs are strictly defined in this section for the sake of
clarity and precision, but in the next section and in my synthetic experiments I generalize
further. In Figure 5.2 I show an illustrative example of the pdf of two agents.
Let’s consider we can draw diverse agents from a distribution F . Each agent φi has
r < |Good| actions in its Goodi, and I assume that all actions in Good are equally likely
to be selected to form Goodi (since they are all equally optimal). Note that r is the same























Figure 5.3: Illustrative example of Equation 5.1. Here I show 6 agents (n := 6) with
2 preferred actions each (r := 2). Each action is in the list of preferences of 4 agents
(k := 4). As an example, I mark with a dashed circle one of the actions, a2.
and that I also cover the case where each agent prefers a single action (which would be
r := 1).
I will show that by drawing n agents from F , the team is optimal for large n with
probability 1, as long as n is a multiple of a divisor (> 1) of each |Goodω|. I will also
show that the minimum necessary optimal team size is constant with high probability as
the number of world states grow. I start with the following proposition:
Proposition 5.3.3 If a team of size n is optimal at a world state, then gcd(n, |Good|) >
1. That is, n and |Good| are not co-prime.
Proof: (By contradiction). By the optimality requirement (ii), each action must be in
the Goodi set of the same number of agents. Otherwise, if an action ai is preferred by
a larger number of agents than another action aj , the team would pick ai with a larger
probability than aj . Hence, we must have that:
n× r = k × |Good|, (5.1)
where k is a constant ∈ N>0. k represents the number of agents that have a given action
aj in its Good
i. Note that it must be the same for all optimal actions, and therefore we
have a single constant.
If n and |Good| are co-prime, then it must be the case that r is divisible by |Good|.
However, this yields r ≥ |Good|, which contradicts our assumption. Therefore, n and
|Good| are not co-prime.
I illustrate Equation 5.1 with an example in Figure 5.3. In the figure I show 6 agents
(n := 6), with 2 preferred actions each (r := 2), equivalent to the example that I showed
before in Table 5.1 (II-b). Note that each action is preferred by 4 agents, and hence I
show a case where k := 4. As an example, I mark with a dashed circle one of the actions,
a2. In such case, the team will have an equal probability of picking all optimal actions,
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and optimality condition (ii) would be satisfied if the probability of picking suboptimal
actions is 0.
If, for example, we now change agent 5 to prefer actions a2 and a3 (replacing action
a1 by a2), then the team would be more likely to pick action a2 by plurality voting than
any other action, and it would be less likely to pick action a1 than any other action.
As the number of voting iterations is limited in actual applications, this situation is not
desirable.
Note that we could also have a case where one agent prefers a larger number of
actions than others. For example, we could change agent 5 to prefer actions a1, a2
and a3. However, as the agent has a limited amount of probability distributed over the
actions in the Goodi set (i.e., pGoodi), we have that necessarily the probability of the
agent voting for a1 and a3 would drop; hence, the team would pick a2 more often than
the other actions, and a1 and a3 less often than the other actions.
This does not mean, however, that there is a single optimal configuration for each
number of optimal actions |Good|. There are multiple possible solutions for Equation
5.1, but in any possible solution we will find that the size of the team n and |Good| are
not co-prime.
Proposition 5.3.3 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for optimality. That is, if
Equation 5.1 is satisfied, all optimal actions will be selected with the same probability,
but it is still necessary for the probability of picking suboptimal actions to go to 0 in
order to fully satisfy condition (ii). That will be the case if pGoodi = 1, or if n→∞, since
pGoodj > p
Bad
k , ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad.
Note that Proposition 5.3.3 implies hard restrictions for world states where |Good|
is prime, or for teams with prime size n: if n is prime, |Good| must be a multiple of n;
and if |Good| is prime, n must be a multiple of |Good|.
Now let’s analyze across a set of world states Ω. For a team of fixed size n, Proposition
5.3.3 applies across all world states. Hence, the team size must be a multiple of a divisor
(> 1) of each |Goodω|. Note that the pdfs of the agents (and also r) may change according
to ω. Let D be a set containing one divisor of each world state (if two or more world
states have a common divisor x, it will be representable by only one x ∈D). Hence, ∀ω,
∃d ∈D, such that d ∣∣ |Goodω|; and ∀d ∈D, ∃Goodω, such that d ∣∣ |Goodω|. There are
multiple possible D sets, from the superset of all possibilities D .
Therefore, we can now study the minimum size necessary for an optimal team. Ap-
plying Proposition 5.3.3 at each world state ω, we have that the minimum size necessary
for an optimal team is n = minD∈D
∏
d∈D d. Hence, our worst case is when each |Goodω|
is a unique prime, as the team will have to be a product of all (unique) optimal action
space sizes. This means that:
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Proposition 5.3.4 In the worst case, the minimum team size is exponential in the size
of the world states |Ω|. In the best case, the minimum necessary team size is a constant
with |Ω|.
Proof: In the worst case, each added world state ω has a unique prime optimal action
space size. Hence, the minimum team size is at least the product of the first |Ω| primes,
which, by the prime number theorem, has growth rate exp((1 + o(1))|Ω| log |Ω|). In the
best case, each addedGoodω has a common divisor with previous ones, and the minimum
necessary team size does not change.
However, I show that the worst case happens with low probability, and the best case
with high probability. Let G be the maximum possible |Good|, and M := |Ω|. Assume
that each world state ωj will have a uniformly randomly drawn number of optimal actions,
denoted as mj , for all j = 1, . . . ,M (i.e., ∀ω ∈ Ω). I assume that G is large enough, so
that the probability that a given mj has factor p is 1/p.
Proposition 5.3.5 The probability that the minimum necessary team size grows expo-
nentially tends to 0, and the probability that it is constant tends to 1, as M →∞.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that the probability that m1, . . . ,mM−1 are all co-prime
with mM tends to 0 as M →∞. That is, I show that when adding a new world state
ωM , its |Goodω| will have a common factor with the size of the Good set of some of the
other world states with high probability.
Given any prime p, the probability that at least one of any independently randomly
generated M − 1 numbers m1, ...,mM−1 has factor p is 1− (1− 1p)M−1, while the proba-
bility that one independently randomly generated number mM has factor p is
1
p (for large
enough G). Therefore, the probability mM shares common factor p with at least one of

































(as shown by Euler). Hence, with high probability, when adding a new world state ω,
|Goodω| will share a common factor with a world state already in Ω.
Finally, in the next theorem I show that a diverse team of agents is always optimal as
the team grows, as long as it grows carefully. That is, I show that for large diverse teams
we will be able to satisfy the optimality conditions (i) and (ii), as long as the team size
is a multiple of a divisor of |Goodω|, ∀ω ∈ Ω. Again, I assume that G is large enough,
so that the probability that a given mj has factor p is 1/p.
Theorem 5.3.6 Let D ∈ D be a set containing one factor from each Goodω. For
arbitrary n, the probability that we generate (by drawing from a distribution F) an optimal
team of size n converges to 0 as |Ω| → ∞. However, if n = c∏d∈D d, then the probability
that the team is optimal tends to 1 as c→∞.
Proof: For an arbitrary team size n, let P be the set of its prime factors. Given one
p ∈ P , the probability that p is not a factor of |Goodω| is 1− 1/p. The probability that
all p ∈ P are not factors is: ∏p(1− 1/p). As 0 < ∏p(1− 1/p) < 1, the probability that
at least one p ∈ P is a factor of |Goodω| is 1 −
∏
p(1 − 1/p) < 1. For |Ω| tests, the








which tends to 0, as |Ω| → ∞. Hence, the probability that gcd(n, |Goodω|) = 1 for at






then gcd(n, |Goodω|) 6= 1 ∀ω ∈ Ω, satisfying the necessary condition in Proposition 5.3.3
at all world states.
Let nj be the number of agents φi that have aj in its Good
i, and P (nj = nk) be the
probability that nj = nk (that is, the probability that the same number of agents have
aj and ak in their Good
i). As each aj has equal probability of being in a Good
i, for a
large number of drawings from F (i.e., c→∞), we have that P (nj = nk)→ 1, ∀aj , ak ∈
Goodω,∀ω, by the law of large numbers. Hence, each optimal solution will be selected
with the same probability.
Moreover, as pGoodj > p
Bad
k , ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad, the probability of picking a
suboptimal solution converges to 0 (as n→∞ with c→∞), and hence the probability of
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picking each of the optimal solutions converges to 1/
∏
ω |Goodω| (satisfying optimality
condition (ii)).
If it is expensive to test values for n such that Theorem 5.3.6 is satisfied, we can choose
n = c
∏
ω |Goodω|, as it immediately implies the conditions of the theorem. Moreover, if
we know the size of all |Goodω|, we can check if n and |Goodω| are co-prime in O(h) time
(where h is the number of digits in the smaller number), using the Euclidean algorithm.
Hence, we can test all world states in O(|Ω|h) time.
I presented in this section an idealized version of my theory. In practice, the agents’
pdfs may differ further than what was considered, and the world states (i.e., parameters
of a design problem) may not be completely independent. Hence, in the next section I
generalize the theory to more complex situations.
5.3.3 Generalizations
In this section I present several generalizations from my initial idealized model, in order
to cover more realistic situations. I start by generalizing my theory to cases where the
agents do not have only a probability of pij :=
pGoodi
|Goodi| or pij :=
pGood−pGoodi
|Good\Goodi| to vote for
actions in Good (depending if the action is in Goodi or not), but now can have different
probabilities distributed over the actions in Good. Hence, I now model each agent as
having a set of Goodi sets, each with its own probability distributed over the actions in
the set. For this generalization, I still consider that the agents have the same pdf, but
different preferences. That is, the agents may have different actions at each Goodi set,
but their size and the number of sets is the same across agents.
Hence, I denote each Goodi set j as jGood
i. Each also has its own p
jGoodi total
probability, that will be equally distributed among all actions in jGood
i, in a similar
fashion as before. As mentioned, the content of each jGood
i set may differ across agents,
but I consider the p
jGoodi to be the same across agents. Note that the case where each
action has a different probability is defined as the situation where each |jGoodi| := 1.
Similarly as before, I consider that each agent φi has jr < |Good| actions at each
jGood
i, and all actions in Good are equally likely to be selected to form each jGood
i.
In Figure 5.4 I show an illustrative example of the pdf of two agents with multiple jGood
i
sets.
Proposition 5.3.7 Theorem 5.3.6 still applies under the more general model stated above.
That is, if n = c
∏
d∈D d, then the probability that the team is optimal tends to 1 as c→∞.
Proof: Similarly as before, for each jGood
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Figure 5.4: Illustrative example of the probability distribution functions of two agents
with multiple jGood
i sets.
n× jr = jk × |Good|, (5.2)
so that for each jGood
i we have that jk agents have a given action a in its jGood
i.
As the total probability p
jGoodi of each set is the same across agents, we have that each
optimal action will be selected by the team with the same probability when Equation 5.2
is satisfied for all jGood
i. Hence, across world states, each optimal solution will also have
the same probability of being selected. Similarly as in Proposition 5.3.3, for Equation 5.2
to be satisfied, we must have that n and |Good| are not co-prime, and that will be true
when n = c
∏
d∈D d.
Let jnl be the number of agents φi that have al in its jGood
i, and P (jnl = jnm)
be the probability that jnl = jnm. Like before, as each al has equal probability of
being in a jGood
i, for a large number of drawings from F (i.e., c → ∞), we have that
P (jnl = jnm)→ 1, ∀al, am ∈ Goodω,∀ω, by the law of large numbers.
Notice that this happens for all jGood
i sets. Hence, all optimal actions will be
selected with the same probability by the team. Like before, as pGoodl > p
Bad
m , ∀al ∈
Good, am ∈ Bad, the probability of picking a suboptimal action converges to 0 (as
n→∞ with c→∞), and hence the probability of picking each of the optimal solutions
converges to 1/
∏
ω |Goodω| (satisfying optimality condition (ii)).
Now I present my second generalization. I show that Theorem 5.3.6 still applies for
agents φi with different probabilities over optimal actions pGoodi . I consider here a more
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general definition of optimal team: the difference between the probabilities of picking
each optimal solution and 1/
∏
ω |Goodω| must be as small as possible.
Hence, let pΦj be the probability of team Φ picking optimal action aj , the optimal
team is such that ϑ :=
∑
aj
|pΦj − 1/|Goodω||, ∀aj ∈ Goodω is minimized (∀ω ∈ Ω).
I focus here in a single world state ω, as by minimizing ϑ in each world state we are
also making the difference between the probability of picking each optimal solution and
1/
∏
ω |Goodω| as small as possible. Hence, the original definition in the previous section
is the case where ϑ := 0.
Proposition 5.3.8 Theorem 5.3.6 still applies when |pGoodi − pGoodj | ≤ , ∀φi, φj, for
small enough  > 0.
Proof: Let Φ be an optimal team, where pGoodi is the same for all agents φi. Hence,
the probability of all actions in Good being selected by the team is the same. I.e.,
pΦk = p
Φ




al∈Good |pΦk − pΦl | be the
difference between the probabilities of the team taking each optimal action. In the rest of
the proof we will disturb the probabilities pGoodi of sets of agents, which will change ∆.
I focus in studying the variation in ∆, as minimizing the variation in ∆ also minimizes
the variation in ϑ.
I prove by mathematical induction. Assume we change the pGoodi of x agents φi, and
∆ is as small as possible. Now we will change x+ 1 agents. Let’s pick one agent φi and





al∈Good |pΦk − pΦl | > ∆.
If we add one more agent φj , such that Good
j ∩ Goodi = ∅, the probability of
voting for actions am ∈ Goodj increases. For small enough , pGoodj will be too large to




l , ∀am ∈ Goodj , ak ∈




al∈Good |pΦk − pΦl | > ∆′. The same
applies for each newly added agent, until we have a new team such that n = c
∏
d∈D d
(again, satisfying the conditions of the theorem).
The base case follows trivially. If we did not change the probability of any agent (i.e.,




l , ∀ak ∈ Goodi, al /∈
Goodi, and ∆′ > ∆. By the same argument as before, adding more agents will only
increase ∆′, until n = c
∏
d∈D d.
Thirdly, I also generalize to the case where the number of preferred actions r changes
for each agent. I consider that the number of actions in the Goodi of each agent φi (r
i)
is decided according to a uniform distribution on the interval [1, r′].
Proposition 5.3.9 If n = r′× c∏d∈D d, the probability that the team is optimal → 1 as
c→∞.
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Proof: For large n, the number of agents with ri = 1, . . . , r′ is the same. Therefore, if for
each subset Φi ⊂ Φ, such that rφ = i,∀φ ∈ Φi, we have that pΦik = pΦ
i
l , ∀ak, al ∈ Good,
we will have that pΦk = p
Φ
l ,∀ak, al ∈ Good. Given an optimal team of size n, we have r′
subsets Φi of size n/r′ each. It follows by Theorem 5.3.6 that n/r′ = c
∏
d∈D d, and:




hence n also follows the necessary conditions in Proposition 5.3.3. Similarly as in Theorem
5.3.6, as n→∞ with c→∞, the probability of picking a suboptimal solution converges to
0, and the probability of picking each of the optimal solutions converges to 1/
∏
ω |Goodω|
(satisfying optimality condition (ii)).
Lastly, I discuss the assumption that world states are independent. In design problems
they could actually be correlated. Hence, I present below a constructive proof showing
that we can still use our model to study design problems with correlated parameters.
Proposition 5.3.10 The previous results still apply for design problems with correlated
parameters.
Proof: Let’s consider a design problem with a set Υ of parameters υ. We can divide Υ in
Υk sets, where all υ ∈ Υk are correlated, but υi and υj are independent, ∀υi ∈ Υi, υj ∈
Υj , i 6= j. That is, all parameters υ in a Υk set are correlated, but the parameters
between two different Υk sets are independent. This can always be performed, as in the
worst case where all parameters are correlated, we can have a single Υk := Υ.
Now, instead of modeling each design parameter υ as a world state ω (as in my original
model), we can model each set Υk as a world state ω. Hence, instead of an action a being
one value assigned to a parameter υ, an action a now represents one full combination of
values to each υk in a set Υk.
Hence, instead of voting at each parameter υ, each agent φi now votes for one combi-
nation of value assignments (of correlated parameters) at each set Υk. As all sets Υk are
independent, we still have agents voting for independent world states ω and the previous
results still apply. In the worst case, where all parameters of the problem are correlated,
we would have agents voting for entire solutions, and the model would be considered as
having a single world state ω.
In the next section I perform synthetic experiments with agents whose pdfs differ,
to further generalize over my theory, and I show that diverse teams still significantly
outperform uniform teams.
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of optimal solutions found by uniform teams as max λ+ grows.
Note how maxλ+ := 0 gives the best result.
5.4 Synthetic Experiments
I run synthetic experiments, where I simulate design agents and evaluate diverse and
uniform teams (henceforth diverse and uniform). I randomly create pdfs for the agents,
and simulate voting iterations across a series of world states. I repeat all my experiments
100 times, and in the graphs I plot the average and the confidence interval of my results
(according to a t-test with p := 0.01). I run 1000 voting iterations (z), and measure how
many optimal solutions the team is able to find. I study a scenario where the number of
actions (|A|) := 100, and the number of optimal actions per world state (|Goodω|) is,
respectively: < 2, 3, 5, 5, 5 >, in a total of 750 optimal solutions.
At each repetition of my experiment, I randomly create a pdf for the agents. I start
by studying the impact of maxλ+ in uniform. When creating the uniform team, the
total probability of playing any of the optimal actions (i.e., pGood) is randomly assigned
(uniform distribution) between 0.6 and 0.8. I fix the size of the team (25) and evaluate
different maxλ+ in Figure 5.5. As expected from Proposition 5.3.2, for maxλ+ := 0 the
system finds the highest number of optimal solutions; and as maxλ+ increases, it quickly
drops.
I then study the impact of increasing the number of agents, for uniform and diverse.
To generate a diverse team, I draw randomly a rω in an interval U for each world state,
that will be the size of |Goodi|. I study three variants: diverse*, where U := (0, |Goodω|];
diverse, where U := (0, |Goodω|), and diverse∆, where I allow agents to have different
riω, also drawn from (0, |Goodω|). I independently create pdfs randomly for each agent
φi. For each agent I draw a number between 0.6 and 0.8 to distribute over the set of
optimal actions, and randomly decide rω actions to compose its Good
i set. I distribute
equally 80% of the probability of voting over optimal actions on the actions of that set.
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of optimal solutions as the number of agents grows. The uniform
teams decrease in performance, while multiple variations of diverse teams improve, but
with diminishing returns.
As we can see, in Figure 5.6, the number of solutions decreases for uniform as the
number of agents grows. Normally, in social choice, we expect the performance to improve
as teams get larger, so this is a novel result. It is, however, expected from our Proposition
5.3.2. Diverse, on the other hand, improves in performance for all 3 versions, as predicted
by my theory. However, the system seems to converge for a fixed z, as the performance
does not increase much after around 20 agents.
Hence, in Figure 5.7 I study larger diverse (continuous line) and diverse∆ teams
(dashed line), going all the way up to 1800 agents. I also study four different number of
voting iterations (z, shown in the figure by different lines): 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000. As we
can see, although adding more agents was not really improving the performance in the
experimental scenario under study, there is clearly a statistically significant improvement
(p < 0.01) by increasing the number of voting iterations, with the system improving from
finding around 53% of the optimal solutions, all the way up to finding more than 80%
of them. However, there is a diminishing returns effect, as the impact of adding more
iterations decreases as the actual number of iterations grow larger. We also note that
diverse∆ is better than diverse, and the difference increases as z grows.
As we can see, although theoretically possible, it is still a challenge to have a system
that can find all the possible optimal solutions. Moreover, it would be expensive to pool
the votes of agents through a large number of voting iterations. However, as I show
next, we can actually approximate this process in a real system, by pooling only a small
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Figure 5.7: Percentage of optimal solutions found by large teams of diverse agents.
different combinations of these solutions. In the next section I show executions in a real
design system.
5.5 Experiments in Architectural Design
5.5.1 Architectural Design Domain
I study a real system for architectural building design. This is a fundamental domain,
since the design of a building impacts its energy usage during its whole life-span [Bo-
gensta¨tter, 2000, Lin and Gerber, 2014, Echenagucia et al., 2015]. I use Beagle [Gerber
and Lin, 2013], a multi-objective design optimization software that assists users in the
early stage design of buildings. Hence, the experiments presented here were run in an
actual system that performs expensive energy evaluations over complex architectural de-
signs, and represent months of experimental work.
First, the designer creates a parametric design, containing (as discussed in Section 5.2)
a set of parameters that can be modified within a specified range, allowing the creation
of many variations. The ranges are defined according to the legislation (i.e., setback,
maximum height, etc), or the intention of the designer (for example, the general shape
of the building).
I use designs from Gerber and Lin [2013]: base, a simple building type with uniform
program (i.e., tenant type); office park, a multi-tenant grouping of towers; and contem-
porary, a double “twisted” tower that includes multiple occupancy types, relevant to
contemporary architectural practices. I show the designs in Figure 5.8.
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(a) Base (b) Office Park (c) Contemporary
Figure 5.8: Parametric designs with increasing complexity used in our experiments.
Beagle uses a genetic algorithm (GA) to optimize the building design based on three
objectives: energy efficiency, financial performance and area requirements. In detail, the
objective functions are: Sobj : maxSPCS; Eobj : minEUI; Fobj : maxNPV . SPCS is
the Spatial Programming Compliance Score, EUI is the Energy Use Intensity and NPV
is the Net Present Value, defined as follows.
SPCS defines how well a building conforms to the project requirements (by mea-
suring how close the area dedicated to different activities is to a given specification).
Let L be a list of activities (in our designs, L=<Office, Hotel, Retail, Parking>),
area(l) be the total area in a building dedicated to activity l and requirement(l) be








EUI regulates the overall energy performance of the building. This is an estimated
overall building energy consumption in relation to the overall building floor area. The
process to obtain the energy analysis result is automated in Beagle through Autodesk
Green Building Studio (GBS) web service.
Finally, NPV is a commonly used financial evaluation. It measures the financial per-







T is the Cash Flow Time Span, r is the Annual Rate of Return, c0 is the construction
cost, and ct := Revenue−Operation Cost.
Many options affect the execution of the GA, including: initial population size, size
of the population, selection size, crossover ratio, mutation ratio, maximum iteration.
Further details about Beagle are at Gerber and Lin [2013].
In the end of the optimization process, the GA outputs a set of solutions. These
are considered “optimal”, according to the internal evaluation of the GA, but are not
necessarily so. As in my theory, for each parameter the assigned value is going to be one
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Agent PZ SZ CR MR
Agent 1 12 10 0.8 0.1
Agent 2 18 8 0.6 0.2
Agent 3 24 16 0.55 0.15
Agent 4 30 20 0.4 0.25
Table 5.4: GA parameters for the diverse team. Initial Population and Maximum Itera-
tion were kept as constants: 10 and 5, respectively. PZ = Population Size, SZ = Selection
Size, CR = Crossover Ratio, MR = Mutation Ratio.
of the optimal ones with a certain probability. In fact, most of the solutions outputted
by the GAs are later identified as sub-optimal and eliminated in comparison with better
ones found by the teams.
I model each run of the GA as an agent φ. Each parameter of the parametric design is
a world state ω, where the agents decide among different actions A (i.e., possible values
for the current parameter). My model assumes independent multiple voting iterations
across all world states. However, in general it could be expensive to pool agents for
votes in a large number of iterations. Therefore, in order to test the applicability of
the predictions of my model in more realistic scenarios, in my experiments I actually
pool only 3 solutions per agent, but run multiple voting iterations by aggregating over
all possible combinations of them. That is, at each combination I pick one solution per
agent, and vote across all the design parameters, in a total of 81 voting iterations with
4 agents. Nevertheless, as I show next, the predictions of my model are verified in my
empirical experiments, presented next.
5.5.2 Empirical Results
I run experiments across the different parametric designs shown in Figure 5.8. These are
designs with increasing complexity. More details about the designs and the meanings of
each parameter are available in Gerber and Lin [2013]. I create 4 different agents, using
different options for the GA, as shown in Table 5.4.
Contrary to the previous synthetic experiments, we are dealing here with real (and
consequently complex) design problems. Hence, the true set of optimal solutions is un-
known. I approach the problem in a comparative fashion: when evaluating different
systems, I consider the union of the set of solutions of all of them. That is, let Hx be the
set of solutions of system x; I consider the set H := ⋃xHx. I compare all solutions in
H, and consider as optimal the best solutions in H, forming the set of optimal solutions
O. I use the concept of Pareto dominance: the best solutions in H are the ones that
dominate all other solutions (i.e., they are better in all 3 objectives). As I know which
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system generated each solution o ∈ O, I estimate the set of optimal solutions Sx of each
system.
Although my theory focuses on plurality voting as the aggregation methodology, in
order to have a more thorough experimental study, I also present results using the mean
and the median of the opinions of the agents. That is, given one combination (a set of
one solution from each agent), I also generate a new solution by calculating the mean or
the median of the values from each agent across all parameters (i.e., world states). Also,
when performing the voting aggregation (vote), I consider values that are the same up to
3 decimal places as equal.
Concerning uniform, I evaluate a team composed of copies of the “best” agent. By
“best”, I mean the agent that finds the highest number of optimal solutions. According
to Proposition 5.3.2, such an agent should be the one with the lowest maxλ+, and we
can predict that voting among copies of that agent generates a large number of optimal
solutions. Hence, for each design, I first compare all solutions of all agents (i.e., construct
H as the union of the solutions of all agents), to estimate which one has the largest set
of optimal solutions S. I, then, run that agent multiple times, creating uniform. For
diverse, I consider one copy of each agent in Table 5.4.
I aggregate the solutions of diverse and uniform. I run 81 aggregation iterations
(across all parameters/world states), by selecting 3 solutions from each agent φi, in its
set of solutionsHi, and aggregating all possible combinations of these solutions. I evaluate
together the solutions of all agents and all teams (i.e., I construct H with the solutions
of all systems), in order to estimate the size of Sx of each system.
Since the true optimal solutions set is unknown, I first plot the percentage of unique
solutions found by each system in relation to the total number of unique optimal solutions
in H. Hence, in Figure 5.9 (a), I show the percentage of optimal solutions for all systems,
in relation to |O|. For clarity, I represent the result of the individual agents by the one
that had the highest percentage. As we can see, in all parametric designs the teams find
a significantly larger percentage of optimal solutions than the individual agents. The
agents find less than 1% of the solutions, while the teams are in general always close
to or above 15%. In total (considering all aggregation methods and all agents), for all
three parametric designs the agents find only about 1% of the optimal solutions, while
uniform finds around 51% and diverse 47%. Looking at vote, in base diverse finds a larger
percentage of optimal solutions than uniform (around 9.4% for uniform, while 11.6% for
diverse). In office park and contemporary, however, uniform finds more solutions than
diverse. Based on Proposition 5.3.2, we expect that this is caused by the best agent
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(b) Percentage in relation to the number of solutions of each system.
Figure 5.9: Percentage of optimal solutions of each system. The teams find a much larger
percentage than the individual agents.
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Figure 5.9 (b) shows the percentage of optimal solutions found, in relation to the size
of the set of evaluated solutions of each system. That is, let Ox be the set of optimal
solutions of system x, in O. I show |Ox||Hx| . Concerning vote, the teams are able to find a
new optimal solution around 20% of the time for base, around 73% of the time for office
park and around 36% of the time for contemporary. Meanwhile, for the individual agents
it is close to 0%. We can see that teams have great potential for generating new optimal
solutions, as expected from my theory. However, as studied in my synthetic experiments,
we can expect some diminishing returns when increasing the number of voting iterations.
I show examples of solutions created by the teams in Figure 5.10.
It is interesting to note that the performance of the teams is much higher for office
park than for the other two parametric designs. In base and contemporary, the building
mass is parametrized into a single volume, while in office park the building mass has
multiple volumes. Hence, a possible explanation is that the division in multiple volumes
facilitated the generation of multiple optimal solutions, since these can be combined in
many different ways.
I also plot in Figure 5.11 (a) the percentage of solutions that were reported to be
optimal by each agent, but were later discovered to be suboptimal by evaluating H. A
large amount of solutions are eliminated, close to 100%, helping the designer to avoid
making a poor decision, and increasing her confidence that the set of optimal solutions
found represent well the “true” Pareto frontier. Moreover, I test for duplicated solutions
across different aggregation methods, different teams and different agents. The number is
small: only 4 in contemporary, and none in base and office park. Hence, we are providing a
high coverage of the Pareto frontier for the designer. I show the total number of optimal
solutions in Figure 5.11 (b). We reconfirm here that in the office park design, where
the building mass is divided in multiple volumes, we could generate a larger number of
optimal solutions.
Finally, to better study the solutions proposed by the agents and teams, I plot all the
optimal solutions in the objectives space in Figure 5.12, where I show that the solutions
give a good coverage of the Pareto frontier.
5.6 Discussion
I present in this chapter a new model of teams of voting agents for design problems. I
propose as the main objective of such system to present for human evaluation as many
optimal solutions as possible. Hence, in this chapter I present a view of the role of
artificial intelligence (AI) in the creative process as generating a large number of optimal
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(a) Base. Shaded area shows variance of building’s footprint in relation to site. Dashed line indicates
height variance.
(b) Office Park. Dashed line shows variance in volume.
(c) Contemporary. Line shows variance in orientation.
































(b) Number of unique optimal solutions.
Figure 5.11: Additional analysis. I show here that many falsely reported optimal solutions
are eliminated by the team of agents, and also that the teams provide a large number of
optimal solutions to the designer.
solutions, so that a human can later take an aesthetic choice (also based on a quantitative
evaluation of different objectives, solving complex trade-offs).
A human designer also needs to input an initial parametric design (such as the ones
in Figure 5.8) for the agents to vote for different combinations of values for such design.
Hence, this chapter views the role of AI in the creative process as enabling a collaborative
work between a human and algorithms. I study here the potential of voting systems to be
creative by generating a large number of optimal solutions, but the entire creative process
is actually a collaboration between the voting system and the designer, and the aesthetic
evaluation of quality/beauty is assigned by a human. Hence, the AI system is still in the
role of optimizing quantifiable metrics (cost, energy efficiency, etc), that would be too
burdensome for a human to optimize, while the human designer assumes the aesthetic
evaluation work (which I argue that cannot be properly taken by the machine), besides
solving trade-offs between objectives that may not be well formalized, and hence cannot
be handled by the computer.
The role of AI in the creative process is an important topic of current discussion. For
example, d’Inverno and McCormack [2015], in a very recent position paper, divide the AI
research in two different types: what they ironically call “Heroic AI”, when researchers
try to build systems that are in the role of the whole creative process; and “Collaborative
AI”, when a computational system works in collaboration with a human in the creative
process. This chapter, therefore, is aligned with the second classification of d’Inverno and
McCormack.
Another important topic of discussion is how to evaluate AI systems that handle
creative processes. There is not yet a widely accepted evaluation metric in the literature.
Some researchers use tests inspired by the “Turing test”, and evaluate if humans can
distinguish if a creative output (such as music), was produced by a human or by a
92
NPV
















































































Figure 5.12: All the optimal solutions in the objectives space.
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computer [Burnett et al., 2012]. Other works evaluate in qualitative terms, by reporting
the impressions of a human when using the system to create [Berman and James, 2015].
Others, such as Machado et al. [2015], uses evolutionary algorithms to generate creative
objects (in their case, ambiguous images), and uses the fitness function of the evolutionary
algorithm as a quantitative evaluation metric. However, in the end they still need to
manually look over the “optimal” solutions found by the algorithm and make a qualitative
evaluation if the system was really able to create what it was supposed to. Hence, the
quantitative evaluation still fails to really represent a measurable quality of the system.
In this chapter I propose the number of optimal alternatives as a quantitative eval-
uation metric for a “Collaborative AI” system. Of course that may not be the best
quantitative metric for all creative processes where AI is involved, but it is one possible
evaluation metric that could be used for systems where the aesthetic choice is left for the
human.
It could still be an issue that we may not want to overload a human with too many
solutions. Although mathematically all the solutions are of equal “optimal” quality,
the human may prefer one objective over another (if in a multi-objective optimization
problem), or may want to only evaluate highly different solutions in the aesthetic sense.
This situation is, however, much better than if the human had to pick one solution in the
space of all possible solutions (optimal and suboptimal). The proposed system already
helps to reduce the space to only the solutions that matter, by presenting only optimal
solutions for human evaluation.
I propose, hence, that such voting systems that maximize the number of optimal solu-
tions could be used as a building block of a bigger “Collaborative AI” system. Its output
could be the input of another system that cluster and organize the proposed solutions,
in order to present them to a human designer in a manageable way. As mentioned previ-
ously, systems that organize a large number of solutions for human evaluation is currently
an active research topic in computational design [Erhan et al., 2014, Smith et al., 2010].
Additionally, my model assumes independent world states, which are initially modeled
as the parameters of a parametric design problem. Some design problems, however, may
have correlated parameters. I discuss an extension of my model in Proposition 5.3.10,
where the parameters are grouped into independent groups. In the worst case of such
extension, if all parameters are correlated, the agents would vote for entire solutions,
rather than each parameter.
Besides, a theoretical model allows us to make predictions about a real system, but
most often is only an approximation of reality (as actual systems are normally overly
complex to be modeled and analyzed in detail). Hence, even though the parameters of
a problem may not be completely independent, they (or some subsets of them, as in
94
my extension) may still have some degree of independence, so that my model will still
approximate the real execution.
In light of Proposition 5.3.10, one may also question the need for world states in my
model, instead of simply always voting for entire solutions, which would work for any
design problem. I argue, however, that we should use multiple world states whenever
possible/reasonable, as it has the greatest potential in creating new solutions. With a
single world state, we will always pick one solution proposed by one of the agents, while
with multiple states we can generate solutions that were not individually proposed by
none of the agents (since at each world state we may select actions proposed by different
subsets of agents).
There are, of course, even more complex problems whose solutions cannot even be
properly evaluated by any metric, such as the “wicked problems” coined by Rittel and
Webber [1973]. Such problems seem to be beyond the scope of my theory, as we need
to be able to evaluate a set of solutions with some well defined metric, so that a set
of “optimal” solutions can be found. At the very least, we would need an approximate
measurable quality for each solution, which could be obtained, for example, with computer
simulations.
Finally, this chapter discusses the importance of having diverse agents, but not how
such set of agents with different preferences can be effectively obtained. In Section 5.5
I create different agents by using different settings in a GA software (Beagle), but that
may not yet be the best way to obtain such diverse teams.
Creating and evaluating different diversification strategies is still avenue for future
work. Perhaps the evaluation function of each GA could be tweaked to bias its search to
different portions of the search space. Some of my preliminary results [Marcolino et al.,
2014a], however, show that this should be done with care, as giving one unique objective
for each agent to optimize was not as effective as using different parametrizations for each
GA in the way that I present in this chapter.
Essentially, the best diversification strategy may depend on each specific design prob-
lem. For some problems it could be the case that a bias towards specific kinds of solutions
could be programmed for each agent, or different algorithmic strategies may converge to
different solutions. A deeper study on how diverse agents can be effectively generated
for different design problems is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless,
this chapter sets formal and theoretical guidelines for the community to better develop,
in future work, strong diverse voting teams for design.
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5.7 Conclusion
Design imposes a novel problem to social choice: maximize the number of optimal solu-
tions. This problem is of fundamental importance, since designers need a large space of
alternatives in order to take a choice. Ideally every solution a designer examines should
be optimal according to measurable metrics, so that she can then solve complex trade-offs
that may not be formalized and/or decide according to aesthetics.
Hence, I present a new model for agent teams, that shows the potential of a system
of voting agents to be creative, by generating a large number of optimal solutions to
the designer. My analysis, which builds a new connection with number theory, presents
several novel results: (i) uniform teams are in general suboptimal, and converge to a
unique solution; (ii) diverse teams are optimal as long as the team size is increased
carefully ; (iii) the minimum optimal team size is constant with high probability; (iv) the
worst case for teams is a prime number of optimal actions.
I also extend my theory to more general situations, covering cases where agents have
greater variability on their probabilities of voting for each optimal action, considering
not only a variability across different actions but also across different agents. Most
importantly, I also show one way to generalize my theory to cover design problems with
correlated parameters, by considering independent parameter sets.
I further study my model with synthetic experiments, which evaluate teams of agents
with bounded time and relaxed assumptions, as I allow the probability distribution func-
tions of the agents to vary. The experiments explore three variations of diverse teams
and show that they all perform well, increasing in performance as the number of agents
and/or the number of voting iterations grow, although with diminishing returns. Uniform
teams, on the other hand, decreased in performance as the number of agents increased,
as expected by the theory.
I present results in conceptual architectural design, where I study a real team of
genetic algorithm agents, which propose different alternatives to the design of buildings,
optimizing for energy-efficiency, cost and project requirements. I show that teams find
a large number of solutions for designing energy-efficient buildings across three different
parametric designs of increasing complexity. Moreover, I find that when voting a diverse
team is able to find a larger set of solutions than a uniform team in the real system for
one of the design problems, a result that could be explained by my theory. I also noticed
that we could find a larger number of optimal solutions in the parametric design where
the building mass was divided in multiple volumes, which could indicate that these kind
of designs are preferable when using voting systems.
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Finally, I present an extensive discussion about how this work fits in the context of
the study of creativity within AI, and I argue that my model can be considered as “Col-
laborative AI”, where humans and algorithms work together in the process of creation. I
also propose that voting systems which maximize the number of optimal solutions could
be combined with another system that cluster and filter the solutions, and presents them
in a manageable way to a designer. Such systems are a current topic of research in the
computational design literature.
This chapter, hence, lays a first theoretical foundation for the study of multi-agent
voting teams for design problems. Further extensions of this model, and a deeper study
on how to methodologically create diverse agents for design are exciting venues for the







A difference of opinions just means you and I
On different subjects do not see eye to eye
And who is wrong or right is not for me to say
Since we do look at life in a different way.
(Francis Duggan)
6.1 Introduction
Ranked voting is an active topic of research in the social choice literature [Caragiannis
et al., 2013, Xia and Conitzer, 2011a,b, Soufiani et al., 2012, Baharad et al., 2011, Mao
et al., 2013]. However, there are not many systems actually using ranked voting ap-
proaches, and plurality is still the most common aggregation methodology. Additionally,
it is not yet clear how to extract rankings from existing agents, and how to methodolog-
ically generate diverse teams of agents in order to aggregate their opinions.
In this chapter, I study the performance of ranked voting approaches in two real
systems: Computer Go and Influence Maximization in social networks using PSINET
agents. I analyze experimentally the performance of classical ranked voting rules, and
discuss different ways to extract rankings from existing agents. Additionally, I will study
the performance of large diverse teams of agents, by generating random parametrizations
of one base agent.
This chapter encompasses two of my publications: Jiang et al. [2014] and Yadav et al.
[2015]. Additional experimental and theoretical results can be found in those publications,
but in this thesis I will focus on my main contributions, and hence only some of the results
of these publications is presented and discussed here. Moreover, contrary to the rest of
the thesis, this chapter does not introduce new models, but rather presents techniques for
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team generation and ranking extraction, and experimental results in real systems. The
main focus of the experiments will be in the Computer Go domain, but I will also present
results in social networks, when handling the influence maximization problem.
This chapter is organized in the following way: I briefly introduce the social networks
domain that I consider in this chapter below (Section 6.1.1). Then, Section 6.2 and
Section 6.3 will introduce the team generation and ranking extraction methodologies, in
the context of Computer Go. Section 6.4 will discuss the social network domain in more
detail, including the generation of voting agents and the aggregation methodologies in
that context. Section 6.5 presents my experimental results: First, I will show results in
the Computer Go domain in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2; in Section 6.5.3 I present the results
in the social networks domain.
6.1.1 Social Networks
Homelessness affects ∼2 million youths in USA annually, 11% of whom are HIV positive,
which is 10 times the rate of infection in the general population [Aidala and Sumartojo,
2007]. Peer-led HIV prevention programs such as POL [Kelly et al., 1997] try to spread
HIV prevention information through network ties and recommend selecting intervention
participants based on Degree Centrality (i.e., highest degree nodes first). Such peer-led
programs are highly desirable to agencies working with homeless youth as these youth
are often disengaged from traditional health care settings and are distrustful of adults
[Rice and Rhoades, 2013, Rice, 2010].
Agencies working with homeless youth prefer a series of small size interventions de-
ployed sequentially as they have limited manpower to direct towards these programs. This
fact, along with emotional and behavioral problems of youth makes managing groups of
more than 5-6 youth at a time very difficult [Rice et al., 2012]. Strategically choosing
intervention participants is important so that information percolates through their social
network in the most efficient way.
In this chapter, I will use PSINET to study ranked voting aggregation. PSINET
(POMDP based Social Interventions in Networks for Enhanced HIV Treatment), is a
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) based system which chooses
the participants of successive interventions in a social network [Yadav et al., 2015]. The
main motivation of PSINET is to choose participants for a sequence of interventions,
where they would be educated about HIV-prevention, in order to spread that knowledge
across the social network. As I will explain in detail in Section 6.4, PSINET considers
the uncertainty over the edges (i.e., friendship connections) of the social network. Such




I use a novel methodology for generating large teams. It is fundamentally different from
that of Chapters 3 and 4, where I created a diverse team by combining four different, inde-
pendently developed Go programs. Here I automatically create arbitrarily many diverse
agents by parametrizing one Go program. Specifically, I use different parametrizations
of Fuego 1.1 [Enzenberger et al., 2010]. Fuego is a state-of-the-art, open source, publicly
available Go program; it won first place in 19× 19 Go in the Fourth Computer Go UEC
Cup, 2010, and also won first place in 9× 9 Go in the 14th Computer Olympiad, 2009.
I sample random values for a set of parameters for each generated agent, in order
to change its behavior. In Table 6.1 I present the parameters that were sampled to
generate parametrized versions of Fuego. For each random draw, I used a uniform random
distribution, defined in the interval shown in the column “Range”. Also, depending on
the domain of each parameter, I sample integers or floating point numbers. A detailed
description of these parameters is available in the Fuego documentation, at http://
fuego.sourceforge.net/fuego-doc-1.1/.
Using this approach, I generate larger diverse teams than what I showed in previous
chapters of this thesis. I will evaluate such teams in Section 6.5.1.
6.3 Ranked Voting
6.3.1 Ranking Extraction
Fuego (and, in general, all programs using Monte Carlo tree search algorithms) is not
originally designed to output a ranking over all possible moves (alternatives), but rather
to output a single move — the best one according to its search tree (there is no guarantee
that the selected move is in fact the best one). Hence, we need to study ways to obtain
a ranking from the agents. I study two different methodologies.
First, I modified Fuego to make it directly output a ranking over moves. When asked
to find the best move, Fuego builds a search tree. Each node of the tree corresponds
to a move in the current board state (given by the current level in the tree). In order
to estimate the value of each node, Fuego runs simulations. Hence, each node has two
values associated with it: p and n, where p is the probability of that move being the
best one and n is the number of simulations used to estimate this probability. Due to
the nature of Monte Carlo tree search algorithms, different nodes have wildly different
n values. Hence, the comparison of moves according to the p values is unstable, and by
default Fuego outputs the move with the highest n value. As a natural generalization,
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Parameter Domain Range
uct param globalsearch mercy rule Integer [0,1]
uct param globalsearch territory statistics Integer [0,1]
uct param globalsearch length modification Float [0, 0.5]
uct param globalsearch score modification Float [0,0.5]
uct param player forced opening moves Integer [0,1]
uct param player reuse subtree Integer [0,1]
uct param player use root filter Integer [0,1]
uct param policy nakade heuristic Integer [0,1]
uct param policy fillboard tries Integer [0, 5]
uct param rootfilter check ladders Integer [0,1]
uct param search check float precision Integer [0,1]
uct param search prune full tree Integer [0,1]
uct param search rave Integer [0,1]
uct param search virtual loss Integer [0,1]
uct param search weight rave updates Integer [0,1]
uct param search bias term constant Float [0, 1.0]
uct param search expand threshold Integer [1,4]
uct param search first play urgency Integer [1,10000]
uct param search knowledge threshold Integer [0,10000]
uct param search number playouts Integer [1,3]
uct param search prune min count Integer [1,128]
uct param search randomize rave frequency Integer [0,200]
uct param search rave weight final Integer [1000,10000]
uct param search rave weight initial Integer [0,999]
Table 6.1: Parameters sampled to generate different versions of Fuego.
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I inspect the first level of the final search tree, and rank the moves according to their n
values.
I also introduce a novel ranking methodology, which I call “ranking by sampling”. For
each board state, I sample moves from each agent, and rank the moves according to how
frequently they were played by each agent. I generate the samples by repeatedly asking
the agents where they would play, but without actually changing the current board state
(I do not let the agents reuse parts of previous search trees, for the samples to be as
independent as possible). In Section 6.5.2, I compare these two ranking procedures.
6.3.2 Ranked Voting Rules
In this chapter I will study the performance of 5 different ranked voting rules: Plurality,
Borda, Harmonic, Maximin, and Copeland. For completeness, I briefly introduce those
below:
• Plurality: Plurality is the simplest voting rule: given one vote per agent, the
action with the highest number of votes is taken by the team. If the agents submit
rankings, the plurality voting rule will consider only the top position of the rankings.
• Borda: The Borda voting rule assigns a score for each position in the ranking of
the agents. Given a set of rankings (one per agent), the total score obtained by
each action is calculated (by summing up the scores assigned for the action at each
ranking – according to the position of the action at each ranking). The action with
the highest total score is taken by the team. Traditionally, the scoring vector is
(m,m− 1, . . . , 1), where m is the size of the ranking. That is, at each ranking, the
top action receives score m, the second top action score m − 1, and so on, until
reaching the final action, which receives a score of 1. In this chapter I limit Borda
to the top 6 positions in the rankings.
• Harmonic: The harmonic rule is similar to Borda: each position in the rank-
ing is assigned a score, and rankings are aggregated by summing up the scores
of each action. However, the scoring vector of the harmonic rule is defined as:
(1, 1/2, . . . , 1/m) [Boutilier et al., 2012].
• Maximin: Maximin follows a different approach than the previous rules. Instead
of giving scores to each ranking position, it considers a pairwise comparison among
all actions. Let n(ai, aj) be the number of agents that rank action ai higher than
aj . The maximin score of each action is its worst score: mini 6=j n(ai, aj). The final
result ranks the actions by their maximin score (i.e., the top action has the highest
maximin score).
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• Copeland: The Copeland rule follows a similar approach as the maximin rule:
it considers a pairwise comparison among all actions. Again, let n(ai, aj) be the
number of agents that rank action ai higher than aj . An action ai beats an action
aj if more agents rank ai higher than aj . That is, if n(ai, aj) > n(aj , ai). The
Copeland score of an action ai is defined as the number of actions that ai beats.
Again, the final result ranks the actions by their Copeland score (i.e., the top action
has the highest Copeland score).
6.4 PSINET
I also study ranked voting for influence maximization, using PSINET [Yadav et al., 2015].
In this section I briefly describe the system. Additional details are available at Yadav
et al. [2015].
PSINET was developed to solve the influence maximization problem under uncer-
tainty. Formally, let G := (V,E) be a graph with a set of nodes V and edges E. We
perform η interventions, where at each intervention we pick x nodes. A node may be
either influenced or uninfluenced. An uninfluenced node may change to influenced, but
an influenced node will never change back to uninfluenced. Each time we pick a node for
an intervention, it will change to influenced. When a node changes from uninfluenced to
influenced, it will “spread” the influence to its neighbors with some probability. That is,
at each edge e there is a probability pe. If a node v1 is influenced, and there is an edge
e = (v1, v2), the node v2 will also change to influenced with probability pe. Similarly, if
v2 changes to influenced, it will spread the influence to its neighbors by the same process.
Our objective is to maximize the number of influenced nodes after η interventions.
Contrary to the traditional independent cascade model [Kempe et al., 2003], Yadav
et al. [2015] consider that each edge also has an existence probability qe. Hence, if an
edge e actually exists (with probability qe), the influence will spread in the edge with
probability pe. If the edge does not exist (with probability 1 − qe), influence will not
spread. Additionally, unlike the traditional model [Kempe et al., 2003], Yadav et al.
[2015] consider that an influenced node vi may spread influence to its neighbors after
each time step, instead of only at the moment when it changed to influenced. Moreover,
each time a node vi is selected for an intervention, we are able to observe its edges. That




PSINET works by generating multiple agents before each intervention. Each agent votes
for one action (or a raking over actions), where in this context an action represents which
subset of nodes the agent thinks should be called for an intervention. The system takes an
action by aggregating the opinions of all agents. I will study three different aggregation
methodologies, which will be described later in this section.
Each agent is created by sampling one possible graph instantiation. That is, for each
edge e, we decide whether it will exist or not with probability qe. After going through
all edges, we will have one possible network, which will be given to an agent. The agent,
then, will run simulations in its sampled network, in order to decide which action to
recommend.
I study three different aggregation methodologies:
• PSINET-S: Uses the usual plurality voting, where the vote of each agent has equal
weight.
• PSINET-W: Uses weighted plurality voting. Let m be the number of uncertain
edges. The agent which removes x uncertain edges has a vote weight of:
W (x) :=
{
x ∀x ≤ m/2
m− x ∀x > m/2
This weighting scheme approximates the probabilities of occurrences of real world
events by giving low weights to instances which removes either too few or too many
uncertain edges, since those events are less likely to occur. Instances which remove
m/2 uncertain edges get the highest weight, since that event is most likely.
• PSINET-C: Uses the Copeland voting rule, described in the previous section.
In order to use this aggregation methodology, it is necessary to have a ranking
for each agent. I use the same method as in the previous section: each agent is
queried multiple times, and the actions are ranked according to how frequent they
are chosen by the agent (the most frequent action is assigned to the top position
of the ranking). The rankings of the team are then aggregated using the Copeland
voting rule.





I will start by presenting the results in the Computer Go domain. All results were obtained
by simulating 1000 9 × 9 Go games, in an HP dl165 with dual dodeca core, 2.33GHz
processors and 48GB of RAM. I compare the winning rates of games played against a
fixed opponent. In all games the system under evaluation plays as white, against the
original Fuego playing as black. I evaluate two types of teams: Diverse is composed of
different agents, and Uniform is composed of copies of a specific agent (with different
random seeds). In order to study the performance of the uniform team, for each sample
(which is an entire Go game) I construct a team consisting of copies of a randomly chosen
agent from the diverse team. Hence, the results presented for Uniform are approximately
the mean behavior of all possible uniform teams, given the set of agents in the diverse
team. In all graphs, the error bars show 99% confidence intervals.
Figure 6.1 shows the winning rates of Diverse and Uniform for a varying number
of agents using the plurality voting rule. The winning rates of both teams increase as
the number of agents increases. Diverse and Uniform start with similar winning rates,
around 35% with 2 agents and 40% with 5 agents, but with 25 agents Diverse reaches
57%, while Uniform only reaches 45.9%. The improvement of Diverse over Uniform is not
statistically significant with 5 agents (p = 0.5836), but is highly statistically significant
with 25 agents (p = 8.592×10−7). I perform linear regression on the winning rates of the
two teams to compare their rates of improvement in performance as the number of agents
increases. Linear regression (shown as the dotted lines in Figure 6.1) gives the function
y = 0.0094x + 0.3656 for Diverse (R2 = 0.9206, p = 0.0024) and y = 0.0050x + 0.3542
for Uniform (R2 = 0.8712, p = 0.0065). In particular, the linear approximation for the
winning rate of Diverse increases roughly twice as fast as the one for Uniform as the
number of agents increases.
I now analyze the parametrized agents, in order to better understand the performance
of the diverse team. First, I show that the original Fuego is stronger than the parametrized
agents. I ran 1000 9 × 9 Go games, with the system under evaluation playing as white,
against the original Fuego playing as black. In Figure 6.2 we can see the winning rate of
Fuego and of each one of the parametrized agents. The original Fuego is the strongest
agent (with p < 0.01 for all but 3 agents), having a winning rate close to 50%. The
parametrized agents, on average, have a winning rate of 32.3% (std: 10.4%).
I also evaluate the diversity of a team of parametrized agents, by analyzing a sample
of 10 parametrized agents. I use the metric proposed in Chapter 3, where diversity
is defined as the average Hellinger Distance [Hellinger, 1909] between the probability
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Figure 6.1: Winning rates for Diverse (continuous line) and Uniform (dashed line), for a















Figure 6.2: Winning rate of Fuego and of the parametrized agents.
107
distribution functions (pdfs) of all possible combinations of pairs of agents across different
world states. I show three different results: Control compares each agent with a second
sample of itself, in order to measure the noise in my evaluation; Parametrized Agents
compares all possible pairs of parametrized agents, in order to estimate the diversity of our
team; and Independent Agents compares each parametrized agent with Pachi [Baudiˇs and
Gailly, 2011], an independently developed Computer Go program. In order to perform
the analysis, I estimate the pdfs of Pachi and 10 agents from the diverse team, using
100 different board states. For each board state I sample 100 moves for each agent. The
results are shown in Figure 6.3(a). These results indicate that the level of diversity is
especially high when the parametrized agents are compared with Pachi, suggesting that
the current parametrization methodology falls short of creating an idealized diverse team.
That said, the methodology does lead to some diversity, as indicated by the statistically
significant difference between the Control bar and Parametrized Agents bar.
I also evaluate the level of diversity by testing whether there is a set of board states
where all parametrized agents have a low probability of playing the best action. Again,
I evaluate a sample of 10 agents from the diverse team. I first estimate the best move
for each of 100 board states. To this end, I use Fuego to evaluate the given board state,
but with a time limit 50x higher than the default one. Then, based on the previous
estimated pdfs of the parametrized agents, we can obtain the probability of each agent
playing the optimal action. Finally, I calculate the proportion of board states in which
all parametrized agents play the best action with probability below a certain threshold.
The results are shown in Figure 6.3(b). It turns out that all parametrized agents play the
optimal action with probability smaller than 1/2 in 40% of the board states. Moreover, in
10% of the board states, the probability of playing the optimal action is lower than 10%.
Hence, there is still a large set of board states in which all agents play badly, regardless
of the parametrization.
6.5.2 Ranked Voting
I first study the performance of the ranked voting rules, when extracting rankings directly
from the search tree of the agents. Figure 6.4 compares the results across different voting
rules. As mentioned, to generate ranked votes, I used the internal data in the search tree
of an agent’s run (in particular, I rank using the number of simulations per alternative).
We can see that increasing the number of agents has a positive impact for all voting
rules under consideration. Moving from 5 to 15 agents for Diverse, plurality has a 14%
increase in the winning rate, whereas other voting rules have a mean increase of only 6.85%
(std = 2.25%), close to half the improvement of plurality. For Uniform, the impact of


















(a) Diversity of the parametrized agents, compared with























(b) Percentage of world states where all parametrized
agents have probability of playing the best action below
the given threshold
Figure 6.3: Evaluation of the diversity of the parametrized agents, and the fraction of
states in which all of them have a low probability of playing the optimal action. The
error bars show 99% confidence intervals.
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Figure 6.4: Winning rates for Diverse (continuous line) and Uniform (dashed line), for a
variety of team sizes and voting rules.
for plurality is 5.3%, while the mean increase for other voting rules is 5.70%(std = 1.45%).
Plurality surprisingly seems to be the best voting rule in these experiments, even though
it uses less information from the submitted rankings. This suggests that the ranking
method used does not typically place good alternatives in high positions other than the
very top.
Hence, I study now the performance of my novel ranking extraction methodology. As
mentioned, to generate a ranked vote from an agent on a given board state, I run the
agent on the board state 10 times (each run is independent of other runs), and rank the
moves by the number of times they are played by the agent. I use these votes to compare
plurality with the four other voting rules, for Diverse with 5 agents. Figure 6.5 shows
the results. All voting rules outperform plurality; Borda and maximin are statistically
significantly better (p < 0.007 and p = 0.06, respectively). All ranked voting rules are also
statistically significantly better than the non-sampled (single run) version of plurality.
6.5.3 PSINET
I also evaluate aggregation methodologies for PSINET, in the context of influence max-
imization. I provide two sets of results. First, I show results on artificial networks to
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Figure 6.6: Comparison on BTER graphs
range of networks. Next, I show results on two real world homeless youth networks.
In all experiments, I select 2 nodes per round and average over 20 runs. PSINET-S and
PSINET-W use 20 agents (possible network instances) and PSINET-C uses 5 agents (each
agent is sampled 5 times, in order to build a ranking). The propagation and existence
probability values were set to 0.5 in all experiments (based on findings by Kelly et al.
[1997]). In this section, a 〈X,Y, Z〉 network refers to a network with X nodes, Y certain
and Z uncertain edges. I use a metric of “indirect influence spread” (IIS) throughout this
section, which is the number of nodes “indirectly” influenced by the intervention partici-
pants. For example, on a 30 node network, by selecting 2 nodes each for 10 interventions
(horizon), 20 nodes (a lower bound for any strategy) are influenced with certainty. How-
ever, the total number of influenced nodes might be 26 (say) and thus, the IIS is 6. All
comparison results are statistically significant under bootstrap-t (α = 0.05).
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6.5.3.1 Artificial networks
First, I compare all algorithms on Block Two-Level Erdos-Renyi (BTER) networks (hav-
ing degree distribution Xd ∝ d−1.2, where Xd is number of nodes of degree d) of several
sizes, as they accurately capture observable properties of real-world social networks [Se-
shadhri et al., 2012].
In Figure 6.6, I compare solution qualities of Degree Centrality (DC), POMCP [Silver
and Veness, 2010] (since this problem can be modeled as a POMDP, see Yadav et al.
[2015]), PSINET-S, PSINET-W and PSINET-C on BTER networks of varying sizes. In
DC, nodes are selected in subsequent rounds in decreasing order of out-degrees, where
every uncertain edge adds its existence probability to the node degrees. I choose DC as
my baseline as it is the current modus operandi of agencies working with homeless youth.
This figure shows that all algorithms beat DC by ∼60%. Further, it shows that PSINET-
W beats PSINET-S and PSINET-C. Also, POMCP runs out of memory on 30 node
graphs. Hence, as we can see, for PSINET plurality outperforms the Copeland ranked
voting rule. However, weighted plurality obtains better results than simple plurality
voting.
6.5.3.2 Real world networks
Figure 6.7 shows one of the two real-world friendship based social networks of homeless
youth (created by my collaborators through surveys and interviews of homeless youth
attending My Friend’s Place), where each numbered node represents a homeless youth.
Figure 6.8 compares PSINET variants and DC on these two real-world social networks
(each of size ∼ 〈155, 120, 190〉). This figure clearly shows that all PSINET variants beat
DC on both real world networks by ∼60%, which shows that PSINET works equally well
on real-world networks. Also, PSINET-W (weighted plurality) beats PSINET-S (simple
plurality), in accordance with previous results.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I explored the automatic generation of agent teams, and ranked voting
rules. I present results in two different domains: Computer Go and Social Networks. In
Computer Go I show that we can improve performance with large agent teams, but the
gain in performance decreases as the team grows. How to better generate diverse teams,
in order to obtain even higher performance with large teams is still an open area for
further study.
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Figure 6.8: Solution Quality for Real World Networks
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I also show that when directly extracting rankings from the search trees of the agents,
the result of classical ranked voting rules is actually quite poor, and they are easily outper-
formed by simply playing plurality voting. However, it is possible to obtain better results
by using a different ranking extraction technique, where rankings are built according to
how frequently each action is played when an agent is sampled multiple times. When
using this approach, I show that Borda outperforms plurality with statistical significance.
In the Social Networks domain, I study agents that vote to select subsets of nodes for
influence maximization. I experimentally study the performance of plurality, weighted
plurality and the Copeland ranked voting rule. In this domain plurality outperforms the
Copeland voting rule; but I can obtain a better performance by using weighted plurality
instead of using simple plurality voting.
114
Chapter 7
Simultaneous Influencing and Mapping
’Another may be sadly deceived
By the words you say.
And another, believing and trusting you,
May be led astray by the things you do.’
’For much that never you’ll see or know
Will mark your days as you come and go.
And in countless lives that you’ll never learn
The best and the worst of you will return.’
(Edgar Albert Guest)
7.1 Introduction
Influencing a social network is an important technique, with great potential to posi-
tively impact society, as we can modify the behavior of a community. For example, we
can increase the overall health of a population; Yadav et al. [2015], for instance, spread
information about HIV prevention in homeless populations. However, although influ-
ence maximization has been extensively studied [Kempe et al., 2003, Cohen et al., 2014,
Golovin and Krause, 2010], their main motivation is viral marketing, and hence they
assume that the social network graph is fully known, generally taken from some social
media network (such as Facebook).
However, the graphs recorded in social media do not really represent all the people and
all the connections of a population. Most critically, when performing interventions in real
life, we deal with large degrees of lack of knowledge. Normally the social agencies have
to perform several interviews in order to learn the social network graph [Marsden, 2005].
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These highly unknown networks, however, are exactly the ones we need to influence in
order to have a positive impact in the real world, beyond product advertisement.
Additionally, learning a social network graph is very valuable per se. Agencies also
need data about a population, in order to perform future actions to enhance their well-
being, and better actuate in their practices [Marsden, 2005]. As mentioned, however, the
works in influence maximization are currently ignoring this problem.
Each person in a social network actually knows other people, including the ones she
cannot directly influence. Hence, each time we select someone for an intervention (to
spread influence), we also have an opportunity to obtain knowledge from that person.
Therefore, in this chapter I present for the first time the problem of simultaneously
influencing and mapping a social network. I study the performance of the classical greedy
influence maximization algorithm in this context, and show that it can be arbitrarily low.
Hence, I study a class of algorithms for this problem, and show that we can effectively
influence and map a network when independence of objectives holds. For the interventions
where it does not hold, I give an upper bound in our loss, which converges to 0. I study an
approximation of my main algorithm, that works as well but requiring fewer assumptions.
I perform a large scale experimentation using four real life social networks of homeless
populations, where I show that my algorithm is competitive with previous approaches in
terms of influence (even outperforming them in hard cases), and is significantly better in
terms of mapping.
This chapter is the only one of the thesis that does not consider voting. Here the
aggregation will be performed by a linear combination of two greedy algorithms, in order
to simultaneously influence and map a social network.
7.2 Influencing and Mapping
I consider the problem of maximizing the influence in a social network. However, we
start by knowing only a subgraph of the social network. Each time we pick a node to
influence, it may teach us about subgraphs of the network. Our objective is to spread
influence, at the same time learning the network graph (i.e., mapping). I call this problem
as “Simultaneous Influencing and Mapping” (SIAM). In this chapter, I consider a version
of SIAM where we only need to map the nodes that compose the network. I assume that
we always know all the edges between the nodes of the known subgraph. For clarity, I will
define formally here only the version of SIAM that I handle in this chapter. Therefore,
unless otherwise noted, henceforth by SIAM I mean the version of the problem that is
formally defined below.
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Let G := (V,E) be a graph with a set of nodes V and edges E. We perform η
interventions, where at each one we pick one node. The selected node is used to spread
influence and map the network. I assume we do not know the graph G, we only know
a subgraph Gk = (Vk, Ek) ⊂ G, where k is the current intervention number. Gk starts
as Gk := G0 ⊂ G. For each node vi, there is a subset of nodes V i ⊂ V , which will
be called “teaching list”. Each time we pick a node vi, the known subgraph changes to
Gk := (Vk−1 ∪V i, Ek), where Ek contains all edges between the set of nodes Vk−1 ∪V i in
G. Our objective is to maximize |Vk|, given η interventions.
For each node vi, I assume we can observe a number γi, which indicates the size of
its teaching list. I study two versions: in one γi is the number of nodes in V
i that are
not yet in Gk (hence, the number of new nodes that will be learned when picking vi). I
refer to this version as “perfect knowledge”. In the other, γi := |V i|, and thus we cannot
know how many nodes in V i are going to be new or intersect with already known nodes
in Vk. I refer to this version as “partial knowledge”. The partial knowledge version is
more realistic, as by previous experience we may have estimations of how many people
a person with a certain profile usually knows. I study both versions in order to analyze
how much we may lose with partial knowledge. Note that we may also have nodes with
empty teaching lists (γi = 0). The teaching list of a node vi is the set of nodes that vi
will teach us about once picked, and is not necessarily as complete as the true set of all
nodes known by vi. Some nodes could simply refuse to provide any information.
Additionally, note that I am assuming the teaching list and the neighbor list to be
independent. That is, a node may teach us about nodes that it is not able to directly
influence. For instance, it is common to know people that we do not have direct contact
with, or we are not “close” enough to be able to influence. Similarly, a person may not
tell us about all her close friends, due to limitations of an interview process, or even
“shame” to describe some connections. However, some readers could argue that people
would be more likely to teach us about their direct connections. Hence, I will handle the
case where the independence does not hold in my empirical experiments in Section 7.3.2.
Simultaneously to the problem of mapping, we also want to maximize the spread of in-
fluence over the network. I consider here the traditional independent cascade model, with
observation, as in Golovin and Krause [2010]. That is, a node may be either influenced
or uninfluenced. An uninfluenced node may change to influenced, but an influenced node
will never change back to uninfluenced. Each time we pick a node for an intervention,
it will change to influenced. When a node changes from uninfluenced to influenced, it
will “spread” the influence to its neighbors with some probability. That is, at each edge
e there is a probability pe. When a node v1 changes to influenced, if there is an edge
e = (v1, v2), the node v2 will also change to influenced with probability pe. Similarly, if
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v2 changes to influenced, it will spread the influence to its neighbors by the same process.
Influence only spreads in the moment a node changes from uninfluenced to influenced.
That is, a node may only “try” one time to spread influence to its neighbors. As in
Golovin and Krause [2010], I consider that we have knowledge about whether a node is
influenced or not (but in my case, we can only know about nodes in the current known
subgraph Gk). Let Ik be the number of influenced nodes after k interventions. Our ob-
jective is to maximize Ik given η interventions. Influence may spread beyond Gk. Hence,
I consider Ik as the number of influenced nodes in the full graph G. I denote as σi the
expected number of nodes that will be influenced when picking vi (usually calculated by
simulations).
As mentioned, we want to attend both objectives simultaneously. Hence, we must
maximize both |Vk| and Ik. It is easy to show that SIAM is an NP-Complete problem:
Proposition 7.2.1 SIAM is NP-Complete.
Proof: Let κ be an instance of the influence maximization problem, with graph G.
Consider now a SIAM problem where no node carries information and G0 := G. If we
can solve this SIAM problem we can also solve the influence maximization problem κ.
Therefore, SIAM is NP-Complete.
As SIAM is NP-Complete, similarly to previous influence maximization works [Kempe
et al., 2003, Golovin and Krause, 2010], I study greedy solutions. Like the exploration
vs exploitation dilemmas in online learning [Valizadegan et al., 2011], the fundamental
problem of SIAM is whether to focus on influencing or mapping the network. Hence, I
propose as a general framework to select the node vi such that:
vi = argmax(c1 × σi + c2 × γi) (7.1)
Constants c1 and c2 control the balance between influencing or mapping. c1 = 1, c2 =
0 is the classical influence maximization algorithm (“influence-greedy”); c1 = 0, c2 = 1,
on the other hand, only maximizes the knowledge-gain at each intervention (“knowledge-
greedy”). c1 = c2 = 1 is an algorithm where both objectives are equally balanced (“bal-
anced”). Different weights may also be used.
Remember that I defined two versions for the γ values: perfect knowledge, where we
know how many new nodes a node will teach us about; and partial knowledge, where we
do not know how many nodes will be new. In order to better handle the partial knowledge
case, I also propose the “balanced-decreasing” algorithm, where c2 constantly decreases












c′2 − 1d × c′2 × k if k ≤ d
0 otherwise
, (7.2)
where c′2 is the desired value for c2 at the very first iteration, and d controls how fast c2
decays to 0.
7.2.1 Analysis
I begin by studying influence-greedy. It was shown that when picking the node v which
argmax(σv) at each intervention, we achieve a solution that is a (1−1/e−) approximation
of the optimal solution, as long as our estimation of σv (by running simulations) is “good
enough” [Kempe et al., 2003]. However, even though the actual influence spread may go
beyond the known graph Gk, we can only run simulations to estimate σv in the current
Gk. Hence, the previous results are no longer valid. In fact, in the next observation I
show that we can obtain arbitrarily low-performing solutions by using influence-greedy.
Observation 7.2.2 The performance of influence-greedy can be arbitrarily low in a
SIAM problem.
I show with an example. Consider the graph in Figure 7.1, and assume we will run
2 interventions (i.e., pick 2 nodes). There is a probability 1 to spread influence in any
edge. Our initial knowledge is V0 = {A,A′, B,B′, C}. A and B can influence A’ and
B’, respectively. However, C cannot influence any node. A, B, A’ and B’ have empty
teaching lists. C, on the other hand, can teach us about a connected graph of z nodes.
Influence-greedy, by running simulations on the known graph, picks nodes A and B, since
each can influence one more node. The optimal solution, however, is to pick node C,
which will teach us about the connected graph of z nodes. Then, we can pick one node
in that graph, and influence z + 1 nodes in total. Hence, the influence-greedy solution
is only 4z+1 of the optimal. As z grows, influence-greedy will be arbitrarily far from the
optimal solution.
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If we make some assumptions about the distribution of the teaching lists across the
nodes, however, influence-greedy eventually maps the full graph given enough interven-
tions. Let n = |V |, and nk = |Vk|. I show the expected number of interventions to learn
all n nodes (subtracted by a small , for numerical stability). I study the partial knowl-
edge version. Assume the size of the teaching list of each node is drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval [0, u], and any node is equally likely to be in a teaching list.
I consider that there is a probability ϕ that a node will have a non-empty teaching list.
Proposition 7.2.3 The expected number (kfull) of interventions for influence-greedy to






Proof: Since influence-greedy is not considering γ, it picks nodes arbitrarily in terms
of knowledge-gain. Hence, on average it selects the expected value of the uniform dis-
tribution, u/2. For each node v in a teaching list, the probability that it is not yet
known is n−nkn . Therefore, the expected number of nodes known at one iteration k
is: E[nk] = ϕ × u2 × n−E[nk−1]n + E[nk−1]. Solving the recurrence gives: E[nk] =
n0 × (1 − ϕ×u2×n )k − n × (1 − ϕ×u2×n )k + n. Solving for E[nk] = n −  gives that the ex-






kfull quickly increases as ϕ (or u) decreases. In Section 7.3, I study experimentally
the impact of ϕ on the performance of influence-greedy.
Now, let’s look at balanced. Clearly, it will learn the full graph with a lower number of
expected interventions than influence-greedy. However, although intuitively balanced may
seem reasonable, its performance may also quickly degrade if we assume partial knowledge
(i.e., γi = |V i|).
Proposition 7.2.4 The performance of the balanced algorithm degrades as nk → n, if
γi = |V i|.
Proof: Each node in the teaching list of a node vi has probability
n−nk
n of being a yet
unknown node. Hence, the expected number of unknown nodes that will be learned by
picking a node with teaching list size γi is: E[new] = γi× n−nkn . As nk → n, E[new]→ 0.
Hence, when nk → n, balanced picks a node v that maximizes σv + γv, thus missing to
select nodes vo (if available) with σo > σv, σo + γo < σv + γv, with no actual gains in
mapping.
This problem does not happen in the perfect knowledge version. Since the γ values
only include new nodes, γ → 0 as nk → n, for all γ. Hence, in the perfect knowledge
version, balanced converges to the same behavior as influence-greedy as k increases. In
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order to approximate this behavior for the partial knowledge case, I propose the balanced-
decreasing algorithm, where the constantly decreasing c2 “simulates” the decreasing γ
values.
I now show that balanced can match the performance of influence-greedy in terms of
influence, but at the same time mapping better the network. As I just discussed that
perfect knowledge can be approximated by using balanced-decreasing, I focus here on the
perfect knowledge case. I show that when the independence of objectives hypothesis holds
(defined below), balanced plays the same as influence-greedy or better, while influence-
greedy may still fail in terms of mapping. If the hypothesis does not hold, our influence
loss at one intervention will be bounded by u/2→ 0.
Let V σk be a subset of Vk where each v ∈ V σk maximizes σ in the current intervention k.
Similarly, let V γk ⊂ Vk, where each v ∈ V γk maximizes γ in the current intervention k. As
before, I consider that the teaching list size of a node is given by a uniform distribution,
but since γ tends to decrease at each intervention, I denote the interval as [0, uk].
Clearly, any node in the set V Goodk := V
σ
k ∩ V γk should be selected, as they maximize
both objectives. Hence, when V Goodk 6= ∅ it is possible to simultaneously maximize both
objectives, and thus we say that the independence of objectives hypothesis holds. Since
we are studying greedy-algorithms, both balanced and influence-greedy lack optimality
guarantees. Hence, I focus here on a “local” analysis, and show that given a set of k
possible interventions (with the same graph state across both algorithms at each inter-
vention), balanced is able to pick nodes that spread as much influence as influence-greedy.
Moreover, when balanced picks a different node, our loss is bounded by uk/2. As uk → 0
with k →∞, our loss also converges to 0.
Proposition 7.2.5 Balanced selects nodes that spread as much influence as influence-
greedy, if |V σk | > nk/2 and |V γk | > nk/2, or as k → ∞. Influence-greedy, on the other
hand, selects worse nodes than balanced in terms of mapping with probability 1− |V σk ∩V
γ
k |
|V σk | .
Moreover, when balanced selects a node with worse σ than influence-greedy, the expected
influence loss is bounded by uk/2, which → 0 as k →∞.
Proof: As balanced plays argmax(σ + γ), if there is a node v ∈ V Goodk , balanced picks
v. Influence-greedy, however, selects an arbitrary node in V σk . Hence, it picks a node
v ∈ V Goodk with probability
|V σk ∩V γk |
|V σk | . Therefore, for all interventions where V
Good
k 6= ∅,
balanced selects a node in V Goodk , while influence-greedy makes a mistake in terms of
mapping with probability 1− |V σk ∩V
γ
k |
|V σk | .
We consider now the probability of V Goodk 6= ∅ across k interventions. Clearly, if
|V σk | > nk/2, and |V γk | > nk/2, we have V Goodk 6= ∅. If not, note that as k →∞, nk → n.
121
Therefore, V γk → Vk (since all γ → 0, all nodes will have the same teaching list size), thus
V Goodk → V σk 6= ∅. Hence, the probability of V Goodk 6= ∅ goes to 1 as k →∞.
Let’s study now the case when V Goodk = ∅. Let v1 be the node in V σk picked by
influence-greedy, and v2 be the node in Vk \ V σk with the largest γ2. Since V Goodk = ∅, we
must have that σ1 > σ2, and γ2 > γ1. However, as long as γ2 − γ1 < σ1 − σ2, balanced
still selects v1 (or an even better node). In the worst case, the expected value for γ2 is the
expected maximum of the uniform distribution: E[γ2] = uk − uk/(nk + 1) ≤ uk. γ1, on
the other hand, has the expected value of the uniform distribution E[γ1] = uk/2. Hence,
as long as σ1−σ2 > uk/2, in expectation balanced still picks v1 (or an even better node).
Moreover, when balanced does not pick v1, our loss in terms of influence at intervention
k is at most uk/2. Since γ → 0 as nk → n, uk/2→ 0 as k →∞.
Proposition 7.2.5 shows that we may experience loss in one intervention, when com-
paring influence-greedy with balanced. However, the loss is bounded by uk/2, which goes
to 0 as the number of interventions grows. Moreover, when we do not update the γ values,
we can use the balanced-decreasing algorithm to simulate the same effect. Additionally,
in Proposition 7.2.5 I considered the same graph states at each intervention across both
algorithms. In practice, however, since balanced is able to map the network faster, any
loss experienced in the beginning when k is low can be compensated by playing better
later with full knowledge of the graph, while influence-greedy may still select nodes with
lower σ due to lack of knowledge. As noted in Observation 7.2.2, lack of knowledge of the
full graph can make influence-greedy play with arbitrarily low performance. In Section
7.3.2 I perform an empirical analysis assuming a power law model for the teaching lists,
and I note here that my main results still hold.
7.3 Results
I run experiments using four real life social networks of the homeless population of Los
Angeles, provided by Eric Rice, from the School of Social Work of the University of South-
ern California. All the networks are friendship-based social networks of homeless youth
who visit a social agency. The first two networks (A, B) were created through surveys
and interviews. The third and fourth networks (Facebook, MySpace) are online social
networks of these youth created from their Facebook and MySpace profiles, respectively.
I run 100 executions per network. At the beginning of each execution, 4 nodes are
randomly chosen to compose our initial subgraph (G0). As mentioned, I consider that
we always know the edges between the nodes of our current knowledge graph (Gk). I
noticed similar tendencies in the results across all four social networks. For clarity, I plot
here the results considering all networks simultaneously (that is, I average over all the
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400 executions). In the Appendix A I show the individual results for each network. In
all graphs, the error bars show the confidence interval, with ρ = 0.01. When I say that a
result is significantly better than another, I mean with statistical significance according
to a t-test with ρ ≤ 0.01, unless noted otherwise. The size of each network is: 142, 188,
33, 105; for A, B, Facebook and MySpace, respectively. I evaluate up to 40 interventions.
I measure the percentage of influence in the network (“Influence”) and percent-
age of known nodes (“Knowledge”) for influence-greedy, knowledge-greedy, balanced and
balanced-decreasing (with c′2 = 1.0, and d = 5). In order to estimate the expected influ-
ence spread (σv) of each node, I run 1000 simulations before each intervention. Estimating
the expected influence through simulations is a common method in the literature. In our
case, the simulations are run in the current known subgraph Gk, although the actual in-
fluence may go beyond Gk. Influenced nodes in G\Gk will be considered when I measure
Influence, but will not be considered in my estimation of σv. Concerning the teaching
list size (γv), I consider it to hold the number of new nodes that would be learned if
v is selected, for balanced and knowledge-greedy (i.e., perfect knowledge). For balanced-
decreasing, I consider γv to hold the full teaching list size, including nodes that are
already known (i.e., partial knowledge). Therefore, we can evaluate if balanced-decreasing
approximates well balanced, when perfect knowledge is not available.
I simulate the teaching lists, since there are no real world data available yet (I only have
data about the connections in the four real life social networks). I study two models: (i)
uniform, which follows the assumptions of my theoretical analysis; (ii) power law, which
considers that nodes are more likely to teach us about others which are close to them in
the social network graph. I present the second model to show that my conclusions hold
irrespective of the uniform assumption. For each node, we decide whether it will have a
non-empty teaching list according to a probability ϕ. I run experiments using different
combinations of ϕ, probability of influence p, and c1 and c2 values.
7.3.1 Uniform Model
Under the uniform model, if a node has a teaching list, I fix its size according to a uniform
distribution from 0 to 0.5 × |V |. Each node in the graph is also equally likely to be in
the teaching list of a node vi. I consider here the teaching list and the neighbor list to be
independent, as people may know others that they cannot influence, and they may also
not tell us all their connections, as described before. The case where the teaching list and
the neighbor list are not independent is considered in Section 7.3.2.
I run several parametrizations. Figure 7.2 shows the result at each intervention for ϕ =
0.5 and p = 0.5. As we see in Figure 7.2 (a), the Influence obtained by influence-greedy,
balanced, and balanced-decreasing are very similar. In fact, out of all 40 interventions,
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure 7.2: Results of 4 real world networks across many interventions, for p = 0.5 and
ϕ = 0.5 (uniform distribution).
their result is not significantly different in any of them (and they are significantly better
than knowledge-greedy in around 75% of the interventions). This shows that balanced is
able to successfully spread influence in the network, while at the same time mapping the
graph. We can also notice that a perfect knowledge about the number of new nodes in the
teaching lists is not necessary, as balanced-decreasing obtained close results to balanced.
Figure 7.2 (b) shows the results in terms of Knowledge. All algorithms clearly out-
perform influence-greedy with statistical significance. Moreover, the result for knowledge-
greedy, balanced and balanced-decreasing are not significantly different in any of the in-
terventions. This shows that we are able to successfully map the network (as well as
knowledge-greedy), but at the same time spreading influence successfully over the network
(as well as influence-greedy), even in the partial knowledge case. Hence, the independence
of objectives hypothesis seems to hold at most interventions in the networks, since we
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could maximize both objectives simultaneously, as predicted in Proposition 7.2.5. Given
enough interventions, however, influence-greedy is also able to map the network, as I
discussed in Proposition 7.2.3.
It is also interesting to note that even though influence-greedy has much less infor-
mation about the network (with significantly lower mapping performance in around 16
interventions), it is still able to perform as well as the other algorithms in terms of Influ-
ence. Observation 7.2.2, however, showed that its Influence performance can be arbitrarily
low. As I discuss later, for some parametrizations we actually found that influence-greedy
has significantly lower results than the other algorithms in terms of Influence as well.
In order to compare the results across different parametrizations, we calculate the
area under the curve (AUC) of the graphs. The closer the curves are to 1.0 the better,
hence an AUC of 39 (that is, always at 1.0 across all 40 interventions) would be an
“ideal” result. In Figure 7.3 (a) I show the results for a fixed influence probability value
(p = 0.5), but different teaching probability (ϕ) values. First I discuss the results in
terms of Influence (left-hand side of the graph). As we can see, except for knowledge-
greedy, all algorithms obtain very similar results. However, for ϕ = 0.1, the Influence for
balanced and balanced-decreasing is slightly better than influence-greedy, in the borderline
of statistical significance (ρ = 0.101 and 0.115, respectively). Moreover, we can see that
ϕ does impact the influence that we obtain over the network, although the impact is
not big. For influence-greedy, from ϕ = 0.5 to ϕ = 1.0, the difference is only statistically
significant with ρ = 0.092. However, from ϕ = 0.1 to ϕ = 0.5 the difference is statistically
significant with ρ = 3.26× 10−27. Similarly, for all other algorithms there is a significant
difference from ϕ = 0.1 to ϕ = 0.5, while from ϕ = 0.5 to ϕ = 1.0 the difference is
only significant with ρ < 0.1 (except for knowledge-greedy, its difference is not significant
between ϕ = 0.5 and ϕ = 1.0).
Let’s look at the results in terms of Knowledge, on the right-hand side of Figure 7.3
(a). We can see that ϕ has a much bigger impact in our mapping, as expected. Knowledge-
greedy, balanced and balanced-decreasing are all significantly better than influence-greedy.
However, we can notice that the difference between influence-greedy and the other algo-
rithms decreases as ϕ increases. Similarly, when comparing knowledge-greedy, balanced
and balanced-decreasing, we can notice that the difference between the algorithms also
decreases as ϕ increases. For both ϕ = 0.1 and ϕ = 0.5, however, the algorithms are
not significantly different. Interestingly, when ϕ = 1, because of the lower variance,
knowledge-greedy and balanced become significantly better than balanced-decreasing, even
though the differences between the algorithms decreases.
In Figure 7.3 (b), I keep ϕ = 0.5, and change p. In the left-hand side we see the
results for Influence. As expected, there is clearly a significant difference when p changes
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure 7.3: Results of Influence and Knowledge for different teaching and influence prob-
abilities (uniform distribution).
from 0.1 to 0.5. However, we can notice that the difference between the algorithms does
not change significantly when p changes. In both cases, the differences between influence-
greedy, balanced and balanced-decreasing are not significant. Additionally, in both cases
all algorithms are significantly better than knowledge-greedy. In terms of Knowledge
(right-hand side of the figure) we see that the influence probability has no impact in any
algorithm, as it would be expected. For all algorithms, the difference between p = 0.1
and p = 0.5 is not statistically significant.
I also compare the regret obtained by the different algorithms at different influence
probabilities and teaching probability values. First, I run the influence-greedy algorithm,
but considering that we know the full graph (that is, Gk := G). Although that solution is
not optimal, it is the best known approximation of the optimal, hence I call it “perfect”.
I calculate the AUC for perfect, and define the regret of an algorithm x as: AUCPerfect−
AUCx. I analyze the regret in terms of Influence in Figure 7.4. Note that, in the figure,
the lower the result the better. On the left-hand side I show the regret for p = 0.1
and different ϕ values, while on the right-hand side I show for p = 0.5. All algorithms
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p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure 7.4: Regret for different teaching and influence probabilities (uniform distribution).
Lower results are better.
(except knowledge-greedy) have a similar regret, as it would be expected based on the
previous results. However, we can notice here that the regret for balanced and balanced-
decreasing when ϕ = 0.1 and p = 0.5 is actually lower than influence-greedy. The
difference is statistically significant, with ρ = 0.069 and ρ = 0.092, respectively. Hence,
we can actually have a significantly better influence on the social network graph than
the traditional greedy algorithm, when the teaching probability is low. However, when
ϕ = 0.1 and p = 0.1, even though the regret for balanced and balanced-decreasing is
still lower than influence-greedy, it is not significant anymore (as there is larger variance
when p = 0.1). Additionally, we note that the difference in regret for balanced and
balanced-decreasing is always not significant. It is also interesting to note that for some
parametrizations, the regret of influence-greedy is actually close to 0, which means that
in some cases lack of knowledge of the full graph does not significantly harm the influence
performance. When p = 0.1, and ϕ = 0.5 or ϕ = 1.0, the regret is not significant
(ρ = 0.410, and ρ = 0.78, respectively). For p = 0.5 and ϕ = 1.0, the regret is in the
borderline of not being significant (ρ = 0.102). In all other cases, the regret is significant.
I discussed 4 algorithms, but my framework can actually generate a variety of behav-
iors by using different c1 and c2 values. I tested 6 more combinations: {(0.5, 2), (1, 0.5),
(1, 1.5), (1, 2), (2, 0.5), (2, 1)}, but I did not observe significant differences in compari-
son with the previous algorithms in the four social networks graphs. Hence, finding a
good parametrization of c1 and c2 does not seem to be a crucial problem for the balanced
algorithm.
7.3.2 Power Law Model
In order to show that my conclusions still hold under different models, I also run experi-
ments considering a power law distribution for the teaching lists. The power law is a very
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suitable model for a range of real world phenomena. In fact, Andriani and McKelvey
[2007], in a very comprehensive literature survey, lists 80 different kinds of phenomena
which are modeled in the literature by power law distributions, and half of them are social
phenomena. For example, it has been shown to be a good model for social networks, co-
authorships networks, the structure of the world wide web and actor movie participation
networks. A power law model also seems suitable in our case, as we can expect that a
person will be very likely to teach us about the people who she has a direct connection
with, and less and less likely to report people that are further away in the graph. Hence,
when generating the teaching list of a node vi in my experiments, each node vo (vo 6= vi)
will be in its teaching list according to the following probability: po := (a − 1.0) × h−ao ,
where 1.0 < a ≤ 2.0, and ho is the shortest path distance between node vi and vo. a−1.0
represents the probability of a neighbor node vo (i.e., ho = 1) being selected. If node vi
and vo are completely disconnected, I set ho := |V |. Under this model the probability of
a person teaching us about another is always strictly greater than 0, even though it may
be very small if the respective nodes are very distant in the graph.
I fix a = 1.8 (80% probability of each of a nodes’ neighbors being in its teaching list).
I show results for a = 1.2 in Appendix A, for the interested reader (and my conclusions
still hold in the alternative parametrization). Similarly as before, Figure 7.5 shows the
result at each intervention for ϕ = 0.5 and p = 0.5. As we can see, my main conclusions
still hold in the power law model. The Influence obtained by influence-greedy, balanced,
and balanced-decreasing are very similar. Out of 40 interventions, their results are not
significantly different in 39 (ρ ≤ 0.05), and they are significantly better than knowledge-
greedy in around 60% of the interventions (ρ ≤ 0.05).
This time, however, balanced-decreasing obtained worse results than balanced in terms
of Knowledge. Although up to iteration 4, knowledge-greedy, balanced and balanced-
decreasing are not significantly different; both knowledge-greedy and balanced are sig-
nificantly better than balanced-decreasing after that iteration. It is harder to obtain
Knowledge under the power law model than under the uniform model (all algorithms
converge slower to 1.0 than before). Hence, balanced-decreasing would require a slower
decay speed (i.e., higher d) in this case, in order to perform better.
We can also notice that all algorithms are significantly better than influence-greedy
in all iterations, in terms of Knowledge. Note that under the uniform model, influence-
greedy was not significantly worse than the other algorithms after iteration 20 (ρ ≤ 0.1).
Hence, as expected, influence-greedy becomes relatively worse than the other algorithms
when we assume a model where mapping is harder.
I calculate the AUC, in order to compare different parametrizations. Figure 7.6 (a)
shows the result for a fixed influence probability value (p = 0.5), and different teaching
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure 7.5: Results of 4 real world networks across many interventions, for p = 0.5 and
ϕ = 0.5 (power law distribution).
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probability (ϕ) values. As before, except for knowledge-greedy, all algorithms in general
obtain similar results in terms of Influence. We notice, however, that for ϕ = 0.1, the
result for balanced and balanced-decreasing is actually significantly better than influence-
greedy (ρ = 0.064 and 0.038, respectively). Again, we also notice that ϕ significantly
impacts the influence that we obtain over the network, although the impact is small. For
all algorithms, the impact is significant from ϕ = 0.1 to ϕ = 0.5. For influence-greedy,
the difference is statistically significant with ρ = 1.39 × 10−31, while for knowledge-
greedy, balanced and balanced decreasing, there is statistically significant difference with
ρ = 4.529×10−6, 3.258×10−14 and 8.429×10−20, respectively. However, the impact of ϕ
increasing from 0.5 to 1 is not that significant for knowledge-greedy, balanced and balanced-
decreasing (ρ = 0.41, 0.02, 0.03, respectively), while for influence-greedy the change has
significant impact (ρ = 10−6). In terms of Knowledge, we can see that all algorithms are
significantly better than influence-greedy for all ϕ values (with ρ ≤ 3.464015 × 10−19).
However, this time we notice that knowledge-greedy and balanced are significantly better
than balanced-decreasing for all ϕ. As mentioned, a different decay speed d is necessary
in this case.
In Figure 7.6 (b), I show different values of p for ϕ = 0.5. As before, in terms
of Influence the difference between influence-greedy, balanced and balanced-decreasing is
not significant, and all algorithms are significantly better than knowledge-greedy. In
terms of Knowledge, the influence probability does not affect knowledge-greedy, balanced
nor balanced-decreasing significantly, as expected. This time, however, influence-greedy
obtains a significantly better result for p = 0.1 than for p = 0.5. This may happen
because for p = 0.1 influence-greedy has a higher tendency of selecting nodes with a high
number of neighbors, which also tends to be the ones with large teaching lists. Note that
this does not happen when the teaching and neighbor lists are independent.
Figure 7.7 shows the regret (lower results are better). We can notice similar results
as before: all algorithms have similar regret (except for knowledge-greedy), and the regret
for balanced and balanced-decreasing when ϕ = 0.1 and p = 0.5 is again significantly lower
than influence-greedy (ρ = 0.019 and 0.009, respectively). This time, however, we can
notice that for some parametrizations balanced-decreasing is actually the algorithm with
the lowest regret. For p = 0.5 and ϕ = 0.5, balanced-decreasing is better than balanced
with ρ = 4.7× 10−4. Hence, even though balanced-decreasing performed relatively worse
than under the uniform model in terms of Knowledge, it is actually the best algorithm
in terms of Influence for some parametrizations.
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(b) Changing influence probability
Figure 7.6: Influence and Knowledge for different teaching and influence probabilities
(power law distribution).













p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure 7.7: Regret for different teaching and influence probabilities (power law distribu-
tion). Lower results are better.
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7.4 Discussion
I present, for the first time, the problem of simultaneously influencing and mapping a
social network. This is a fundamental step for a greater applicability of influencing social
networks, for example to increase the adoption of healthy-conscious behavior.
My model, however, currently has two main shortcomings. First, I focus in this chap-
ter on the problem of learning the network nodes, and I assume to always know the edges
of the current known subgraph. This assumption was necessary to keep the clarity and
precision of my theoretical analysis. A simple extension would be to consider the teaching
lists to contain both nodes and edges. That is, at each time we pick a node vi, we would
learn a set of nodes V i and a set of edges Ei. We must enforce, however, that va, vb ∈ V i,
for all (va, vb) ∈ Ei. Otherwise, we could run into the situation of learning an edge e
without knowing the edge end-points, which would be inconsistent. My theoretical results
would still apply, but this constraint makes the theoretical analysis unnecessarily more
intricate. Another alternative would be to always consider fully connected graphs, but
with a very low influence probability. We could, then, increase the influence probability
of the edges which we are certain of their existence.
Second, there is not yet a grounded model available to simulate how much someone
may be able to teach us about the social network upon being called for interview, nor
real world datasets that we could use. I do have datasets of real social network graphs,
but as I mentioned, the teaching list of a node is not the same as its neighbor list. People
often know others who they do not have direct contact with, or are not “close” enough
to have a chance of influencing behavior. Besides, a person may not teach us about all
her connections during an interview, due, for example, of shame or privacy issues. An
exciting venue for future work would be to perform experiments with human subjects
to understand how the teaching lists are actually formed. Such an experiment, however,
would present many challenges. To start with, we would need access to the full knowledge
of a person, in order to know which persons she fails to report to us. Also, we can expect
high variance in the difference between the full knowledge and the teaching lists, as it
depends on the personality of each individual.
In my theoretical analysis, I assume a uniform distribution model. The uniform distri-
bution has as its main advantage the lack of any biases, which suits this situation where
the precise real-world model is yet unknown. However, intuitively many readers would
expect that a person would be more likely to report people who she is directly connected
to, and less likely to report people that are more distant in the graph. Hence, I comple-
ment my empirical evaluation with experiments where I assume a power law distribution
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when generating the teaching lists of each node. My main conclusions still hold under
this alternative model, showing that my results generalize to different distributions.
I noticed, however, that although balanced-decreasing had a similar performance as
balanced in terms of Knowledge under the uniform distribution model, it did have a lower
performance under the power law model. I used the same decay speed in both cases,
but under the power law it is harder to map the network. Hence, in that situation it
would be necessary to use a lower decay speed in order to better match the performance
of balanced. Balanced-decreasing, however, is not worse in terms of Influence. In fact, for
some parametrizations it was actually the best algorithm, outperforming influence-greedy.
Therefore, it can perform reasonably well, even without an accurate parametrization of
the speed of decay.
Additionally, another interesting point of my experimental analysis is that under both
models we found that influence-greedy tends to perform as well as balanced in terms of
Influence. This shows that the traditional greedy influence maximization algorithm is able
to perform well even without full knowledge of the social network graph. In fact, for some
parametrizations it is even not statistically different than running with full knowledge of
the network. There are cases, however, where it will perform badly: for a low teaching
probability the regret is lower for the other algorithms, and my Observation 7.2.2 shows
that it can have an arbitrarily low performance.
Moreover, influence-greedy clearly performs worse in terms of Knowledge. Besides
helping to influence a network, mapping the graph is also an important action per se.
Social agencies usually need knowledge about a community in order to decide their policies
and programs, enhancing their ability to increase the general well-being of a population.
For instance, during an interview we will not necessarily only learn about the existence of
a node vx. When we learn about vx we may also query for additional information about
the person represented by vx, such as gender, age group or profession. Agencies, then,
will be able to use this data when deciding their educational programs.
7.5 Conclusion
I introduced the novel problem of simultaneously influencing and learning the graph of a
social network. I show theoretically and experimentally that an algorithm which locally
maximizes both influence and knowledge performs as well as an influence-only greedy
algorithm in terms of influence, and as well as a knowledge-only greedy approach in terms
of knowledge. I present an approximation of my algorithm that gradually decreases the
weight given to knowledge-gain, which requires fewer assumptions.
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I run experiments using four real-life social networks, where I study two different ways
of modeling the knowledge gained by interviewing each node: one where a uniform dis-
tribution is assumed, avoiding biases and matching my theoretical analysis; and another
where a power law distribution is assumed, and thus nodes are more likely to report oth-
ers which are closer to them in the social network graph. By testing two different models
I validate my conclusions irrespective of the uniform distribution assumption.
My empirical results show not only that the proposed algorithms are competitive
with the traditional greedy one in terms of influence, but that they can also significantly
influence more nodes than the traditional algorithm when nodes have a low teaching
probability. Additionally, the proposed algorithms are significantly better in terms of
mapping the graph. Besides helping in influencing, learning about the social network







Every Team Deserves a Second Chance
In the middle of the road there was a stone
there was a stone in the middle of the road
there was a stone
in the middle of the road there was a stone.
Never should I forget this event
in the life of my fatigued retinas.
Never should I forget that in the middle of the road
there was a stone
there was a stone in the middle of the road
in the middle of the road there was a stone.
(Carlos Drummond de Andrade)
8.1 Introduction
It is well known that aggregating the opinions of different agents can lead to a significant
performance improvement when solving complex problems. In particular, voting has been
extensively used to improve the performance in machine learning [Polikar, 2012], crowd-
sourcing [Mao et al., 2013, Bachrach et al., 2012], and even board games [Obata et al.,
2011, Soejima et al., 2010]. Additionally, it is an aggregation technique that does not de-
pend on any domain, being very suited for wide applicability. However, a team of voting
agents will not always be successful in problem-solving. It is fundamental, therefore, to
be able to quickly assess the performance of teams, so that a system operator can take
actions to recover the situation in time. Moreover, complex problems are generally char-
acterized by a large action space, and hence methods that work well in such situations
are of particular interest.
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Current works in the multi-agent systems literature focus on identifying faulty or
erroneous behavior [Khalastchi et al., 2014, Lindner and Agmon, 2014, Tarapore et al.,
2013, Bulling et al., 2013], or verifying correctness of systems [Doan et al., 2014]. Such
approaches are able to identify if a system is not operating correctly, but provide no
help if a correct system of agents is failing to solve a complex problem. Other works
focus on team analysis. Raines et al. [2000] present a method to automatically analyze
the performance of a team. The method, however, only works oﬄine and needs domain
knowledge. Other methods for team analysis are heavily tailored for robot-soccer [Ramos
and Ayanegui, 2008] and focus on identifying opponent tactics [Mirchevska et al., 2014].
In fact, many works in robotics propose monitoring a team by detecting differences
in the internal state of the agents (or disagreements), mostly caused by malfunction of
the sensors/actuators [Kaminka and Tambe, 1998, Kaminka, 2006, Kalech and Kaminka,
2007, Kalech et al., 2011]. In a system of voting agents, however, disagreements are inher-
ent in the coordination process and do not necessarily mean that an erroneous situation
has occurred due to such malfunction. Additionally, research in social choice is mostly
focused on studying the guarantees of finding the optimal choice given a noise model for
the agents and a voting rule [Caragiannis et al., 2013, List and Goodin, 2001, Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2005], but provide no help in assessing the performance of a team of
voting agents.
There are also many recent works presenting methods to analyze and/or make predic-
tions about human teams playing sports games. Such works use an enormous amount of
data to make predictions about many popular sports, such as American football [Quenzel
and Shea, 2014, Heiny and Blevins, 2011], soccer [Bialkowski et al., 2014, Lucey et al.,
2015] and basketball [Maheswaran et al., 2012, Lucey et al., 2014]. Clearly, however,
these works are not applicable to analyzing the performance of a team of voting agents.
Hence, in this chapter, I show a novel method to predict the final performance (success
or failure) of a team of voting agents, without using any domain knowledge. Therefore,
my method can be easily applied in a great variety of scenarios. Moreover, my approach
can be quickly applied online at any step of the problem-solving process, allowing a system
operator to identify when the team is failing. This can be useful in many applications.
For example, consider a complex problem being solved on a cluster of computers. It
is undesirable to allocate more resources than necessary, but if we notice that a team
is failing in problem solving, we might wish to increase the allocation of resources. Or
consider a team playing together a game against an opponent (such as board games, or
poker). Different teams might play better against different opponents. Hence, if we notice
that a team is predicted to perform poorly, we could dynamically change it. Under time
constraints, however, such prediction must be done quickly.
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Although related, note that the contribution of this chapter is not in using a team
of experts to solve a problem or make predictions [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006] or
aggregating multiple classifiers through voting as in ensemble systems [Polikar, 2012].
My objective is, given a team of voting agents, to make a prediction about such a team,
in order to estimate whether they will be able to solve a certain problem or not.
My approach is based on a prediction model derived from a graphical representation
of the problem-solving process, where the final outcome is modeled as a random variable
that is influenced by the subsets of agents that agreed together over the actions taken at
each step towards solving the problem. Hence, my representation depends uniquely on
the coordination method, and has no dependency on the domain. I explain theoretically
why we can make accurate predictions, and I also show the conditions under which we
can use a reduced (and scalable) representation. Moreover, my theoretical development
allows us to anticipate situations that would not be foreseen by a simple application
of classical voting theories. For example, my model indicates that the accuracy can be
better for diverse teams composed of different agents than for uniform teams, and that
we can make equally accurate predictions for teams that have significant differences in
playing strength (which is later confirmed in our experiments). I also study the impact of
increasing the action space in the quality of my predictions, and show that we can make
better predictions in problems with large action spaces.
I present experimental results in two different domains: Computer Go and Ensemble
Learning. In the Computer Go domain, I predict the performance of three different
teams of voting agents: a diverse, a uniform, and an intermediate team (with respect
to diversity); in four different board sizes. I study the predictions at every turn of the
games, and compare with an analysis performed by using an in-depth search. I am able
to achieve an accuracy of 71% for a diverse team in 9× 9 Go, and of 81% when I increase
the action space size to 21× 21 Go. For a uniform team, I obtain 62% accuracy in 9× 9,
and 75% accuracy in 21× 21 Go.
I evaluate different classification thresholds using Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves, and compare the performance for different teams and board sizes according
to the area under the curves (AUC). I experimentally show in such analysis that: (i)
we can effectively make high-quality predictions for all teams and board sizes; (ii) the
quality of my predictions is better for the diverse and intermediate teams than uniform
(irrespective of their strength), across all thresholds; (iii) the quality of the predictions
increases as the board size grows. Moreover, the impact of increasing the action space
on the prediction quality occurs earlier in the game for the diverse team than for the
uniform team. Finally, I study the learned prediction functions, and how they change
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across different teams and different board sizes. My analysis shows that the functions are
not only highly non-trivial, but in fact even open new questions for further study.
In the Ensemble Learning domain, I predict the performance of classifiers that vote to
assign labels to set of items. I use the scikit-learn’s digits dataset [Pedregosa et al., 2011],
and teams vote to correctly identify hand-written digits. I am also able to obtain high-
quality predictions online about the final performance of two different teams of classifiers,
showing the applicability of my approach to different domains.
8.2 Prediction Method
I start by presenting my prediction method, and in Section 8.3 I will explain why the
method works. I consider scenarios where agents vote at every step (i.e., world state) of
a complex problem, in order to take common decisions at every step towards problem-
solving. Formally, let T be a set of agents ti, A be a set of actions aj and S be a set of
world states sk. The agents must vote for an action at each world state, and the team
takes the action decided by the plurality voting rule, that picks the action that received
the highest number of votes (I assume ties are broken randomly). The team obtains a
final reward r upon completing all world states. In this chapter, I assume two possible
final rewards: “success” (1) or “failure” (0).
I define the prediction problem as follows: without using any knowledge of the do-
main, identify the final reward that will be received by a team. This prediction must be
executable at any world state, allowing a system operator to take remedial procedures in
time.
I now explain my algorithm. The main idea is to learn a prediction function, given
the frequencies of agreements of all possible agent subsets over the chosen actions. In
order to learn such function, we need to define a feature vector to represent each problem
solving instance (for example, a game). My feature vector records the frequency that
each subset of agents was the one that determined the action taken by the team (i.e., the
subset whose action was selected as the action of the team by the plurality voting rule).
When learning the prediction function I calculate the feature vector considering the whole
history of the problem solving process (for example, from the first to the last turn of a
game). When using the learned prediction function to actually perform a prediction, we
can simply compute the feature vector considering all history from the first world state to
the current one (for example, from the first turn of a game up to the current turn), and
use it as input to our learned function. Note that my feature vector does not hold any
domain information, and uses solely the voting patterns to represent the problem solving
instances.
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Formally, let P(T) = {T1,T2, . . .} be the power set of the set of agents, ai be the
action chosen in world state sj and Hj ⊆ T be the subset of agents that agreed on ai in
that world state. Consider the feature vector ~x = (x1, x2, . . .) computed at world state
sj , where each dimension (feature) has a one-to-one mapping with P(T). I define xi as







where I is the indicator function and Sj ⊆ S is the set of world states from s1 to the
current world state sj .
Hence, given a set X˜ such that for each feature vector ~xt ∈ X˜ we have the associated
reward rt, we can estimate a function, fˆ , that returns an estimated reward between 0 and
1 given an input ~x. I classify estimated rewards above a certain threshold ϑ (for example,
0.5) as “success”, and below it as “failure”.
In order to learn the classification model, the features are computed at the final world
state. That is, the feature vector will record the frequency that each possible subset
of agents won the vote, calculated from the first world state to the last one. For each
feature vector, we have (for learning) the associated reward: “success” (1) or “failure”
(0), accordingly with the final outcome of the problem solving process. In order to execute
the prediction, the features are computed at the current world state (i.e., all history of
the current problem solving process from the first world state to the current one).
I use classification by logistic regression, which models fˆ as
fˆ(~x) =
1
1 + e−(α+~βT ~x)
,
where α and ~β are parameters that will be learned given X˜ and the associated rewards.
While training, I eliminate two of the features. The feature corresponding to the subset
∅ is dropped because an action is chosen only if at least one of the agents voted for it.
Also, since the rest of the features sum up to 1, and are hence linearly dependent, I also
drop the feature corresponding to all agents agreeing on the chosen action.
I also study a variant of this prediction method, where we use only information about
the number of agents that agreed upon the chosen action, but not which agents exactly
were involved in the agreement. For that variant, I consider a reduced feature vector
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Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
Iteration 1 a1 a1 a2
Iteration 2 a2 a2 a1
Iteration 3 a1 a2 a2
Table 8.1: A simple example of voting profiles after three iterations of problem-solving.
~y = (y1, y2, . . .), where I define yi to be the proportion of times that the chosen action






where I is the indicator function and Sj ⊆ S is the set of world states from s1 to the
current world state sj . I compare the two approaches in Section 8.4.
8.2.1 Example of Features
I give a simple example to illustrate my proposed feature vectors. Consider a team of
three agents: t1, t2, t3. Let’s assume three possible actions: a1, a2, a3. Consider that, in
three iterations of the problem solving process, the voting profiles were as shown in Table
8.1, where I show which action each agent voted for at each iteration. Based on plurality
voting rule, the action chosen for the respective iterations would be a1, a2, and a2.
We can see an example of how the full feature vector will be defined at each iteration
in Table 8.2, where each column represents a possible subset of the set of agents, and I
mark the frequency that each subset agreed on the chosen action. Note that the frequency
of the subsets {t1}, {t2} and {t3} remains 0 in this example. This happens because we
only count the subset where all agents involved in the agreement are present. If there was
a situation where, for example, agent t1 votes for a1, agent t2 votes for a2 and agent t3
votes for a3, then we would select one of these agents by random tie braking. After that,
we would increase the frequency of the corresponding subset containing only the agent
that was chosen (i.e, either {t1}, {t2} or {t3}).
If the problem has only three iterations in total, we would use the feature vector
at the last iteration and the corresponding result (“success” — 1, or “failure” — 0),
while learning the function fˆ (that is, the feature vectors at Iteration 1 and 2 would be
ignored). If, however, we already learned a function fˆ , then we could use the feature
vector at Iteration 1, 2 or 3 as input to fˆ to execute a prediction. Note that at Iteration 1
and 2 the output (i.e., the prediction) of fˆ will be exactly the same, as the feature vector
did not change. At Iteration 3, however, we may have a different output/prediction.
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{t1} {t2} {t3} {t1, t2} {t1, t3} {t2, t3}
Iteration 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Iteration 2 0 0 0 1 0 0
Iteration 3 0 0 0 2/3 0 1/3
Table 8.2: Example of the full feature vector after three iterations of problem solving.
1 2
Iteration 1 0 1
Iteration 2 0 1
Iteration 3 0 1
Table 8.3: Example of the reduced feature vector after three iterations of problem solving.
In Table 8.3, I show an example of the reduced feature vector, where the column
headings define the number of agents involved in an agreement over the chosen action. I
consider here the same voting profiles as before, shown in Table 8.1. Note that the reduced
representation is much more compact, but we have no way to represent the change in
which specific agents were involved in the agreement, from Iteration 2 to Iteration 3. In
this case, therefore, we would always have the same prediction after Iteration 1, Iteration
2 and also Iteration 3.
8.3 Theory
I consider here the view of social choice as a way to estimate a “truth”, or the correct
(i.e., best) action to perform in a given world state. Hence, we can model each agent as
a probability distribution function (pdf): that is, given the correct outcome, each agent
will have a certain probability of voting for the best action, and a certain probability of
voting for some incorrect action. These pdfs are not necessarily the same across different
world states (Chapter 3). Hence, given the voting profile in a certain world state, there
will be a probability p of picking the correct choice (for example, by the plurality voting
rule).
I will start by developing, in Section 8.3.1, a simple explanation of why we can use the
voting patterns to predict success or failure of a team of voting agents, based on classical
voting theories. Such explanation will give an intuitive idea of why we can use the voting
patterns to predict success or failure of a team of voting agents, and it can be immediately
derived from the classical voting models. However, it fails to explain some of the results in
Section 8.4, and it needs the assumption that plurality is an optimal voting rule. Hence,
it is not enough for a deeper understanding of my prediction methodology. Therefore,
I will later present, in Section 8.3.2, my main theoretical model, that provides a better
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understanding of my results. In particular, based on classical models we would expect
to make better predictions for teams that have a greater performance (i.e., likelihood of
being correct). My theory and experiments will show, however, that we can actually make
better predictions for teams that are more diverse, even if they have a worse performance.
Moreover, I will also be able to build on my previous ST agent model, in Section 8.3.3,
to study the effect of increasing the action space on the prediction quality.
8.3.1 Classical Voting Model
I start with a simple example to show that we can use the outcome of plurality voting to
predict success. Consider a scenario with two agents and two possible actions, a correct
and an incorrect one. I assume, for this example, that agents have a probability of 0.6 of
voting for the correct action and 0.4 of making a mistake.
If both agents vote for the same action, they are either both correct or both wrong.
Hence, the probability of the team being correct is given by 0.62/(0.62 + 0.42) = 0.69.
Therefore, if the agents agree, the team is more likely correct than wrong. If they vote
for different actions, however, one will be correct and the other one wrong. Given that
profile, and assuming that we break ties randomly, the team will have a 0.5 probability
of being correct. Hence, the team has a higher probability of taking a correct choice
when the agents agree than when they disagree (0.69 > 0.5). Therefore, if across multiple
iterations these agents agree often, the team has a higher probability of being correct
across these iterations, and we can predict that the team is going to be successful. If they
disagree often, then the probability of being correct across the iterations is lower, and we
can predict that the team will not be successful.
More generally than the previous example, we can consider all cases where plurality
is the optimal voting rule. In social choice, optimal voting rules are often studied as
maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) of the correct choice [Conitzer and Sandholm,
2005]. That is, each agent is modeled as having a noisy perception of the truth (or
correct outcome). Hence, the correct outcome influences how each agent is going to vote,
as shown in the model in Figure 8.1. For example, consider a certain agent t that has a
probability 0.6 of voting for the best action, and let’s say we are in a certain situation
where action a∗ is the best action. In this situation agent t will have a probability of 0.6
of voting for a∗.
Therefore, given a voting profile and a noise model (the probability of voting for
each action, given the correct outcome) of each agent, we can estimate the likelihood of
each action being the best by a simple (albeit computationally expensive) probabilistic
inference. Any voting rule is going to be optimal if it corresponds to always picking the
action that has the maximum likelihood of being correct (i.e., the action with maximum
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“Correct Outcome”
Agent 1’s vote Agent 2’s vote ... Agent n’s vote
Figure 8.1: “Classical” voting model. Each agent has a noisy perception of the truth, or
correct outcome. Hence, its vote is influenced by the correct outcome.
likelihood of being the best action), according to the assumed noise model of the agents.
That is, the output of an optimal voting rule always corresponds to the output of actually
computing, by the probabilistic inference method mentioned above, which action has the
highest likelihood of being the best one.
If plurality is assumed to be an optimal voting rule, then the action voted by the
largest number of agents has the highest probability of being the optimal action. We
can expect, therefore, that the higher the number of agents that votes for an action,
the higher the probability that the action is the optimal one. Hence, given two different
voting profiles with a different number of agreeing agents, we expect that the team has
a higher probability of being correct (and, therefore, be successful) in the voting profile
where a larger number of agents agrees on the chosen action.
I formalize this idea in the following proposition, under the classical assumptions of
voting models. Hence, I consider that the agents have a higher probability of voting for
the best action than any other action (which makes plurality a MLE voting rule [List
and Goodin, 2001]), uniform priors over all actions, and that all agents are identical and
independent.
Proposition 8.3.1 The probability that a team is correct increases with the number of
agreeing agents m in a voting profile, if plurality is MLE.
Proof: Let a∗ be the best action (whose identity we do not know) and V = v1, v2 . . . vn
be the votes of n agents. The probability of any action a being the best action, given the
votes of the agents (i.e., P (a = a∗|v1, v2 . . . vn)), is governed by the following relation:
P (a = a∗|v1, v2 . . . vn) ∝ P (v1, v2 . . . vn|a = a∗)P (a = a∗) (8.1)
Let’s consider two voting profiles V1,V2, where in one a higher number of agents
agree in the chosen action than in the other (i.e., mV1 > mV2). Let w1 be the action
with the highest number of votes in V1, and w2 the one in V2.
Without loss of generality (since the order does not matter), let’s reorder the voting
profiles V1 and V2, such that all votes for w1 are in the beginning of V1 and all votes
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2 be the voting profiles considering
only the first x agents (after reordering).
We have that P (V
mV2
1 |w1 = a∗) = P (V
mV2
2 |w2 = a∗), since up to the first mV2
agents for both voting profiles we are considering the case where all agents voted for a∗.
Now, let’s consider the agents from mV2 + 1 to mV1 . In V1, the voted action of all
agents (still w1) is wired to a
∗ (by the conditional probability). However, in V2, the voted
action a 6= w2 is not wired to a∗ in the conditional probability anymore. As each agent is
more likely to vote for a∗ than any other action, from mV2 + 1 to mV1 , the events in V1
(an agent voting for a∗) has higher probability than the events in V2 (an agent voting
for an action a 6= a∗). Hence, P (VmV11 |w1 = a∗) > P (V
mV1
2 |w2 = a∗).
Now let’s consider the votes after mV1 . In V1 there are no more votes for w1, and in
V2 there are no more votes for w2. Hence, all the subsequent votes are not wired to any
ranking (as we only wire w1 = a
∗ and w2 = a∗ in the conditional probabilities). Therefore,
each vote can be assigned to any ranking position that is not the first. Since the agents
are independent, any sequence of votes will thus be as likely. Hence, P (V1|w1 = a∗) >
P (V2|w2 = a∗).
Since I assume uniform priors, it follows that:
P (w1 = a
∗|V1) > P (w2 = a∗|V2)
Therefore, the team is more likely correct in profiles where a higher number of agents
agree.
Hence, if across multiple voting iterations, a higher number of agents agree often, we
can predict that the team is going to be successful. If they disagree a lot, we can expect
that they are wrong in most of the voting iterations, and we can predict that the team is
going to fail.
In the next observation I show that we can increase the prediction accuracy by knowing
not only how many agents agreed, but also which specific agents were involved in the
agreement. Basically, I show that the probability of a team being correct depends on the
agents involved in the agreement. Therefore, if we know that the best agents are involved
in an agreement, we can be more certain of a team’s success. This observation motivates
the use of the full feature vector, instead of the reduced one.
Observation 8.3.2 Given two profiles V1,V2 with the same number of agreeing agents
m, the probability that a team is correct is not necessarily equal for the two profiles.
We can easily show by an example (that is, we only need one example where the
probability is not equal to show that it will not always be equal). Consider a problem
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with two actions. Consider a team of three agents, where t1 and t2 have a probability of
0.8 of being correct, while t3 has a probability of 0.6 of being correct. As the probability
of picking the correct action is the highest for all agents, the action chosen by the majority
of the agents has the highest probability of being correct (that is, we are still covering a
case where plurality is MLE).
However, when only t1 and t2 agree, the probability that the team is correct is given
by: 0.82× 0.4/(0.82× 0.4 + 0.22× 0.6) = 0.91. When only t2 and t3 agree, the probability
that the team is correct is given by: 0.8×0.6×0.2/(0.8×0.6×0.2+0.2×0.4×0.8) = 0.59.
Hence, the probability that the team is correct is higher when t1 and t2 agree than when
t2 and t3 agree.
However, based solely on the classical voting models, one would expect that given
two different teams, the predictions would be more accurate for the one that has greater
performance (i.e., likelihood of being correct), as I formalize in the following proposition.
Therefore, this model fails to explain my experimental results (as I will show later). I
will use the term strength to refer to a team’s performance.
Proposition 8.3.3 Under the classical voting models, given two different teams, one can
expect to make better predictions for the strongest one.
Proof Sketch: Under the classical voting models, assuming the agents have a noise
model such that plurality is a MLE, we have that the best team will have a greater
probability of being correct given a voting profile where m agents agree than a worse
team with the same amount of m agreeing agents.
Hence, the probability of the best team being correct will be closer to 1 in comparison
with the probability of the worse team being correct. The closer the probability of success
is to 1, the easier it is to make predictions. Consider a Bernoulli trial with probability
of success p ≈ 1. In the learning phase, we will see many successes accordingly. In the
testing phase, we will predict the majority of the two for every trial, and we will go wrong
only with probability |1− p| ≈ 0.
Of course, we could also have an extremely weak team, that is wrong most of the
time. For such team, it would also be easy to predict that the probability of success is
close to 0. Notice, however, that I am assuming here the classical voting models, where
plurality is a MLE. In such models, the agents must play “reasonably well”: classically
they are assumed to have either a probability of being correct greater than 0.5 or the
probability of voting for the best action is the highest one in their pdf [List and Goodin,
2001]. Otherwise, plurality is not going to be a MLE.
Consider, however, that the strongest team is composed of copies of the best agent







Figure 8.2: My main model. I assume that the subset of agents that decided the action
of the team at each world state Hi determines whether the team will be successful or not
(W ).
that, in fact, such agents will not necessarily have noise models (pdfs) where the best
action has the highest probability in all world states. In some world states, a suboptimal
action could have the highest probability, making the agents agree on the same mistakes
(Chapter 3). Therefore, when plurality is not actually a MLE in all world states, we have
that Proposition 8.3.1 will not hold in the world states where this happens. Hence, we
will predict that the team made a correct choice, when actually the team was wrong,
causing problems in our accuracy. I give more details in the next section.
8.3.2 Main Theoretical Model
I now present my main theory, that holds irrespective of plurality being an optimal voting
rule (MLE) or not. Again, I consider agents voting across multiple world states. I assume
that all iterations equally influence the final outcome, and that they are all independent.
Let the final reward of the team be defined by a random variable W , and let the
number of world states be S. I model the problem solving process by the graphical model
in Figure 8.2, where Hj represents the subset of agents that agreed on the chosen action
at world state sj . That is, I assume that the subset of agents that decided the action
taken by the team at each world state of the problem solving process will determine
whether the team will be successful or not in the end. A specific problem (for example,
Go games where the next state will depend on the action taken in the current one) would
call for more complex models to be completely represented. My model is a simplification
of the problem solving process, abstracting away the details of specific problems.
For any subset H, let P (H) be the probability that the chosen action was correct
given the subset of agreeing agents. If the correct action is a∗, P (H) is equivalent to:
P (∀t ∈ H, t chooses a∗, ∀t /∈ H, t chooses a 6= a∗)
P (∃a′ ∀t ∈ H, t chooses a′, ∀t /∈ H, t chooses a 6= a′) ,
where H is the subset of agents which voted for the action taken by the team.
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Note that P (H) depends on both the team and the world state. However, I marginalize
the probabilities to produce a value that is an average over all world states. I consider







I use the exponent 1/S in order to maintain a uniform scale across all problems.
Each problem might have a different number of world states; and for one with many
world states, it is likely that the incurred product of probabilities is sufficiently low to fail
the above test, independent of the actual subsets of agents that agreed upon the chosen
actions. However, the final reward is not dependent on the number of world states.
I can show, then, that we can use a linear classification model (such as logistic regres-
sion) that is equivalent to Equation 8.2, to predict the final reward of a team.
Theorem 8.3.4 Given the model in Equation 8.2, the final outcome of a team can be
predicted by a linear model over agreement frequencies.





log(P (Hj)) > log(δ)
The sum over the steps (world states) of the problem-solving process can be trans-





log(P (H)) > log(δ), (8.3)
where nH is the number of times the subset of agreeing agents H was encountered during
problem solving. Hence, nHS is the frequency of seeing the subset H, which I will denote
by fH.
Recall that T is the set of all agents. Hence, fT (which is the frequency of all agents
agreeing on the same action), is equal to 1−∑H∈P\{T} fH. Also, note that n∅ = 0, since
at least one agent must pick the chosen action. Equation 8.3 can, hence, be rewritten as:
fT log(P (T)) +
∑
H∈P\T




 log(P (T)) + ∑
H∈P\T

























Note that log( δP (T)) and the “coefficients” log(
P (H)
P (T) ) are all constants with respect
to a given team, as I have discussed earlier. Considering the set of all fH (for each
possible subset of agreeing agents H) to be the characteristic features of a single problem,
the coefficients can now be learned from training data that contains many problems
represented using these features. Further, the outcome of a team can be estimated through
a linear model.
The number of constants is exponential, however, as the size of the team grows.
Therefore, in the following corollary, I show that (under some conditions) we can approx-
imate well the prediction with a reduced feature vector that grows linearly. In order to
differentiate different possible subsets, I will denote by Hi a certain subset ∈ P, and by
|Hi| the size of that subset (i.e., the number of agents that agree on the chosen action).
Corollary 8.3.5 If P (Hi) ≈ P (Hj) ∀Hi,Hj such that |Hi| = |Hj |, we can approxi-
mate the prediction with a reduced feature vector, that grows linearly with the number of
agents. Furthermore, in a uniform team the reduced representation is equal to the full
representation.
Proof: By the assumption of the corollary, there is a PH′n , defined as PH′n ≈ P (Hj),
∀Hj such that |Hj | = n. Let fn =
∑
fHj , over all |Hj | = n. Also, let N′ be the set of

















As PH′n depends only on the number of agents, we have that such representation
grows linearly with the size of the team.
Moreover, note that for a team made of copies of the same agent, we have that
PH′n = P (H
j), ∀Hj such that |Hj | = n. Hence, the left hand side of Equation 8.5 is
going to be equal to the right hand side.
Also, notice that my model does not need any assumptions about plurality being an
optimal voting rule (MLE). In fact, there are no assumptions about the voting rule at
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all. Hence, Proposition 8.3.1, Observation 8.3.2 and Proposition 8.3.3 do not apply, and
we can still make accurate predictions irrespective of the performance of a team.
We can also note that the accuracy of the predictions is not going to be the same across
different teams. Given two teams where plurality is the optimal voting rule in general
(i.e., P (Hi) > P (Hj), ∀Hi,Hj where |Hi| > |Hj |): one uniform, made of copies of the
best agent, and a diverse, made of different agents, we have that we can actually make
better predictions for diverse than uniform, irrespective of the actual playing performance
of these two teams.
Corollary 8.3.6 Given a diverse and a uniform team, the accuracy of the prediction for
the diverse team can be higher, even if the diverse team has a lower probability of victory.
Proof Sketch: Note that the learned constants cˆH ≈ log(P (H)P (T) ) represent the
marginal probabilities across all world states. However, I showed (Chapter 3) that the
agent with the highest marginal probability of voting for the correct choice will not nec-
essarily have the highest probability of being correct at all world states.
Hence, let Bad be the set of world states where the best agent does not have the
highest probability of voting for the correct action in its pdf. In such world states, the
agents tend to agree over the incorrect action that has the highest probability. This
follows from modeling the voting of all agents as a multinomial distribution. Hence, the
expected number of agents that vote for an action aj , in a team with n agents, is given by:
E[|H|] = n× pj , where pj is the probability of the agent voting for action aj . Therefore,
the action with the highest probability will tend to receive the highest number of votes.
However, in my prediction model, the estimation that the team is correct will get
higher as more agents agree together upon the final choice. Hence, we will tend to make
wrong predictions for the world states in the set Bad, and our accuracy will be lower as
|Bad| gets higher.
Since a diverse team is composed of agents with different pdfs, it is less likely that in
a given world state they will all have the highest probability in the same incorrect action
(Chapter 3). Hence, it is less likely that the situation described above happens, and we
can have better predictions for a diverse team.
Although I only give here a proof sketch, in Section 8.4 I experimentally show a
statistically significant higher accuracy for the predictions for a diverse team than for
a uniform team, even though they have similar strength (i.e., performance in terms of
winning rates). I am able to achieve a better prediction for diverse teams both in the
end of the problem-solving process and also while doing online predictions at any world
state.
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8.3.3 Action Space Size
I present now my study concerning the quality of the predictions over large action space
sizes. In order to perform this analysis, I assume the spreading tail (ST ) agent model,
presented in Chapter 4. The ST agent model was developed to study how teams of
voting agents change in performance as the size of the action space increases. The basic
assumption is that the pdf of each member of the team has a non-zero probability over
an increasingly larger number of suboptimal actions as the action space grows, while the
probability of voting for the optimal action remains unchanged. Chapter 4 perform an
experimental validation of this model in the Computer Go domain.
As a reminder, I briefly summarize here the formal definition of the ST agent model,
and I refer the reader to Chapter 4 for a more detailed description. Let Dm be the set
of suboptimal actions (aj , j 6= 0) assigned with a nonzero probability in the pdf of an
agent i, and dm = |Dm|. The ST model assumes that there is a bound in the ratio of the
suboptimal action with highest probability and the one with lowest nonzero probability,
i.e., let pi,min = minj∈Dmpi,j and pi,max = maxj∈Dmpi,j ; there is a constant ζ such that
pi,max ≤ ζpi,min ∀ agents i. ST agents are agents whose dm is non-decreasing on m and
dm →∞ as m→∞. I consider that there is a constant  > 0, such that for all ST agents
i, ∀m, pi,0 ≥ . I also assume that pi,0 does not change with m.
Let the size of the action space |A| = %, and pi,j be the probability that agent i votes
for action with rank j. In Chapter 4, I show that when % → ∞, the probability that a













that is, the probability of two or more agents agreeing over suboptimal actions converges
to zero, and the agents can only agree over the optimal choice (note that a suboptimal
action can still be taken as we may have situations where no agent agrees). Hence,
Equation 4.1 calculates the total probability minus the cases where the best action is not
chosen: the second term covers the case where all agents vote for a suboptimal action
and the third term covers the case where one agent votes for the optimal action and all
other agents vote for suboptimal actions.
Before proceeding to my study, I am going to make a few definitions and then two
weak assumptions. I consider now here any action space size. Let α be the probability
of a team taking the optimal action when all agents disagree. Since we can only take
the optimal action if one agent votes for that action, α is a function of the probability of
each agent voting for the optimal action. That is, we may have voting profiles where all
agents disagree and no agent voted for the optimal action, or we may have voting profiles
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where all agents disagree, but there is one agent that voted for the optimal action (and,
hence, we may still take the optimal action due to random tie braking).
Let β be the probability of a team taking the optimal action when there is some
agreement on the voting profile. β may be different according to each voting profile, but
we assume that we always have that β < 1 if % <∞, and β = 1 if %→∞, according to the
ST agent model. That is, if two or more agents agree, there is always some probability
q > 0 that they are agreeing over a suboptimal action, and q → 0 as %→∞.
I will make the following weak assumptions: (i) If there is no agreement, the team is
more likely to take a suboptimal action than an optimal action. I.e., α < 1 − α; (ii) If
there is agreement, there is at least one voting profile where the team is more likely to
take an optimal action than a suboptimal action. That is, there is at least one β such
that β > 1− β.
Assumption (i) is weak, since α < 1/n (as we break ties randomly and there may be
cases where no agent votes for the optimal action). Clearly 1/n < 1 − 1/n for n > 2.
Assumption (ii) is also weak, because if we are given a team that is always more likely
to take suboptimal actions than an optimal action for any voting profile, then a trivial
predictor that always outputs “failure” would be optimal (and, hence, we would not need
a prediction at all). Therefore, assumption (i) and (ii) are satisfied for all situations of
interest. I present now my result:
Theorem 8.3.7 Let T be a set of ST agents. The quality of our prediction about the
performance of T is the highest as %→∞.
Proof: Let’s fix the problem to predicting performance at one world state. Hence, as we
consider a single decision, there is a single Hi such that fHi = 1, and fHj = 0 ∀j 6= i. In
order to simplify the notation, I denote by H the subset Hi corresponding to fHi = 1. I
also consider the performance of the team as “success” on that fixed world state if they
take the optimal action, and as “failure” otherwise.
Let a voting event be the process of querying the agents for the vote, obtaining the
voting profile and the corresponding final decision. Hence, it has a unique correct label
(“success” or “failure”). A voting event ξ will be mapped to a point χ in the feature
space, according to the subset of agents that agreed on the chosen action. Multiple
voting events, however, will be mapped to the same point χ (as exactly the same subset
can agree in different situations, sometimes they may be agreeing over the optimal action,
and sometimes they may be agreeing over suboptimal actions). Hence, given a point χ,
there is a certain probability that the team was successful, and a certain probability that
the team failed. Therefore, by assigning a label to that point, our predictor will also
be correct with a certain probability. With enough data, the predictor will output the
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more likely of the two events. That is, if given a profile, the team has a probability p
of taking the optimal action, and p > 1 − p, the predictor will output “success”, and
it will be correct with probability p. Correspondingly, if 1 − p > p, the predictor will
output “failure”, and it will be correct with probability 1− p. Hence, the probability of
the prediction being correct will be max(p, 1− p).
I first study the probability of making a correct prediction across the whole feature
space, for different action space sizes, and after that I will focus on what happens with
the specific voting events as the action space changes.
Let us start by considering the case when % → ∞. By Equation 4.1, we know that
every time two or more agents agree on the same action, that action will be the optimal
one. Note that this is a very clear division of the feature space, as for every single point
where |H| ≥ 2 the team will be successful with probability 1. Therefore, on this subspace
we can make perfect predictions.
The only points in the feature space where a team may still take a suboptimal action
are the ones where a single agent agrees on the chosen action, i.e., |H| = 1. Hence, for
such points we will make a correct prediction with probability max(α, 1− α).
Let’s now consider cases with a smaller action space size (i.e., % < ∞). Let’s first
consider the subspace |H| ≥ 2. Before, our predictor was correct with probability 1. Now,
given a voting event where there is an agreement, there will be a probability β < 1 of
the team taking the optimal action. Hence, the predictor will be correct with probability
max(β,1− β), but max(β, 1− β) < 1.
Let’s consider now the subspace |H| = 1. Here the quality of the prediction depends
on α, which is a function of the probability of each agent playing the best action. On
the ST agent model, however, the probability of one agent voting for the best action is
independent of % (Chapter 4). Hence, α does not depend on the action space size, and
for these cases the quality of our prediction will be the same as before. Therefore, for all
points in the feature space, the probability of making a correct prediction is either the
same or worse when % <∞ than when %→∞.
However, that does not complete the proof yet, because a voting event ξ may map to
a different point χ when the action space changes. For instance, the number of agents
that agree over a suboptimal action may overpass the number of agents that agree on
the optimal action as the action spaces changes from % → ∞ to % < ∞. Therefore, we
need to show that our prediction will be strictly better when %→∞ irrespective of such
mapping.
Hence, let us now study the voting events. As the number of actions decrease, a
certain voting event ξ when %→∞, will map to a voting event ξ′ when % <∞ (where ξ
may or may not be equal to ξ′). Let χ and χ′ be the corresponding points in the feature
153
space for ξ and ξ′. Also, let H and H′ be the respective subset of agreeing agents. Let’s
consider now the four possible cases:
(i) |H| = |H′| = 1. For such events, the performance of the predictor will remain
the same, that is, for both cases we will make a correct prediction with probability
max(α, 1 − α). Note that this case will not happen for all events, as pi,0 6→ 0 when
%→∞, hence there will be at least one event where |H| ≥ 2.
(ii) |H| ≥ 2, |H′| ≥ 2. For such events the performance of the predictor will be higher
when %→∞, as we can make a correct prediction for a point χ with probability 1, while
for a point χ′ with probability max(β, 1− β) < 1.
(iii) |H| ≥ 2, |H′| = 1. This case will not happen under the ST agent model. If there
was a certain subset H of agreeing agents when % → ∞, when we decrease the number
of actions the new subset of agreeing agents H′ will either have the same size or will be
larger. This follows from the fact that we may have a larger subset agreeing over some
suboptimal action when the action space decreases, but the original subset that voted for
the optimal action will not change.
(iv) |H| = 1, |H′| ≥ 2. We know that in this case ξ′ is an event where the team fails
(otherwise the same subset would also have agreed when %→∞). Hence, for 1− α > α
(weak assumption (i)), we make a correct prediction for such case when % → ∞. When
% < ∞, we make a correct prediction if 1 − β > β. β, however, depends on the voting
profile of the event ξ′. By weak assumption (ii), there will be at least one event where the
team is more likely to be correct than wrong (that is, β > 1 − β). Hence, there will be
at least one event where our predictor changes from making a correct prediction (when
%→∞) to making an incorrect prediction (when % <∞).
Hence, for all voting events, the probability of making a correct prediction will either
be the same or worse when % <∞ than when %→∞, and there will be at least one voting
event where it will be worse, completing the proof. Hence, %→∞ is strictly the best case
for our prediction. As we assume that all world states are independent, if % → ∞ is the
best case for a single world state, it will also be the best case for a set of world states.
8.4 Results
8.4.1 Computer Go
I first test my prediction method in the Computer Go domain. I use four different Go
software: Fuego 1.1 [Enzenberger et al., 2010], GnuGo 3.8 [FSF, 2009], Pachi 9.01 [Baudiˇs
and Gailly, 2011], MoGo 4 [Gelly et al., 2006], and two (weaker) variants of Fuego (Fuego∆



















Figure 8.3: Winning rates of the three teams, under four different board sizes.
agent among all of them (Chapter 3). The description of Fuego∆ and FuegoΘ is available
in Chapter 3.
I study three different teams: Diverse, composed of one copy of each agent1; Uniform,
composed of six copies of the original Fuego (initialized with different random seeds, as
in Soejima et al. [2010]); Intermediate, composed of six random parametrized versions
of Fuego (from Chapter 6). In all teams, the agents vote together, playing as white, in
a series of Go games against the original Fuego playing as black. I study four different
board sizes for diverse and uniform: 9x9, 13x13, 17x17 and 21x21. For intermediate, I
study only 9x9, since the random parametrizations of Fuego do not work on larger boards.
In Go a player is allowed to place a move at any empty intersection of the board, so the
largest number of possible actions at each board size is, respectively: 81, 169, 289, 441.
In order to evaluate my predictions, I use a dataset of 1000 games for each team and
board size combination (in a total of 9000 games, all played from the beginning). For all
results, I used repeated random sub-sampling validation. I randomly assign 20% of the
games for the testing set (and the rest for the training set), keeping approximately the
same ratio as the original distribution. The whole process is repeated 100 times. Hence,
in all graphs I show the average results, and the error bars show the 99% confidence
interval (p = 0.01), according to a t-test. If the error bars cannot be seen in a certain
point in a graph, it is because they are smaller than the symbol used to mark that point in
the graph. Moreover, when I say that a certain result is significantly better than another,
I mean statistically significantly better, according to a t-test where p < 0.01, unless I
explicitly give a p value.
First, I show the winning rates of the teams in Figure 8.3. This result is not yet
evaluating the quality of my prediction, it is merely background information that I will
1Except for GnuGo, all other agents use Monte Carlo Tree Search. However, each software was
developed by different groups, and use different heuristics and implementation strategies. In comparison
with the other teams studied, this is the team with the greater diversity.
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use when analyzing my prediction results later. On 9x9 Go, uniform is better than diverse
with statistical significance (p = 0.014), and both teams are clearly significantly better
than intermediate (p < 2.2 × 10−16). On 13x13 and 17x17 Go, the difference between
diverse and uniform is not statistically significant (p = 0.9619 and 0.5377, respectively).
On 21x21 Go, the diverse team is significantly better than uniform (p = 0.03897).
In order to verify my online predictions, I used the evaluation of the original Fuego,
but I give it a time limit 50× longer. I will refer to this version as “Baseline”. I, then,
use the Baseline’s evaluation of a given board state to estimate its probability of victory,
allowing a comparison with my approach. Considering that an evaluation above 0.5 is
“success” and below is “failure”, I compare my predictions with the ones given by the
Baseline’s evaluation, at each turn of the games.
I use this method because the likelihood of victory changes dynamically during a
game. That is, a team could be in a winning position at a certain stage, after making
several good moves, but suddenly change to a losing position after committing a mistake.
Similarly, a team could be in a losing position after several good moves from the opponent,
but suddenly change to a winning position after the opponent makes a mistake. Therefore,
simply comparing with the final outcome of the game would not be a good evaluation.
However, for the interested reader, I show in Appendix B how the evaluation would be
comparing with the final outcome of the game — and I note here that our prediction
quality is still high in such alternative.
Since the games have different lengths, I divide all games in 20 stages, and show the
average evaluation of each stage, in order to be able to compare the evaluation across
all games uniformly. Therefore, a stage is defined as a small set of turns (on average,
1.35 ± 0.32 turns in 9 × 9; 2.76 ± 0.53 in 13 × 13; 4.70 ± 0.79 in 17 × 17; 7.85 ± 0.87 in
21× 21). For all games, I also skip the first 4 moves, since my baseline returns corrupted
information in the beginning of the games.
I will present my results in four different sections. First, I will show the analysis for a
fixed threshold (that is, the value ϑ above which the output of my prediction function fˆ
will be considered “success”). Secondly, I am going to analyze across different thresholds
using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, and the area under such curves
(AUC). Thirdly, I will present the results for different board sizes. Then, finally, I will
study the performance of the reduced feature vector.
8.4.1.1 Single Threshold Analysis
I start by showing my results for a fixed threshold, since it gives a more intuitive under-
standing of the quality of my prediction technique. Hence, in these results I will consider
that when my prediction function fˆ returns a value above 0.5 for a certain game, it will
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be classified as “success”, and when the value is below 0.5, it will be classified as “failure”.
In this section I also restrict myself to the 9x9 Go case.
I will evaluate my prediction results according to five different metrics: Accuracy,
Failure Precision, Success Precision, Failure Recall, Success Recall. Accuracy is defined
as the sum of the true positives and true negatives, divided by the total number of tests
(i.e., true positives, true negatives, false positives, false negatives). Hence, it gives an
overall view of the quality of the classification. Precision gives the percentage of data
points classified with a certain label (“success” or “failure”) that are correctly labeled.
Recall denotes the percentage of data points that truly pertain to a certain label, that
are correctly classified.
I show the results in Figure 8.4. As we can see, we were able to obtain a high-
accuracy very quickly, already crossing the 0.5 line in the 2nd stage for all teams. In fact,
the accuracy is significantly higher than the 0.5 mark for all teams after the 2nd stage
(and for diverse and intermediate since the 1st stage).
From around the middle of the games (stage 10), the accuracy for diverse and uniform
already gets close to 60% (with intermediate only close behind). Although we can see
some small drops – that could be explained by the sudden changes in the game –, overall
the accuracy increases with the game stage number, as expected. Moreover, for most of
the stages, the accuracy is higher for diverse than for uniform. The prediction for diverse
is significantly better than for uniform in 90% of the stages. It is also interesting to note
that the prediction for intermediate is significantly better than for uniform in 60% of the
stages, even though intermediate is a significantly weaker team. In fact, we can see that
in the last stage, the accuracy, the failure precision and the failure recall is significantly
better for intermediate than for the other teams.
8.4.1.2 Multiple Threshold Analysis
I now measure my results under a variety of thresholds (that is, the value ϑ above which
the output of our prediction function fˆ will be considered “success”). In order to perform
this study, I use receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. An ROC curve shows
the true positive and the false positive rates of a binary classifier at different thresholds.
The true positive rate is the number of true positives divided by the sum of true positives
and false negatives (i.e., the total number of items of a given label). That is, the true
positive rate shows the percentage of “success” cases that are correctly labeled as such.
The false positive rate, on the other hand, is the number of false positives divided by the
sum of false positives and true negatives (i.e., the total number of items that are not of a
given label). That is, the false positive rate shows the percentage of “failure” cases that
are wrongly classified as “success”.
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Figure 8.4: Performance metrics over all turns of 9x9 Go games.
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Hence, ROC curves allow us to better understand the trade-off between the true
positives and the false positives of a given classifier. By varying the threshold, we can
increase the number of items that receive a given label, increasing henceforth the number
of items of such label that are correctly classified, but at the cost of also increasing the
number of items that incorrectly receive the same label.
The ideal classifier is the one on the upper left corner of the ROC graph. Such point
(true positive rate = 1, false positive rate = 0) indicates that every item classified with a
certain label truly pertains to such label, and every item that truly pertains to such label
receives the correct classification.
In this chapter, I do not aim only on studying the performance of a single classifier,
but rather on comparing the performance of our prediction technique on a variety of
situations, changing the team and the action space size (i.e., the board size). Hence,
I also study the area under the ROC curve (AUC), as a way to synthesize the quality
information from the curve into a single number. The higher the AUC, the better the
prediction quality of my technique in a given situation. That is, a completely random
classifier would have an AUC of 0.5, and as the ROC curve moves towards the top-left
corner of the graph, the AUC gets closer and closer to 1.0.
In fact, the AUC metric has been shown to be equal to the probability of, given
two pair of items with different labels (one “success” case and one “failure” case, in our
situation), correctly considering the item that was truly a “success” as more likely to
be a “success” case than the other item. It has also been shown to be related to other
important statistical metrics, such as the Wilcoxon test of ranks, the Mann-Whitney U
and the Gini coefficient [Hanley and McNeil, 1982, Mason and Graham, 2002, Hand and
Till, 2001].
I start by studying multiple thresholds in a fixed board size (9x9), and in the next
section I study the effect of increasing the action space. Hence, in Figure 8.5 I show
the ROC curves for all teams in the 9x9 Go games, for 4 different stages of the game.
Although in the beginning of the game (stage 5) it is hard to distinguish the results for
the different teams, we can note that from the middle of the games to the end (stage
15 and 20), there is a clear distinction between the prediction quality for diverse and
intermediate, when compared with the one for uniform, across many different thresholds.
As mentioned, to formally compare these results across all stages I use the AUC metric.
Hence, in Figure 8.6, I show the AUC for the three different teams in 9x9 Go. As we can
see, the three teams have similar AUCs up to stage 10, but from that stage on we can
get better AUCs for both diverse and intermediate, significantly outperforming the AUC
for uniform in all stages. We also find that, considering all stages, we have a significantly
better AUC for diverse (than for uniform) in 85% of the cases, and for intermediate
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Figure 8.5: ROC curves, analyzing different thresholds in 9x9 Go.
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Figure 8.6: AUC for diverse, uniform and intermediate teams, in 9x9 Go.
in 55% of the cases. Curiously, we can also note that even though intermediate is the
weakest team, we can obtain for it the (significantly) best AUC in the last stage of the
games, surpassing the AUC found for the other teams. Overall, these results show that
my hypothesis that we can make better predictions for teams that have higher diversity
holds irrespective of the threshold used for classification. On the next section, I study
the effect of increasing the action space size.
8.4.1.3 Action Space Size
Let us start by showing, in Figure 8.7, ROC curves for diverse and uniform under different
board sizes. It is harder to distinguish the curves on stages 5 and 10, but we can notice
that the curve for 21x21 tends to dominate the others on stages 15 and 20. Again, to
better study these results, we look at how the AUC changes for different teams and board
sizes.
In Figure 8.8 we can see the AUC results. For the diverse team (Figure 8.8 (a)), we
start observing the effect of increasing the action space after stage 5, when the curves for
17 × 17 and 21 × 21 tends to dominate the other curves. In fact, the AUC for 17 × 17
is significantly better than smaller boards in 60% of the stages, and in 80% of the stages
after stage 5. Moreover, after stage 5 no smaller board is significantly better than 17×17.
Concerning 21×21, we can see that from stage 14, its curve completely dominates all the
other curves. In all stages from 14 to 20 the result for 21× 21 is significantly better than
for all other smaller boards. Hence, we can note that the effect of increasing the action











































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8.8: AUC for different teams and board sizes, organized by teams.
Concerning the uniform team (Figure 8.8 (b)), up to 17 × 17 we cannot observe a
positive impact of the action space size on the prediction quality; but for 21× 21 there is
clearly an improvement from the middle game when compared with smaller boards. On
all 8 stages from stage 13 to stage 20, the result for 21 × 21 is significantly better than
for other board sizes.
In terms of percentage of stages where the result for 21 × 21 is significantly better
than for 9×9, we find that it is 40% for the uniform team, while it is 85% for the diverse
team. Hence, the impact of increasing the action space occurs for diverse earlier in the
game, and over a larger number of stages.
Now, in order to compare the performance for diverse and uniform under different
board sizes, I show the AUCs in Figure 8.9 organized by the size of the board (Figure
8.6 is repeated here in Figure 8.9 (a) to make it easier to observe the difference between
board sizes). It is interesting to observe that the quality of the predictions for diverse is
better than for uniform, irrespective of the size of the action space. Moreover, while for
9 × 9 and 13 × 13 the prediction for diverse is only always significantly better than for
uniform after around stage 10, we can notice that for 17× 17 and 21× 21, the prediction
for diverse is always significantly better than for uniform, irrespective of the stage (except
for stage 1 in 17× 17). In fact, I can also show that the difference between the teams is
greater on larger boards. In Figure 8.10 we can see the difference between diverse and
uniform, in terms of area under the AUC graph, and also in terms of percentage of stages
where diverse is significantly better than uniform, for 9× 9 and 21× 21. The difference
between the areas in 9× 9 and 21× 21 is statistically significant, with p = 0.0003337.
I study again the accuracy, precision and recall in 21 × 21, as the results in these
metrics may be more intuitive to understand for most readers (although limited to a fixed
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(b) By percentage of stages
Figure 8.10: Differences in prediction quality for the diverse and uniform teams.
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threshold, in this case 0.5). I show these results in Figure 8.11, where for comparison I
also plot the results for 9×9. For the diverse team, the accuracy in 21×21 is consistently
significantly better than in 9× 9, in all stages from stage 12. We also have a significantly
better accuracy in the first 5 stages. Concerning uniform, the accuracy for 21 × 21 is
only consistently better from stage 15 (and also in stage 1). Hence, again, we can notice
a better prediction quality on larger boards, and also a higher impact of increasing the
action space size on diverse than on uniform (in terms of number of stages, and also how
early the performance improves).
8.4.1.4 Reduced Feature Vector
Finally, I study the reduced feature vector. The results are very similar to the ones
using the full feature vector, so I do not repeat them here. I note, however, that we can
obtain similar results with a much more scalable representation2. In fact, in Figure 8.12
I study the area under the AUC graphs of the full and reduced representations, for all
combinations of teams and board sizes. Surprisingly, the reduced representation turns out
to be significantly better for all teams on the 9× 9 and 13× 13 boards. This may happen
since it is easier to learn a model with less features. For the diverse team, however, the
importance of the full representation increases as the action space grows. On 17×17, the
difference between the representations is not statistically significant (p = 0.9156), while
on 21 × 21 the full representation is actually significantly better than the reduced one
(p = 0.001794).
8.4.2 Ensemble Learning
In this section, I demonstrate that my approach also applies to other domains, by using
my technique in order to predict the performance of an ensemble system. Note that I am
not using here an ensemble system to predict the performance of a team. I am still using
a single predictor function, but now the team of agents whose final performance we want
to predict is a set of classifiers voting in order to assign labels to sets of items. Hence,
an agent here corresponds to one classifier, an action corresponds to a label assignment,
and a world state corresponds to an item.
I use the scikit-learn’s digits dataset [Pedregosa et al., 2011], which is composed of
1797 8× 8 images. Each image is a hand-written digit, and the objective of the ensemble
is to correctly identify the digit. Hence, for each item (i.e., image), there are 10 possible
labels, corresponding to each possible digit, and only one of these labels will be a correct
2All my main conclusions still hold, except that this time the AUC for 21 × 21 is significantly better
than for 9× 9 around stage 15 for both teams.
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Diverse Uniform IntermediateDiverse Uniform Diverse Uniform Diverse Uniform
9x9 13x13 17x17 21x21
Figure 8.12: Comparison of prediction quality with the full and reduced representation.
classification. I randomly select 1000 items for training the agents. Among the chosen
1000 samples, 400 randomly selected items are used in training each individual agent. I
use the remaining 797 items for the testing phase, where the agents will vote to assign
labels to sets of 50 items randomly sampled from the remaining 797. To avoid confusion,
note that I am referring here to the training process of the individual agents, not of my
team prediction methodology (which I will discuss later in this section).
I use 6 classification algorithms: SVM, Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, Nearest
Neighbour, Bernoulli Naive Bayes, Gaussian Naive Bayes. Each classification algorithm
corresponds to one agent. I study two different teams. Diverse 1, composed by copies
of the SVM agent with different parametrizations; and Diverse 2, composed by one copy
of each agent. Unlike in the Go domain, where multiple copies of the same agent (like
Fuego), would still vote for different actions due to the randomness involved in the rollouts
of the UCT Monte Carlo algorithm, a classifier is deterministic given its algorithm and
parametrization. Therefore, I do not present results for Uniform in this domain, and
instead I present two possible variations for a diverse team.
I define one instance of the problem solving process as a set of 50 items to be classified.
Similar to the previous domain, where we have a large set of games (each with a set of
turns), we will have here multiple sets of 50 items to be classified (each corresponding to
one world state). Each set of items is constructed from random sampling 50 items from
our testing set (i.e., the 797 items that were not used to train the agents).
The agents will vote to assign labels for each item, and the problem solving process
will be completed when the team assigns a label to each one of the 50 items. If the
team classifies correctly more than a threshold percentage of the items, I consider it a
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“Success”. Otherwise, the performance of the team is classified as “Failure”. I explain
below how the threshold is calculated.
I randomly generate 2500 sets in this fashion. I will now discuss the training of my
team prediction methodology. I randomly select 2000 sets for training, where the agents
voted to classify each item, as discussed (note that the training set previously discussed
in this section was used to train the individual agents). I use the mean performance over
these 2000 sets as our threshold. Hence, if the team is able to classify a higher number
of items than its average performance, I consider it a “success”. Otherwise, the problem
solving process will be classified as “failure”.
The remaining sets are used to test my team prediction methodology. I again evaluate
accuracy, precision and recall. One run consists of the ensemble evaluating one set of
items, and the performance metric at each stage will be calculated as the average over
500 runs (similarly as in the Computer Go case, where I evaluated across multiple games).
As before, I use random sub-sampling evaluation. Hence, the whole training and
testing procedure is repeated 50 times; and at each time the training and the testing set
(of my team prediction methodology) are randomly sampled from the full database of
runs. Again, in all graphs I show the average results, and the error bars show the 99%
confidence interval (p = 0.01), according to a t-test. When I say that a certain result is
significantly better than another, I mean statistically significantly better, according to a
t-test where p < 0.01, unless I explicitly give a p value.
I show the results in Figure 8.13, where each stage corresponds to an item to be
classified. As we can see, we are able to obtain high quality predictions for both teams
quickly. The accuracy for both teams is always significantly higher than 50% after Stage
3. Around the middle of the runs (i.e., Stage 25), the accuracy of Diverse 1 is already
around 60%, with Diverse 2 only close behind. Towards the end of the runs we obtain
around 70% accuracy for Diverse 1 and 60% accuracy for Diverse 2. Note that we also
obtain results significantly better than 50% for most of the stages in the other performance
metrics.
In Figure 8.14, we can see the results using the reduced feature vector. As we can
see, we can still obtain high-quality predictions in a more compact representation. This
holds especially for Diverse 1, as we obtain an accuracy higher than 70% towards the end
of the runs.
8.5 Analysis of Coefficients
I analyze the coefficients that are learned in my experiments, in order to better under-
stand the prediction functions. I focus here in analyzing the reduced feature vector in
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Figure 8.13: Performance metrics over a set of items in ensemble system classification
(full feature vector).
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Figure 8.14: Performance metrics over a set of items in ensemble system classification
(reduced feature vector).
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the Computer Go domain, as its lower number of coefficients makes the analysis more
practicable (and its results are similar to the ones with the full feature vector). Hence,
I study the different coefficients learned for each subset size (i.e., the size of the subset
of agents that agrees on the chosen action), under different teams and board sizes. As
a way to make a comparison among the coefficients under different situations, I plot the
normalized coefficients, by dividing each by their overall sum. This allows us to study
how the relative importance of each coefficient in determining whether a team will be
successful changes under different situations. Similarly to the previous section, I also plot
error bars showing the 99% confidence interval (i.e., p = 0.01) by performing a t − test
over the results of my random subsampling validation.
I start by plotting, in Figure 8.15, the coefficients organized according to the board
sizes, to better compare how they change for each team. Note that the closer to 0 a
coefficient is (i.e., the lower the bar size in the graphs), the higher the importance of the
corresponding subset size in determining that a game will be a victory for the team. Also,
the numbers on the x axis indicate the respective subset size.
We can make several observations from these graphs. First, note that in general
the learned coefficients are quite stable, as the low error bars indicate a low variance
across different samples. Second, for almost all the coefficients we have a statistically
significant difference across the different teams. This indicates that the learned functions
are not trivial, as the appropriate values for each coefficient strongly depends on the team
members.
Furthermore, we normally would expect the coefficients to increase (i.e., get closer
to 0) as the respective subset size increases, capturing the notion that the higher the
agreement, the higher the likelihood of success. However, that is not always the case,
and we can, in fact, observe many surprising coefficients, especially in larger board sizes.
On 21 × 21 Go, the “strict increase” hypothesis does not happen for both the diverse
and the uniform teams. The coefficient for subsets of size 1 for the uniform team is the
most surprising result, as it seems to indicate some tendency of winning the games when
the agents fully disagree. For intermediate, we can notice such non-strict increase even
on 9 × 9 Go (as the coefficient for subsets of size 4 is significantly higher than the one
for subsets of size 5), which may be caused by this being the weakest team (and, hence,
more agents agreeing on the same action may not really indicate a higher likelihood of
the action being optimal).
In order to better analyze how the coefficients change as the board size increases,
I plot in Figure 8.16 the coefficients organized by teams. It is interesting to note that
the coefficients evolve in different ways for the different teams. For diverse, we notice
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(d) 21x21
Figure 8.15: Normalized coefficients of all teams and board sizes, organized by board
sizes.
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surpassing subsets of size 4. One possible explanation could be that in such board size the
team is more likely correct when the three strongest agents are in (exclusive) agreement.
For the uniform team the results are even more surprising. We can notice a consistent
increase in the importance of subsets of size 1. This seems to indicate that the team is
more likely to be winning when the team is in full disagreement as the board size grows,
which does not correspond well with the ST agent model. The ST agent model, however,
was originally created to model diverse teams (Chapter 4), hence a deviation on uniform
teams could be expected. Perhaps this result may happen because the games where the
agents fully disagree tend to be more complex, and the uniform team may be in a higher
advantage on dealing with such complex positions than its opponent.
It is worthy of notice that even though the prediction functions for these teams are so
different, and evolve in such different ways as the number of actions increases, we could
still learn them adequately for all these different situations, always obtaining high-quality
prediction results. This shows that my learning methodology is robust, as it is able to
learn good prediction functions for a variety of situations.
8.6 Discussion
I show, both theoretically and experimentally, that we can make high-quality predictions
about the performance of a team of voting agents, using only information about the
frequency of agreements among them. I present two kinds of feature vectors, one that
includes information about which specific agents were involved in an agreement and one
that only uses information about how many agents agreed. Although the number of fea-
tures in the former increases exponentially with the number of agents, causing scalability
concerns, the latter representation scales much better, as it increases linearly. Theoret-
ically, the full feature vector should have better results in general, but as I discuss in
Corollary 8.3.5, the reduced representation approximates well the full one under some
conditions. In fact, however, in my experiments we find that, although the results are
similar, the reduced representation is statistically significantly better in most cases. This
may happen since it is easier to learn a model with less features. Hence, for large teams
we can safely use the reduced feature vector, avoiding scalability problems.
Moreover, in real applications we usually do not have extremely large teams of vot-
ing agents. Unless we have an “idealized” diverse team, the performance is expected to
converge after a certain number of agents (Chapter 6). In Chapters 3 and 4, significant
improvements are already obtained with only 6 agents, while Chapter 6 shows little im-
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(c) Intermediate Team
Figure 8.16: Normalized coefficients of all teams and board sizes, organized by teams.
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8.3.5 does not apply, and the reduced vector is not a good approximation, the scalability
of the full feature vector might not be a real concern.
Based on classical voting theory, and in my Proposition 8.3.1, Observation 8.3.2 and
Proposition 8.3.3, we would expect the predictions to work better for the uniform team,
if it is composed of copies of the best agent. However, I present a more general model
in Theorem 8.3.4, that does not really depend on plurality being a maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE). In fact, I show in my experiments that the prediction works significantly
better for the diverse team, and I explain this phenomenon in Corollary 8.3.6. Moreover,
the prediction for intermediate works as well as for the other teams, and also significantly
better than for the other teams towards the last stages of the games, even though it is
a significantly weaker team. We would not expect this result, based on classical voting
theory and Proposition 8.3.1, Observation 8.3.2 and Proposition 8.3.3. We can, however,
expect such result based on my more general model in Theorem 8.3.4, as I show that the
prediction does not really depend at all on plurality being a MLE. Hence, it can still work
well in cases where the team is weaker, and the MLE assumption does not hold well.
We also observed that the quality of my prediction increases significantly as the board
size increases, for both the diverse and the uniform team, but the impact for diverse
occurs earlier in the game, and over a larger number of stages. I explain such phenomenon
in Theorem 8.3.7. As normally complex problems are characterized by having a large
action space, this shows that we can make better predictions for harder problems, when
it is actually more useful to be able to make predictions about the team performance.
As I study the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, and the respective
Areas Under the Curves (AUC), I can also show that my experimental conclusions hold
irrespective of how we interpret the output of the prediction function. Hence, we find
that across many different thresholds we can still make better predictions for the diverse
team, and the prediction quality still improves in larger boards. We also notice that
the difference on the prediction quality for diverse and uniform teams increases in larger
boards.
I analyze the coefficients of the reduced feature vector, and note that they are highly
non-trivial. The way the coefficient for subsets of size 1 evolves for the uniform team is
the most surprising result, and seems to suggest that the performance improves for such
team for a different reason than the one presented in Theorem 8.3.7. As the theorem
assumes ST agents, however, we can expect it to cover better the situation of the diverse
team. A better understanding of why the coefficients turned out to be how they are
is an interesting direction for future work. Nevertheless, it is a positive result that my
learning technique could work well and learn adequate prediction functions across all
these different situations.
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I also applied my technique to the Ensemble Learning domain, where I was able to
predict the final performance of a team of classifiers in a dataset of hand-written digits
recognition. This shows that my model is really domain independent, as it worked well
in two completely different domains.
However, although I showed a great performance in prediction, I did not present
in this chapter what an operator should actually do as the prediction of failure goes
high. Possible remedial procedures (and the relative qualities of each one of them) vary
according to each domain, but here I discuss some possible situations.
For example, consider a complex problem being solved in a cluster of computers. We
do not want to overly allocate resources, as that would be a waste of computational power
that could be allocated to other tasks (or a waste of electrical energy, at the very least).
However, we could increase the allocation of resources for solving the current problem
when it becomes necessary, according to our prediction.
While playing a game, it is well known that the best strategy changes according to
each specific opponent we are facing [Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2011, Southey et al., 2005,
Lockett et al., 2007, Schadd et al., 2007, Bakkes et al., 2009]. However, it is in general
hard to know which player is our current antagonist. Therefore, we could start playing
the game with the team that works the best against general opponents, and dynamically
change the team as our prediction of failure goes high, trying to adapt to the current
situation.
Moreover, it is known that the best voting rule depends on the noise model of the
agents [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005]. However, in general, such model is not known for
existing agents (Chapter 3). Therefore, we could start by playing a game with a very
general rule, such as plurality voting, and dynamically try different voting rules according
to our current prediction. Note that although Proposition 8.3.1, Observation 8.3.2 and
Proposition 8.3.3 refer to plurality voting, my general model presented in Theorem 8.3.4
does not really depend on the voting rule.
Finally, in this chapter I always trained and tested my classifier under similar condi-
tions, as in traditional machine learning approaches. Training and testing under different
conditions leads to a transfer learning problem, which is a current topic of research in
the machine learning literature [Banerjee and Stone, 2007, Konidaris et al., 2012, Taylor
and Stone, 2009]. Hence, exploring transfer learning in the context of my technique is an
interesting direction for future work.
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8.7 Conclusion
Voting is a widely applied domain independent technique, that has been used in a variety
of domains, such as: machine learning, crowdsourcing, board games, forecasting systems,
etc. In this chapter, I present a novel method to predict the performance of a team
of agents that vote together at every step of a complex problem. My method does not
use any domain knowledge and is based only on the frequencies of agreement among the
agents.
I explain theoretically why my prediction works. First, I present an explanation based
on classical voting theories, but such explanation fails to fully explain my experimental
results. Hence, I also present a more general model, that is independent of the voting
rule, and also independent of any optimality assumptions about the voting rule (i.e., the
voting rule does not need to be a maximum likelihood estimator across all world states).
Such model allows a deeper understanding of the prediction methodology, and a more
complete comprehension of my experimental results.
I perform experiments in the Computer Go domain with three different teams, each
having different levels of diversity and strength (i.e., performance), and four different
board sizes. I showed that the prediction works online at each step of the problem solving
process, and matches often with an in-depth analysis (that takes orders of magnitude
longer time). Hence, I could achieve a high prediction quality for all teams, despite their
differences. In particular, I show that, contrary to what would be expected based on
classical voting models, my prediction is not better for stronger teams, and can actually
work equally well (even significantly better in some cases) for a very weak team. Moreover,
I showed that I could achieve a higher prediction quality for a diverse team than for a
uniform team. Furthermore, I verified experimentally that the prediction quality increase
as the action space (board size) grows (and the impact occurs earlier in the game for the
diverse team). All that could be expected based on my more general model.
I also study the Receiver Operating Characteristic curves of my results, and their re-
spective Areas Under the Curves (AUC). Hence, I verified that my conclusions hold across
many different thresholds (i.e., different ways to interpret the output of my prediction
function).
Moreover, I tested my approach when predicting the final performance of a team of
classifiers, a domain that is very different than Computer Go. I was still able to obtain
high-quality predictions, showing that my approach really works across different domains.
Finally, I studied in detail the prediction functions learned. My analysis showed that
these functions are highly non-trivial, and vary significantly according to each team and
board size. In fact, better understanding how and why these coefficients evolved in the
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way they did as the board size grows for different teams is an open direction for further
study. Overall, however, my prediction technique is very robust, as it could learn adequate
functions across all these situations.
Therefore, a system operator can use my technique to take remedial procedures if the
team is not performing well, or incorporated within an automatic procedure to dynam-
ically change the team and/or the voting rule. I discussed in detail how that could be
executed in different domains.
Hence, this chapter is a significant step towards not only a deeper understanding of
voting systems, but also towards a greater applicability of voting in a variety of domains,
by combining the potential of voting in finding correct answers with the ability to access







This thesis presented theoretical and experimental results in decision-centered teamwork,
a novel paradigm in artificial intelligence. Decision-centered teamwork is the analysis of
agent teams that iteratively take joint decisions into solving complex problems. I divide
it in three fundamental challenges: Agent Selection, Aggregation of Opinions and Team
Assessment.
In Agent Selection, my main focus was on the importance of diversity when forming
teams. I presented three models: the first shows that a diverse team can outperform a
uniform team, and gives the necessary conditions for that to happen. The second shows
that diverse teams get stronger in large action spaces, allowing one to better identify when
diverse teams should be used. It introduces the novel model of spreading tail agents, which
assign a non-zero probability to a larger set of actions as the action space increases. The
third model studies agent teams for design problems, where the focus is on providing a
large set of optimal actions, for a human to select according to aesthetics or other factors.
I show that diverse teams improve as the number of agents grows, while uniform teams
actually decrease in performance.
In Aggregation of Opinions, I studied ranking extraction techniques, and showed in
the Computer Go domain that the Borda voting rule outperforms plurality when using
the ranking by sampling technique, which ranks actions according to how frequently they
are played when sampling an agent multiple times. However, in the context of influencing
social networks, weighted plurality was still the best voting rule.
I also studied the simultaneous influencing and mapping problem, where we must
iteratively discover a network and spread influence at the same time. That was the only
part of the thesis that does not concern voting, but rather a linear combination over two
greedy algorithms. I showed that under some conditions, we can spread influence as well
as the classical greedy influence maximization algorithm, but mapping the network much
better.
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Concerning Team Assessment, I presented a novel technique to predict whether a
team of voting agents will be successful or will fail while solving a complex problem.
My prediction can be performed online, and it is completely domain independent. I
demonstrate its effectiveness in the Computer Go domain, and in the Ensemble Learning
domain, and I also showed that the quality of the prediction increases in large action
spaces.
Although this thesis presents several contributions, in order to effectively use multi-
agent teams to jointly take decisions into solving complex problems much more must be
developed. Some topics I will investigate in my future work include:
Dynamic Teams: For effective teamwork, we must dynamically change teams. Hence,
we need to further develop assessment mechanisms, and also methods to decide how to
switch members and coordination methods according to the assessment results and the
problem state.
Agent Adaptation for Teamwork: Although some agents may already exist for a
certain problem, most often they were not originally designed to coordinate with others,
or were not designed to coordinate using our desired mechanism. Therefore, enabling
an easy re-use of agents for teamwork will open the doors for a large number of agents
available to choose from.
Team Generation: For many problems we may not even have a few agents available to
choose from; in fact, there could be only one agent. My research shows, however, that
diversity is an important factor in teamwork. Therefore, given a “basic” agent, automatic
methods to create diverse variations of it are very desirable, as a way to easily form diverse
teams. As I showed in the thesis, generating random parametrizations of an agent is not
yet a good solution; as the resulting team may still have limited diversity, besides the
risk of the individual members being too weak in comparison with the “basic” agent.
Mixed Teams: In order to effectively use human input, AI systems must present complex
and large-scale information in a manageable way, while simultaneously gaining user trust.
Additionally, we must not assume that an “optimal” AI system is always “correct”, since
any model has limitations. Hence, the system must also respect and trust the user opinion,
delegating when necessary and even changing its own behavior accordingly. Besides, I
believe that an interaction between a human and the computer is essential when handling
projects related to arts and creativity.
Simultaneous Influencing and Mapping: In Chapter 7, I studied the problem of
learning a social network graph, while spreading influence. However, in order to effectively
solve this problem, a deeper study is necessary. In particular, it is important to better
understand how we can estimate beforehand the amount of information that we will
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obtain when interviewing one node (according, for example, to its profile). We must also
understand better how the information provided by a node correlates with the list of
neighbors in the social network graph. That is, we must understand how likely will be
someone to teach us about each one of his/her friends, and how likely would he/she teach
us about nodes that are further away in the social network graph; allowing us to better
model the knowledge gain at each intervention, and hence improve our performance.
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Simultaneous Influencing and Mapping: Additional
Results
A.1 Results for each network
Since in Section 7.3 I presented my results across 4 different social network graphs, in this
section I present those individually for each network, for the interested reader. Assuming
a uniform model for the teaching lists, we can see the results for network A in Figures A.1,
A.2, A.3; for network B in Figures A.4, A.5, A.6; for the Facebook network in Figures A.7,
A.8, A.9; and finally for the MySpace network in Figures A.10, A.11, A.12. Assuming a
power law model, we can see the results for network A in Figures A.13, A.14, A.15; for
network B in Figures A.16, A.17, A.18; for the Facebook network in Figures A.19, A.20,
A.21; and finally for the MySpace network in Figures A.22, A.23, A.24. As we can see,
the results for each network show similar tendencies as the results across all networks
presented in the thesis.
A.2 Additional results for power law distribution
In Section 7.3.2 I presented results for the power law distribution for a = 1.8. In this
section, I present results for a = 1.2 (that is, each neighbor has a 20% probability of
being in a teaching list). I show in Figure A.25 the result at each intervention for ϕ = 0.5
and p = 0.5. In Figure A.26, I show the AUC results for different parametrizations of p
and ϕ. Finally, I present the regret for this case in Figure A.27. As we can see, my main
conclusions still hold for a different parametrization of a.
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.1: Results for network A across many interventions, for influence probability
p = 0.5, teaching probability ϕ = 0.5, assuming uniform distribution.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.2: Results of Influence and Knowledge in network A for different teaching and
influence probabilities, assuming uniform distribution.














p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.3: Regret in network A for different teaching and influence probabilities, as-
suming uniform distribution.
202



















































































(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.4: Results for network B across many interventions, for influence probability
p = 0.5, teaching probability ϕ = 0.5, assuming uniform distribution.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.5: Results of Influence and Knowledge in network B for different teaching and
influence probabilities, assuming uniform distribution.














p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.6: Regret in network B for different teaching and influence probabilities, assum-
ing uniform distribution.
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.7: Results for Facebook network across many interventions, for influence prob-
ability p = 0.5, teaching probability ϕ = 0.5, assuming uniform distribution.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.8: Results of Influence and Knowledge in Facebook network for different teaching
and influence probabilities, assuming uniform distribution.

















p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.9: Regret in Facebook network for different teaching and influence probabilities,
assuming uniform distribution.
206












































































(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.10: Results for MySpace network across many interventions, for influence prob-
ability p = 0.5, teaching probability ϕ = 0.5, assuming uniform distribution.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.11: Results of Influence and Knowledge in MySpace network for different teach-
ing and influence probabilities, assuming uniform distribution.














p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.12: Regret in MySpace network for different teaching and influence probabilities,
assuming uniform distribution.
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.13: Results for network A across many interventions, for influence probability
p = 0.5, teaching probability ϕ = 0.5, assuming power law distribution.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.14: Results of Influence and Knowledge in network A for different teaching and
influence probabilities, assuming power law distribution.













p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.15: Regret in network A for different teaching and influence probabilities, as-
suming power law distribution.
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.16: Results for network B across many interventions, for influence probability
p = 0.5, teaching probability ϕ = 0.5, assuming power law distribution.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.17: Results of Influence and Knowledge in network B for different teaching and
influence probabilities, assuming power law distribution.













p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.18: Regret in network B for different teaching and influence probabilities, as-
suming power law distribution.
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.19: Results for Facebook network across many interventions, for influence prob-
ability p = 0.5, teaching probability ϕ = 0.5, assuming power law distribution.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.20: Results of Influence and Knowledge in Facebook network for different teach-
ing and influence probabilities, assuming power law distribution.

















p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.21: Regret in Facebook network for different teaching and influence probabili-
ties, assuming power law distribution.
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.22: Results for MySpace network across many interventions, for influence prob-
ability p = 0.5, teaching probability ϕ = 0.5, assuming power law distribution.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.23: Results of Influence and Knowledge in MySpace network for different teach-
ing and influence probabilities, assuming power law distribution.














p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.24: Regret in MySpace network for different teaching and influence probabilities,
assuming power law distribution.
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(c) Influence + Knowledge
Figure A.25: Results of 4 real world networks across many interventions, for p = 0.5 and
ϕ = 0.5, assuming power law distribution with a = 1.2.
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(a) Changing teaching probability



















(b) Changing influence probability
Figure A.26: Results of Influence and Knowledge for different teaching and influence
probabilities, assuming power law distribution with a = 1.2.















p = 0.1 p = 0.5
Figure A.27: Regret for different teaching and influence probabilities, assuming power
law distribution with a = 1.2. Lower results are better.
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Appendix B
Every Team Deserves a Second Chance: Additional
Results
In this chapter I present the results of my team assessment methodology (Chapter 8)
when comparing with the actual final outcome of the games, instead of using Fuego’s
evaluation. I show these results because some readers could be interested in seeing this
alternative evaluation methodology.
In Figure B.1 I show the accuracy, precision and recall for 9x9 Go games, while in
Figure B.2 I show the ROC curves for such games. In Figure B.3 we can see the ROC
results for all the 4 different board sizes, while I plot the AUC results with one graph per
team in Figure B.4. I also show the AUC results with one graph per board size in Figure
B.5. In Figure B.6 I plot the difference between the areas under the AUC graphs for
diverse and uniform, and also the percentage of stages where the prediction for diverse
is significantly better. Finally, in Figure B.7 I show the accuracy, precision and recall for
21× 21 Go (and also 9× 9 Go, for comparison). As we can see, the results are similar to
the previous ones, and my main conclusions still hold: we still can make better predictions
for the diverse team than for the uniform team, and we can observe a better quality when
predicting for 21 × 21 Go than smaller board sizes. We notice, however, that this time
the difference between diverse and uniform (both in terms of area under the AUC curves
and percentage of stages where the AUC for diverse is significantly better) is higher on
9× 9 Go than on 21× 21 Go.
I compare the full and the reduced representation under this alternative baseline as
well. In Figure B.8 I show the area under the AUC curves for all teams and board sizes
under consideration. Again, the results of both representations are similar1, but the
reduced one is significantly better in almost all cases.
1My main results still hold, except that the AUC for 21×21 is significantly better than for 9×9 earlier
for uniform than diverse under the reduced representation. For uniform, since stage 12, while for diverse,
since stage 15.
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Figure B.1: Performance metrics over all turns of 9x9 Go games. (Alternative baseline)
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Figure B.3: ROC curves for diverse and uniform, for different board sizes. (Alternative
baseline) 222
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Figure B.4: AUC for different teams and board sizes, organized by teams. (Alternative
baseline)
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(b) By percentage of stages
Figure B.6: Differences in prediction quality for the diverse and uniform teams. (Alter-
native baseline)
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Diverse Uniform IntermediateDiverse Uniform Diverse Uniform Diverse Uniform
9x9 13x13 17x17 21x21
Figure B.8: Comparison of prediction quality with the full and reduced representation.
(Alternative baseline)
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